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Abstract 
This thesis purports to understand the possibilities of sociology of ethics and morality through a 
theoretical interpretation and comparison of Jurgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, and thereby seeks 
to constitute a new sub-discipline within sociology. Thus an intense abstraction of the elements of 
sociology of ethics and morality from their general sociology is undertaken in order to collect the 
building blocks, and followed by a comparison on their theories to provide a deeper understanding and 
to prelude an establishment of a new theory. 
After a detailed interpretation and comparison of Habermas's discourse ethics and Luhmann's 
code of the moral, four tendencies of sociology of ethics and morality are induced: 1. the cancellation 
of the dichotomy of fact and value that embraced by classical sociologists in Habermas's and 
Luhmann's theories become the methodology; 2. along with the sublation of the philosophy of 
consciousness, the subject matters of ethics and morality in sociology have changed from action as the 
attribution centre to communication; 3. following this vein, at an ontological level, relation instead of 
unit becomes the underlying dynamic of social life; 4. the level of analysis prefers formal rather than 
substantive levels, in which Habermas's procedural ethics retains traces of substantive content in the 
tenet of formalism, yet Luhmann's moral code completely formalizes and functionalizes ethics and 
morality. 
Besides these tendencies, divergence appears at the point of conception of social order. For 
Habermas, a normal social order is as such a moral order, and yet a non-normative social order is 
yielded by Luhmann's adoption of the "order from noise principle" from cybernetics. Despite of this 
different understanding of morality at the level of social order, their convergence is indicated as well. 
Both the reflectivity of Habermas's communicative action and rational discourse, as well as 
Luhmann's self-referential and reflexive observations, highlight the prospect of sociology of ethics 
and morality: whatever a normative or non-normative perspective is adopted, reflectivity and 
reflexivity should be the core principle of sociology of ethics and morality, insofar as classical 




















I. The Problem: A Brief Introduction 
I.a. Research Problems 
It is not easy to map out the problematic of this thesis, which is as such a possibly 
elusive and controversial attempt to define the so-called "sociology of ethics and morality". 
Understanding the problem from its research question may help to ease for the time being the 
suspicion on the validity of the problematization. The main question can be split into two 
parts: methodological and theoretical. For the former, questions are raised regarding the long 
been taken for granted understanding of the moral phenomenon in sociology. Deeply 
influenced by positivistic science in its early years and subverted radically to another 
subjectivist dismissal of methodology by postmodernism in its recent development, the 
possibility of a sociological conceptualization of ethics and morality is, to say the least, only 
loosely thematized and problematized. 
The crux of the matter is that, from the perspective of ethics and morality, how can 
sociology be relevant to moral phenomena and social ethics? While viewed from sociology, 
the complexity of ethics and morality that constituted by moral sentiment, emotional feelings, 
political motivations, philosophical justification of goodness, and so forth would increase the 
difficulty of understanding. Both sides are reluctant to concede the lack of communication 
and understanding of each other, let alone any modification of their own positions. As a result, 
unproductive unilateral theoretical inquiries emerged and suffused the field—for example, 
positivistic approaches are proned to objectify morality to be social facts, and hermeneutic 
theories are likely to entrap moral phenomenon to the endless interpretation process. 
In addition to the methodological problem, lights should be shed on the theoretical 
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perplexity involved, which is closely related to the impoverished theoretical research in the 
field. Much attention is given to reason instead of morality in the theoretical discourse of 
modernity, thus the crucial relations between morality, social order, enlightenment, and the 
relevant concepts thus derived—meaning, value, communication, etc.一are rarely clarified. To 
theorize sociology of ethics and morality, therefore, cannot eschew the obligation to revisit 
and review the intermingled sociological foundations, which will in turn condition the 
direction of conceptualization. All these would, perhaps, indirectly realize the goal of this 
thesis: to understand the possibilities of sociology of ethics and morality through a theoretical 
interpretation and comparison ofHabermas's and Luhmann 's theories. 
I.b. The Subject Matters 
Before entering the core issue of this thesis, some effort spent on definition are 
indispensable. Ethics and morality are understood normatively by relating to their 
philosophical and political tradition. Yet, as the subject matter of sociology, ethics and 
morality would be conceived neutrally without the entanglement of ideological influence and 
disputes on definitions of good life. What interests sociology of ethics and morality is their 
formation of discourse, effects in communication, social meaning of moral action, and their 
structural relation to particular socio-historical context. These value-neutral sociological 
approaches are generally undertaken by the field and will be employed for this thesis. 
To achieve this goal, the general sociologies of Jurgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann 
are introduced as exemplars to uncover the potential and orientation of a contemporary 
sociology of ethics and morality. To note, the main theme of this thesis is not a comprehensive 
comparison between their theories, but rather focuses upon the constitution of a theoretical 
framework of sociology of ethics and morality, by way of the complementarity of their 
theories. In short, after some paragraphs be given to explicate Habermasian and Luhmannian 
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theories, analysis and abstraction of their peculiar formulation of sociology of ethics and 
morality will be undertaken to be the empirical basis of metatheoretical comparison. 
I.e. Conceptualization of the Subject Matters 
Conceptualization is the first step to thematize the problematic of this thesis. It is 
noteworthy that numerous sociological inquiries to ethics and morality are supported by 
historical researches in order to legitimize the empirical validity of the inquiries as such (e.g. 
Bellah et al. 1985; Putnam 2000). The surveying of historical data can also suffice to 
constitute a socio-historical discourse (cf. Marske 1996). This is not to say that this approach 
is totally invalid for this sub-discipline. Nevertheless, an integral theoretical framework is 
here prioritized. Reflections on the history of ethics and morality can concretely map out the 
socio-transformation of the latter. Whereas the weakness of this approach precisely appears 
also at this point—that is, emphases on the concrete historical data will at the same time 
overlook the integrity of abstract theory, which is definitely the groundwork of the former. 
Accomplishment of the latter would be achieved through the conceptualization that can go 
beyond historical description of the semantic of ethics and morality. 
The general definition of ethics and morality are usually distinguished from value per se, 
albeit they are one kind of values in the broad sense, in their specifically presupposing the 
orientation to goodness and disdain for evil. Ethics and morality have intense (even more 
intense than value as such) regulative functions by motivating as well as sanctioning 
particular deviated deeds. Furthermore, these two terms have different meanings; morality 
tends to depict the normative evaluation of particular intention, process, and consequence of 
an action, whereas ethics is as such a theoretical reflection on morality (Lee 1928). In 
sociology, ethics is a general term describing the collective value orientation of a particular 
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social group that defines "goodness" according to particular context (cf. Gamer 1994, p. 17), 
for example Max Weber's protestant ethics differs from morality, which requires attribution 
from individual conscience and proclaims a universal and objective essence (ibid.). Above all, 
ethics is defined with a certain extent of relative and descriptive feature and morality 
inevitably entails normative action orientations based on the basic conviction of the doctrines 
denoting the universal goodness. 
More specifically, a higher level of theoretical reflection on moral phenomenon is 
achieved by the sociology of ethics and morality, instead of merely clinging to the universal 
moral ideal, ideological conflicts or political propagandas of philosophic and political ethics. 
From a sociological perspective, ethics and morality are not confined to any particular social 
system~either intellectual system with metaphysical thinking or political system with the 
primacy of polity—but are abstracted to a more general and synthetic societal level that can 
overview each operation and consequences in every particular social subsystem. ^  This 
explains the necessity to resort to the general sociology of Habermas and Luhmann, as well as 
to call for a theoretical comparison on them. 
This argument can be further justified by referring to the inadequacies of philosophical 
and political conceptualizations of ethics and morality. Moral philosophy seeks to understand 
and justify the necessity of moral practices, and thereby adjudicate the meaning of and the 
way to a good life (cf. Weinstein and Weinstein 1992，pp. 137-141). In addition, political 
ethics furthers the practice of collective action regulation by the implementation of rules and 
laws，combined with philosophical ethics, to draw the boundary of right/wrong action.^ In 
short，justification and regulation of action are two underlying principal functions of 
1 Refer to Luhmann's systems theory, ethics and morality are semantics that wandering around social systems, 
and every social system is illegitimate to proclaim the overwhelming societal representation. See section 2.1. 
One could refer to Aristotle's Politics that in the very beginning politics is subordinated to philosophy, and 
both of them have a similar goal—to pursue a good life by artificial regulations on the collective behaviour. 
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philosophical and political ethics respectively. However, these two functions can readily 
degenerate into metaphysics and ideology, by the temptations of self-contained theoretical 
systems. A sociological reflection based on the survey of the socio-historical conditions can 
probably further the discussion on the taken-for-granted side of ethics and morality, as well as 
evade from the blind spots of philosophical and political ethics, i.e. an unreflective pursue of 
implementation of moral ideal. In other words, sociology reflects on every social phenomenon 
including ideology and metaphysical thinking, thus by definition one cannot confuse 
sociology of ethics and morality with its subject matter (ethics and morality in society). 
Despite the advantages of sociology, one should also be awared of the temptation of 
sociologism that subordinates all irreducible complexity of other knowledge systems under 
sociology, such that metatheoretical reflections on both the nature of sociology and ethics and 
morality should be adopted to extricate from one-sided foundationalist thinking. 
Conceptualization of sociology of ethics and morality does not end at the point of 
indirect discrimination of sociology from other disciplines. Several repercussions emerge to 
confront the problem of moral inquiry in social sciences. Despite their anti-positivistic 
position, their conclusion is that power mediates between social science and ethics indeed, 
which may seduce scientific inquiries to justify the extant powers since we always take the 
possibility of complicity in social conformity for granted, namely, we are blind to the 
imbalance power of interpretation between sociology and ethics and morality (Haan et al. 
1983，pp. 4-5). As such the primacy of social sciences as a self-critical and self-aware 
knowledge is emphasized, and through the reflexivity of the social sciences, an appropriate 
relationship between sociology and moral inquiry can thus be reestablished.^  Based on this 
perspective, empiricist approach is being criticized for their limitation on the justification of 
"oughtness", and similarly the deconstructionists' indifferent and cynical attitude toward the 
3 More details on the reflexivity and the sociology of ethics and morality will be shown in section 3.9. 
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radical relativism and historicism is also under judgment (ibid., p. 15), albeit Haan et. al 
concede that deconstructionism indeed provides alternatives to the hegemony of empiricism. 
Haan et. al's own limitations are also recognized by themselves. One of the problems is 
that whether a social science (and sociology in specific) with moral inquiry can be called a 
science in a more exact understanding of "science" (ibid., p. 8). This problem pervades also to 
general theoretical concepts, such as fact/value, rational/non-rational, and moral/non-moral, 
which need more elucidations 4 Another puzzle is that, albeit all contributors of that book 
have provided some perspectives for this theme, "on the whole they are modest in their claims 
and offer no grandiose solutions, [and they] prefer to open dialogues rather than to dictate 
answers" (Haan et al. 1983, p. 9). Yet, as a reference, their endeavors have actually reopened 
the discourse of sociology of ethics and morality at both theoretical and application levels. 
I.d. The Orientation of the Research: Habermas, Luhmann, and Theory 
Recalling the above argument, this thesis adopts a theoretical exploration of sociology of 
ethics and morality by selecting Habermas and Luhmann as the intellectual exemplars, instead 
of conducting qualitative or quantitative researches. This theoretical approach is justified by 
several reasons. First of all is a methodological matter.^  Quantitative researches with the 
routine statistical correlations tend to produce pure descriptive ethics (Stiver 1996), which are 
mainly positivistic and can rarely explore the underlying meaning and value of ethics and 
morality at both social and personal levels; while qualitative researches easily slipped to the 
expressions of subjective moral preferences. Both ways have their own shortcoming on 
methodology, but more important is that empirical researches are incapable to reflect on the 
validity of the method they use. Since the methodological polemics stemmed from positivist 
4 See section 3.6. 
Also see section Il.b. 
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and hermeneutic positions are not yet resolved at the research level, metatheoretical reflection 
on sociology has priority over the practice of extant methodologies. Only thus can the 
methodology of sociology of ethics and morality be more plausible, and discourse of 
Habermasian and Luhmannian theories would complement in this respect. 
The above methodological problems can be illustrated by several prominent literatures 
within the field. Ethics and morality are conceptualized as the manifested civil religion of the 
Americans in Robert Bellah et. al.'s eloquent research (1985), undertook by both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. In the book the contemporary conditions of the ethics of the 
Americans were mapped out and the functions of ethics and morality in the form of civil 
religion are captured. Similar to their research, arguing social capital as the crucial resources 
for communities' well-being, Robert Putnam claims that the moral sentiment embedded in the 
inter-personal relationships is declining in the United States (2000). Both Bellah et al. and 
Putnam rely on the empirical research conducted in a fixed temporal period of the United 
States, which is the commonest way for sociological researches with ethics and morality as 
the subject matters. Yet, the problem lies here is that the concept of ethics and morality as 
such are not carefully examined before undertaking empirical research, which may cause the 
problem of different research results not due to the different context but different concepts. 
Another approach concerns the importance of normative elements in the social sciences 
and the limits of rational thinking (Etzioni 1988), however, this conclusion may not help a lot 
to understand the concept of ethics and morality in social science as such. Actually, as early as 
in the century, Adam Smith had already avowed the crucial position of moral sentiment in 
the economic and social world at large (Smith 1976). Rather, the radical thinking of Zygmunt 
Bauman supersedes Etzioni's reduced scope of the relations between rationality and 
irrationality in social science, and probes into the nature of sociology as such to reexamine the 
consequence of taking ethics and morality as the subject matters of sociology. Ethics and 
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morality conceived by Bauman are the irreducible elements of- human life (1989)，that is, 
sociology only selectively reduces the formal and functional sides of ethics and morality, 
which will eventually denature the core sentimental elements of ethics and morality, that 
subsumed to be one of rational attributes of human actions. The establishment of the 
holocaust during World War II is the evidence of these theoretical manipulations of ethics and 
morality. In the holocaust, the logistic of killing Jews effectively undermined the moral reason 
of the Nazis, in which ethics and morality are detached from the care of the others and then 
become the deed of rules observance. In this way Bauman radically excludes the possibility of 
understanding ethics and morality authentically in sociology, and furthermore de-evaluates the 
importance of a rigorous sociology. This biased conception, of course, does not become the 
consensus within the field, but it draws our attention to the priority of re-conceptualizing 
ethics and morality in sociology. 
The second reason bases on practical concern. If one agreed with Parsons's analytical 
realism, then empirical researches should be undertaken only after the constitution of a 
mature theoretical framework (Parsons 1937). Since the objective of this thesis is to revisit 
and to clarify the not yet firmly established sub-discipline of sociology, a mature theoretical 
framework is practically precedent to empirical research if no framework is founded.^ 
The third reason relates to the objective of this thesis. What we are concern here is the 
properties, orientations, and possible ways to establish a rigid sociology of ethics and morality. 
In other words, current sociological researches are not suffice to understand ethics and 
morality comprehensively, and this thesis attempts to improve this situation. As shown in 
section Il.b.，empirical researches in this sub-discipline are still inadequate to generate a 
6 It is not to say that the empirical researches are meaningless for the sociology of ethics and morality, but these 
works are in essence the application of the theoretical frameworks of the sociology of ethics and morality. 
Besides, some attempts to inquire ethics and morality from sociological perspectives are fruitful for the 
particular context only (e.g. Bellah et al. 1985’ Hunt 2003), and yet they are inadequate to constitute a 
theoretical framework. 
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relatively satisfactory theoretical foundation for the raison d'etre of the sociology of ethics 
and morality, as long as they are confined by the conventional conceptions of ethics and 
morality to be either social facts or personal judgments. 
However, one may challenge that why this thesis focuses on Habermas and Luhmann but 
not other theorists, such as Weber and Durkheim. It is no doubt that two contrasting 
conceptions of society formulated by Durkheim and Weber—from the collectivist perspective 
and the individualist perspective—are basically the groundwork of sociology, nevertheless, 
new constellation of contemporary societies have undergone drastic transformation. And even 
if their theories are still significant, much refinements are still required to comprehend 
complex societies. Fortunately, their arguments have been inherited yet with revisions in both 
Habermasian and Luhmannian theory: Durkheimian vision on social integration is assimilated 
into Habermas's theory of communicative action, but at the same time Durkheim's 
functionalism based on the biological metaphor is best developed and exemplified in 
Luhmann's systems theory.^  Likewise, Weber's analysis of the dissociation of value spheres 
is squarely fitted to Luhmann's code of the moral, namely, ethics and morality were 
differentiated out of most social systems and become marginal nowadays. Weber's 
commitment to subjective meaning is also redeemed by Habermas by providing lifeworld as a 
rational and moral foundation. 
All these are going to show that, though indirectly, Habermas and Luhmann are selected 
among others not merely because of their prominent status and reputation amid general 
sociologists, nor merely because of they are rivals for the definition of sociology which may 
be convenient for a theoretical comparison, but more fundamentally, it is because of their 
developments and elaborations of the sociological tradition in contemporary social context, 
7 Although Luhmann begins his theory with a biological metaphor, he further develops systems theory by 
introducing cybernetics and protologic, which is different from Durkheim's and Parsons's formulations (Bailey 
1998). 
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which are indeed articulating the discussion of ethics and morality to a more general 
theoretical level, instead of remaining on the piecemeal explanations of moral phenomena. 
Recalling the objective of this thesis, the heart of the matter is to inquire the possible outlooks 
of the sociology of ethics and morality rather than to explicate moral phenomena from a given 
sociological perspective, and that is why after comparing Habermas's and Luhmann's 
sociology of ethics and morality, a metatheoretical reflection is introduced to uplift the level 
g 
of analysis of this thesis to reveal the constitution of the sub-discipline. 
In detail, the metatheoretical reflections on, first Habermas's and Luhmann's theory (Part 
II), and specifically on the sociology of ethics and morality (section 3.9) are undertaken. 
Metatheory is thereby introduced to the context for the sake of resolving the theoretical 
polemics to pursue a deeper understanding on the related themes, and at the same time 
keeping a distance from immediate normative judgments and the unreflected, far-fetched 
theoretical syntheses—or worse, ideological self-justifications.^ Metatheorizing as a means 
for the comprehensive and authentic understanding of theories would help the readers to 
extricate from the conventional dichotomy of morality/immorality and hence their 
understanding on morality and immorality is upgraded.川 This can be possible owing to the 
amoral nature of reflection (theory) which precedes moral judgment (practice), yet, it is not to 
claim naively that everyone is able to reflect on ethics and morality sociologically before one 
makes a moral judgment. But the sociologists, who are obliged to understand and explain 
moral phenomena in society, should be awared of the ideological consequences of an 
unreflected moral judgment. 
8 It can be referred to the metatheorizing process from "metatheorizing as a means of attaining a deeper 
understanding of theory" to “metatheorizing as a prelude to theory development” (Ritzer 1991, p.6). Also see 
section Ill.a. for more details. 
9 Regarding to the possibilities of metatheorizing, see Ritzer 1992a, 1992b; Turner 1990. 
Cf. Chan 2002, pp. 511-516. From a metatheoretical perspective, as Chan elaborated, the boundaries and 
possibilities of morality are linked up with the concept of enlightenment and sacred, in which morality is 
understood amorally, namely through the process of theorization by reflecting on the possibilities of morality 
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To support the above arguments, a quick glance over Habermas's and Luhmann's 
sociology of ethics and morality is of course not superfluous. We can firstly look at discourse 
ethics, which cannot be separated from the theory of communicative action for its validity. 
Discourse ethics as a procedural ethics seemingly provides the third way out of the 
formal/substantive and contemplative/critical distinctions that haunting sociology, as it 
delineates the foundational conditions for ethical activities—intersubjective discourse~on the 
one hand, and resolves the tension between observer/participant, qua one should participate in 
order to observe, on the other hand. One way or another, procedural ethics as the corollary of 
the theory of communicative action extricates itself from the impasse of the moral theories in 
the philosophy of consciousness, which cannot mediate between subject and object solely 
through self-centered consciousness. Contributed to this problem, discourse ethics restores the 
possibility of the moral discourse by analyzing the linguistic structure that allows the 
intersubjective participation to bridge the gap between specific ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and 
universal morality (Moralitdt). 
To clarify, the goal of discourse ethics is to map out the basic conditions of the moral 
cognition and thereby grounds on procedural ethics to resolve moral problems (Habermas 
1990a). Transformed by discourse ethics, therefore, individualistic perspectives endowed 
with Kantian and social contractarian monological ethics are eradicated, and the normative 
rightness can thereby be justified and evaluated intersubjectively and dialogically as long as 
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participants are linguistically competent. All these—mediation between subjectivity and 
objectivity, ethical life and morality一can be accomplished due to the new conception 
as such without any moral judgments. 
Commentators also agree on this point: "I believe that Habermas's discourse ethics can best be interpreted as 
a detailed explication of the conditions that need to be met in order to treat equals as equal in the context of a 
discourse" (Murphy 1994, p. 134. Italics added). 
Immanuel Kant and social contractarians regard moral individual as the basic unit of the moral deliberation 
and thus ethics emerges from their interactions, either in the form of the universalization of categorical 
imperatives, or by agreements on the contract that secures every individual's interest. 
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communicative rationality is formulated by the theory of communicative action. 
By contrast, the coupling of reason and morality is not Luhmann's cup of tea. Rather, it 
is the pure basic forms of the existence of society that interests him, in which moral, ethics, 
and value are totally abstracted from their substantive contents and only serve as an operative 
function of systemic self-reproduction.^^ As such ethics and morality are translated into the 
unusual forms by relating them to the binary schematism—as the "code of the moral"一to 
reduce social complexity, as well as to enforce anticipating power in the inter-personal 
interactions. This peculiar approach to understand morality may provide an alternative 
description on our contemporary moral predicament, which requires us to put our 
pre-reflexive assumptions~especially the humanistic one—into "brackets" and then 
contemplates the moral phenomenon, particularly on the mechanism of our moral action per 
se. To this extent, the goal of a "scientific" sociology is more or less fulfilled by its lucid 
explication of the social phenomenon at its clearest and most fundamental level which 
definitely precedes any further judgments and preferences (cf. Bendarz 1984a, 1984b; Paul 
2001). 
In this morally neutral sociological theory,the moral content and its social function 
proposed by Habermas—consensus formation—have little significance. Instead, following the 
scientific approaches the basic characters and formation of "Ethics" and "Moral" as well as 
their social effects are the heart of the matter.^ ^ Through binary schematism ethics and 
13 Luhmann tries to reconstruct sociology by delineating ontological foundations of society. In this regard, 
sociology is a self-description of contemporary society that based on its ontological presuppositions of society 
as the autopoietic systems. In so doing, we can call his sociology a "social ontology". 
14 Moral, morality, immorality, amorality, and de-moralization have different meanings. "Moral" is generally 
denoted as the matter of moral issues in a neutral sense; "morality" is usually contrasted to immorality with 
normative judgment on good or bad and right or wrong; "amorality" describes a non-moral incident that could 
not be evaluated by morality; and finally, "de-moralization" gets rid of the moral coloring of an incident. 
Luhmann discerns "Moral" (Moral) and "Morality" (Moralitdt) by virtue of the latter is embedded in the 
moral theory with normative preference; the former, on the contrary, is relatively value-neutral which is 
appropriate for distinguishing two modes of operation of the moral code~esteem and disesteem (Luhmann 
1991’ 1993b, 1996b; especially on translator's note (1993b, p. 996)). 
12 
morality are transformed into the moral code that expresses an attitude toward another person 
mediated by the binary form of esteem/disesteem. Moreover, both sides of the code have 
equal chance to be operative, and the preference of the code selection has no invariant 
principle (e.g. norms and culture). In this regard, every moral judgment is therefore merely a 
personal judgment without any indispensable universal moral values—whether justice, 
goodness, and generosity. As we can foresee, the operation of moral codes will engender 
conflict as well as consent with equal chance, such that morality and goodness are readily 
dissociated, and thereby the conventional conceptions of morality in sociology are 
deconstructed ruthlessly. 
An amoral social order, comparing to Habermas's normative discursive order, is hereby 
projected by systems theory. This divergence will demonstrate various possible forms of a 
sociology of ethics and morality一moral and amoral,'^ which are definitely constructive to 
the formation of sociology of ethics and morality. 
I.e. Outline of the Research Result 
Then what is the result of this theoretical inquiry? The result of this research can be 
summarized herein, while justifications as well as elaborations are left to the following 
chapters. After revisiting Habermas's discourse ethics and the theory of communicative action, 
as well as Luhmann's code of the moral and systems theory, four tendencies and one 
conclusive perspective of the sociology of ethics and morality are noticed. These are: first, the 
controversy of the conceptualizations of ethics and morality from the side of facticity or value 
are no longer a problem in Habermas's and Luhmann's theories. For Habermas, the way to 
conceptualize fact via assertoric claims and value via normative claims are commonly 
See section 3.4. 
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grounded by communicative action, as both of them are only one among three aspects of 
communicative action. Besides, morality construed as fact or value is not fundamental enough 
in systems theory. Rather, operations based on distinction and the logic of binary schematism 
grounds all facts and values since facts are constructed by self-reference and values are 
semantic means to facilitate self-referential operations. 
Second, the centre of attribution of ethics and morality is no longer rested on action. 
Theories based on action, as illustrated by Habermas, are unable to extricate from the 
philosophy of consciousness (Habermas 1987a, p. 339), and the only way out is to shift from 
the paradigm of theories of action to the paradigm of theories of communication. By way of 
linguistic communication, subjective interests are mediated through procedure of justice, and 
moral consensus is thereby formed intersubjectively; and similarly, morality as binary code 
channels selections of communication to continue further moral communications. 
The third tendency is closely related to the second one. The implication lies in the 
change of paradigm is that the conventional conception of ethics and morality as a concrete 
unity of action is obsolete and incapable to explain complex moral situation in contemporary 
world. The principle of identity that makes unity of moral action possible is now discovered 
to be too narrow, inasmuch as this whole set of thinking一to conceive morality, or broadly 
speaking, the world by identification一will inevitably identify one side (the side of unity) and 
exclude the other side (e.g. identify moral action should be good and immoral action should 
be bad). In other words, identity thinking based on unity will evade the problem of 
complexity of the other side and thus, according to Habermas, the opposition of subject (the 
unity) and object (the derivative) can never be resolved. And indeed the increasingly complex 
communicative situations do not allow for much theorizing based on unity. Hence a discursive 
procedure which extends from action and operation as a de-centered relation are among the 
outcomes of Habermas's and Luhmann's theories. Relation is a bridge of difference that can 
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mediate various communicative unities, such that they do not talk about "moral action" but 
"moral communication" or "discourse ethics". 
The last tendency is derived from the previous trends. Substantive sociology of ethics 
and morality has lost its plausibility, and it is replaced by formal sociology in terms of 
procedure and pure form. However, Habermas's case shows that the constituents of 
procedural ethics—pragmatics (which is analytical) and communicative practices (which is 
normative)一reserve certain substantive content of morality within the tenet of formal 
sociology. Yet Luhmann's pure form of morality excludes any substantive elements can be 
exemplified as the radical end of formal sociology. 
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What these tendencies indicated is the basic form of society, which has already 
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highlighted in Durkheimian sociology, i.e. normality of social order (see table 1). In general 
sociology, social order is the crux of the matter for the formation of society, and ethics and 
morality are construed as moral order that maintain or reproduce the continued modes of 
social life. Under this premise, Durkheim and Habermas conceptualized moral as normal, 
whereas on the contrary, Weber and Luhmann deem normal as both immoral and amoral 
respectively. Habermas and Luhmann, though avows normality differently, understand moral 
order in a value-neutral sense. What is normal is as such moral owing to the unproblematized 
communicative consensus continues the normality of everyday life, but the moral (or normal) 
situation demonstrated here does not prescribe any action orientation or substantive values. 
The case is clearer in Luhmann's amoral and non-normative social order, in which ethics and 
morality are merely one of the means to reduce complexity. In short, indicated by these four 
tendencies, normality constituted by ethics and morality is understood by its formality and 
emphasis on relation. These metatheoretical inquiries help us to understand the possible 
frameworks and themes of the sociology of ethics and morality. 
Finally, these four tendencies and the general theme of normality identified by analyzing 
Habermasian and Luhmannian sociology of ethics and morality points to the prospect of the 
sub-discipline—the reflexive sociology of ethics and morality. To epitomize, reflexivity 
appears on both theory and methodology. On the side of theory, ethics and morality are no 
longer construed as invariant substantive action attributed to particular actor; instead, what 
defines ethics and morality is by the dynamic emergence of moral communications. During 
(moral) communication one has to reflect on one's (own) validity claim or one's further 
connectivity, yet the recursivity of communication enables reflexivity at the moments of 
shifting between communicative action and rational discourse in Habermas's theory, and 
between first-order and second-order observations in Luhmann's theory.^ ^ 
17 According to Ulrich Beck's usage, reflection entails consciousness and reflexivity is undertaken 
unconsciously. See more in Concluding Reflections. 
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II. The Context 
ILa. Ethics and Morality in Modern Society 
Before entering the theoretical comparison between Habermas and Luhmann, the context 
of the problem should be illustrated to substantiate the development of the problematic. To 
begin with, we can take a glance on the situation of ethics and morality in modem society, 
which is a transitional stage that mediates between pre-modem religious ethics and 
(post)modem reflexive ethics. 
Weber is one of the first sociologists who studied the modem situation of ethics and 
morality. According to his rationalization and modernization thesis, the holistic worldview 
provided by religious belief in Western societies has become disenchanted, in which ethics 
and morality that once supported by religion have now lost their grounds. This problem can 
be attributed to the historical development.'^ In pre-modem societies, ethical rules were 
largely regulated in accord with the natural order, myth, or totemic meaning in order to secure 
group solidarity in terms of conformity. Ethics was intertwined with magic by embodying an 
inexpressible, mystical, and overwhelming power; no discussion on it is allowed. As a social 
institution, ethics and morality were incarnated in religion and law with the function of social 
sanctions and the motivation of obligatory actions. That is to say, they motivated obligation 
via internalization of norms (internal mechanism) and sanctioned through punishment 
(external mechanism). 
The turning point appeared in the age of reason, in which morality had already 
differentiated out of religion insofar as society became more and more complex, and 
• ^ " r i ^ l o w i n g elaborations mainly refer to Schluchter's reconstruction of Weberian developmental history by 
different sociological perspectives (including Lawrence Kohlberg, Habermas, Luhmann, Durkheim’ and 
Robert Bellah) (Schluchter 1981，chap. IV.l.; 1996’ chap. 2) 
One can compare Durkheim's analysis (1972，chap. 3 & 4) with Michael Foucault's genealogy of discipline. 
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eventually internalized in human agency. Of course, both the internal and external 
perspectives of morality remained intact in the Enlightenment, but the crucial difference is 
that human being is autonomous to choose between moral and immoral action in modem 
society. Therefore, the contingent character of morality that underpins social order became 
significant, and precisely at this point sociology was established to provide a theoretical 
reflection on this contingent society. In this regard, moral principles were devised by practical 
reason—allegedly by the exemplary of the Enlightenment: Immanuel Kant—which 
characterized the age of reason with the faith that human rationality should couple with 
morality to foster social progress?。However, as what classical sociologists had already 
recognized, the advancement of science is not necessarily beneficial to moral perfection; 
rather, moral values are decoupled with the undermined religious sphere and yet cannot find 
another institutional underpinning. Value rationality—represented the attempts to rationalize 
ethical values—eventually fails to counterbalance against strategic rationality, as long as the 
former cannot attain sufficient institutional significance, while the latter have become 
anchored firmly in most social spheres. More importantly, the former is irrational per se in the 
latter's eyes, and thus value rationality is largely excluded from the process of social 
rationalization, as diagnosed by Weber (Weber 1968, p. 26). Above all, the collapse of ethics 
and morality and consequently their retreat from the societal level to the individual level leads 
to the contemporary predicament of moral relativism. 
Of course we are now already accustomed to the social relativism, and perhaps even 
justified it with liberalist ideas, but moral vacuum at the social level, in fact, could lead to 
detrimental social consequences. As already mapped out by the classical sociologists, 
separation of reason and morality give rise to social pathologies since social members are 
unable to control, predict and adapt to the social environments with comprehensive 
~—•— 
One of the prominent figures is Immanuel Kant, who bases his ethical reflection on human /Reason (Kant 
1996). 
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consideration. Suffused with strategic rationality, the qualities of the ends of actions are out of 
consideration, only the most effective means is channeled by reason. By this one-sided amoral 
reason, 21 social anomie, loss of meaning, and alienation thereby emerged with the 
discrepancy between social relations and human volition. Moreover, these situations become 
worsened as long as modernization intensifies the contradiction between reason and morality, 
and eventually entrapped in the paradox of Enlightenment—modem barbarism concomitant 
with rationalization exemplified in the two World Wars. Ironically enough, the original goal of 
rationalization is to emancipate human being from their self-incurred intellectual minority, but 
it is in turn followed by an administered society imprisoning human freedom (cf. Horkheimer 
and Adomo 1972). Unfortunately, both rationalism embraced by modem social theorists and 
irrationalism as partaken by postmodernists cannot extricate from this paradox either. Under 
this predicament ethics and morality marginalized by strategic rationality lose their potential 
for social redemption, and eventually become either subjective and relativistic moral 
condemnation, or recede to be the ideological apparatus of social movements and 
authoritarian maneuvers. 
Il.b. Ethics and Morality in Sociology 
In this regard, sociology as a discipline that reflects on society cannot eschew these 
modem amoralized situations. ^^  In its very meaning, sociology was established to 
— 
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"Amoral" in this thesis is defined as "anti-moral". ‘‘[T]he amoralist does not reject ethics, because ethics is no 
more than a set of conventions, practices, and habits that people promote and follow (or the study of those 
conventions, practices, and habits). What the amoralist denies is morality, which is to say that the amoralist 
denies moralists' distinctive (but not yet examined) beliefs about the objectivity and prescriptively of rules, 
22 prohibitions, virtues, vices, rights, and duties." (Garner 1994，p. 17) 
Since the beginning of the last century, sociologists had already notified the significance of the relations 
between sociology and ethics: "The task of sociology is to study social life in all its manifold forms of 
manifestation. Ethical ideals and ethical endeavors, therefore, are objects of sociological research. They are 
Working factors in social development, while they are themselves effects and symptoms of social conditions, 
results of social development." (Hoffding 1905, p. 672). Also, one can refer to Henry Sidgwick's concern on 
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comprehend the enormous increase of social complexity, and more importantly, the objective 
ontic being of the world had been conferred from God and kingship to community and society. 
In other words, the representation of collectivity is disenchanted and depersonalized, yet 
remained uncontrollable and unpredictable as much as God and Kingship. Ironically, this 
collective representation which is opaque and authoritative for us is eventually our collective 
construction. At the same time, personal moral virtues are no longer manifested in the form of 
metaphysical ideas but realized at the social level, which call for a theoretical reflection out of 
the metaphysical explanations on the one hand, and distinguished from the political or 
psychological approaches on the other, with different kinds of subject matters—neither the 
state nor individual psyche, but society in general. Thus classical sociologists responded to 
these questions—how can we conceptualize ethics and morality at the social level and what 
will they like—seriously by devising moral agendas and descriptions of moral situation to 
redeem, if one can, the Enlightenment ideal: the coupling of reason and morality. Here comes 
Durkheim and Weber who ground their diagnosis of ethics and morality in two 
aspects—theory and method—on their general theoretical systems. 
n.b . l . Durkheim and Weber: Conception of Ethics and Morality 
For Durkheim, society constituted by objective social facts is something totally different 
from individual consciousness, albeit the former can only be realized by individuals 
(Durkheim 1964, pp. 38-39). Similarly, ethics and morality are conceived as objective social 
artifacts, and like other natural facts ethics and morality can only be understood by scientific 
methods. Added with historical analysis, morality embedded in the social solidarity had 
already undergone a transformation from mechanical solidarity in pre-modem society to 
organic solidarity in modem society. In the latter, morality is generated in the form of the 
the relation between the newly established sociology and the ethical theory (Sidgwick 1899). 
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division of labour, in which individuals are specialized to as well as interdependent upon each 
other (ibid., p. 85). Furthermore, characterized with two defining elements, moral action 
should be composed of obligation and desirability (Durkheim 1953, p. 45). One is obliged to 
act towards goodness merely because of the sanctions enacted by the moral rules together 
with the culture internalized in the course of socialization. Also, moral rules are attractive and 
desirable because they specify moral ideals that individuals aspired towards. At that moment 
"we feel that we dominate and transcend ourselves [...] we feel a sui generis pleasure in 
carrying out our duty simply because it is our duty" (ibid.). In this regard, ethics and morality 
bridged the sacredness that leads to the sense of transcendence which Durkheim called 
"collective effervescence". In other words, morality is rudimentarily embodied in the 
religiosity in which this duality (obligation and desirability) is also displayed in the 
demarcation of sacred and profane in society (ibid., pp. 36, 69), therefore morality gains 
binding and bonding power by denoting the sacredness through confirmative orientations. In 
this way, one can say that society for Durkheim is primarily a moral community and social 
order is, in fact, a moral order. This analogy helps us to understand morality sociologically 
insofar as Durkheim relentlessly distinguishes sociology from philosophy, and sociology of 
morality from moral philosophy. 
Also, one should not overlook the significance of Durkheim's moral agenda, which 
relegates morality to the division of labour and is thus actualized in occupational groups and 
moral educations. Normal division of labour gives rise to normal organic solidarity and thus 
certain level of morality can be secured, and moral education internalizes not only norms but 
moral values that nourish the orientation to sacredness. Social order is thereby redeemed 
despite the incessant social differentiation and social fragmentation through the functionality 
of the structure of division of labour, the internalizing mechanism, binding and bonding forces 
of morality, and its collective orientation to sacredness. It is not difficult to reveal Durkheim's 
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optimism towards the Enlightenment ideal; he believes that the decline of moral solidarity in 
modem society can be redeemed by positive science, as long as the social division of labour 
becomes perfect and individual members are neatly integrated into the functional social 
relations. In short, Durkheim expects much of science as a means and goal for ethics and 
morality in modem society, both as a methodology and a substantive theory—the science of 
morality, which may recover the mediation of reason and morality. 
Max Weber conceives ethics in a different manner. If Durkheim is interested in the 
duality of morality that attracts and disciplines individual in order to maintain societal order, 
then Weber will construe ethics as a group ethos influencing life order that undergone 
transformations in the course of history. As the embodiment of life order, ethics is related to 
religion in the pre-modem society as a theodicy, basis of action and worldview by classifying 
them into magic ethics, ethics of norms, ethics of principles and ethics of reflexive principle 
(Schluchter 1981, p. 52). From traditional society to modem society, ethics has changed from 
the magic ethic to the ethic of principles (ethic of conviction) and then the ethic of reflexive 
principle (ethic of responsibility); the underlying mechanism is that reason as the evolutionary 
outcome is developed to answer the questions on theodicy, and thereby fosters the 
rationalization process of ethics and religion (cf. Schluchter 1981, pp. 43ff; Weber 1968, pp. 
437ff； Tenbruck 1980). 
Besides historical analysis, the effect of ethics—ethics of conviction and ethics of 
responsibility—as the ethos of the time {Zeitgeist) in shaping modem society is illustrated by 
Weber. In his renowned research of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, Protestant 
ethic provides the inner-worldly ascetic worldview that has affinity with capitalism. Ethics is, 
in a neutral sense, an ideal that has social effect by regulating collective normative 
orientations, but not the action as such is ethical. However, at the individual level, Protestant 
ethic is largely preoccupied with the ethic of conviction to regulate personal life order. 
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Another kind of ethic concerning personal virtue, which is emphasized"in Weber's discussion 
on domination and politics, is ethic of responsibility (Weber 1946, p. 115). Both ethic of 
conviction and ethic of responsibility are essential for not only politicians, but all modem men 
who are not "specialists without spirit, sensualist without heart" (Weber 1976, p. 182), and 
dare to face modem society with the force of calling. Once again, Weber denies the separation 
of conviction and responsibility, because these two qualities of ethics are both indispensable 
for one's maturity and personality—in making judgments according to the demands of the 
days, and balancing conviction with senses of proportion (Weber 1946, p. 127). 
Modernity in Weber's diagnosis is somewhat bleak and dark, yet mature modem men 
can find their way through embodiment of ethics. Thus, ethics for Weber does not merely 
apply to the historical descriptions or to be the explanans of societal transfiguration, but ethics 
also have normative relevance. In this respect, Weber demonstrates that a sociological 
analysis of ethics can be both objective and value-relevant, which means that the scope of 
inquiry is widened by extricating from the dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity in the 
methodology of social sciences. It can be possible since ethics as an abstracted and collective 
ideal that fosters and directs action orientations of social members provides a vantage point 
for sociologists to incorporate normative characteristics of social members objectively. 
As we have seen, different from Durkheim, ethics and morality are conceptualized in two 
different ways from Weber's perspective: on the one hand ethics is objectively investigated by 
undertaking historical analysis of the change of life order through causal explanation, in 
which ethics is merely a descriptive attribute of a particular collective action orientation. On 
the other hand, from a normative perspective, individual and personal ethics should be 
empowered to make modem bureaucratic society acceptable. ^ ^ Besides the objective 
23 For Weber, normal social life is composed of the tension between personal ethics and immoral, or amoral, 
bureaucratic society. Unlike Durkheim, who clearly demarcated the normal division of labour (moral) and the 
anomic situations (abnormal and immoral), the moral ideal of Weberian sociology is the coupling between 
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observation on the group ethics, meaning and idea of social actors that are highlighted in 
directing action orientation cannot be understood by means of positivistic observation that 
Durkheim undertakes. In this respect, sympathetic understanding as an interpretive method is 
undertaken at the micro level to conceptualize the subjective meaning and idea—including 
ethics and morality—and thus integrates with causal explanations at the macro level. After all, 
we can see that, in Weber's perspective, whether ethics and morality at the social level can be 
comprehensively understood is largely depended on the quality of the sociologist—his 
capability to integrate sympathetic understanding and causal explanation—which is, in effect, 
a vulnerable wish. However, it is consistent to Weber's diagnosis of modernity, which is full 
of tension between objective social structure and subjective personal value. A brief summary 
of Durkheim's and Weber's conception of ethics and morality is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Summary of Durkheim's and Weber's Conception of Ethics and Morality 
Durkheim Weber 
Conceptions of ethics and morality Objective Mainly subjective 
„ ^ . , . Building of personality and 
Functions of ethics and morality Social integration group ethos 
. Division of labour, Moral relativism, group 
Diagnoses of ethics and morality in occupational groups, moral ethics, ideological apparatus, 
modern society education social conflicts 
、 ^ , , . Causal explanation and 
Methodology Causal explanation sympathetic understanding 
The relation between reason and morality Coupled Decoupled 
The conception of normality Normal as moral Normal as immoral 
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personal ethics mediated by value rationality and societal mechanics mediated by instrumental rationality. The 
last hope that Weber proposed is the maturity of modern men, who can resolve, or endure, the tension 
between individual and society by his/her own personal ethics. Hence, we can see that the normal/sacred 
distinction highlighted by Weber is still bounded at personal levels, which can be resorted to the Romanticism 
and Nietzschean tradition. 
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II.b.2. Successions and Revisions of Durkheim's and Weber's Perspectives 
Durkheim's and Weber's endeavours encourage and nourish numerous attempts on the 
conceptualization of ethics and morality amid sociologists. However, admittedly, their 
shortcomings are also inherited in the development of the field, as divided into two sides 
focusing on fact/value from the perspective of objectivism/subjectivism. Following Durkheim, 
mainstream sociologists portray morality as an objective and empirical social fact with 
important implications. Morality as a social fact exerts normative effects on individuals 
unilaterally, and this implies that collective morality would override individual morality by 
the pressure of social conformity. Because of the irreducibility of individuality to scientific 
facts, individual will become the dependent variable of the society. Moreover, morality is 
significant for sociologists only if it is a social fact, which presupposes that individual moral 
experiences are not considered, or at least regarded as insignificant, at the social level.之斗 In so 
doing, empirical analysis and causal explanation are justified to be the methodology, and it 
actually would justify the presupposition of dividing social and individual moralities and the 
preference of the societal side by circular argument. Thus, with the aid of natural sciences, 
sociologists often unravel (moral) fact and (moral) value into two distinguished aspects of 
social reality and then discard the side of value. This can be explained by the pursuit of 
scientific objectivity in the sociological inquiries, in which values are presumed to be the 
relative and subjective attributes of social reality. According to this positivistic interpretation, 
value is not an empirical social fact, but rather, the appendage that is attributed to the 
particular actor. Durkheim embarks on his "science of morality" from this assumption and 
proposes that objective morality has to be isolated from individual intervention, because "it is 
external to the individual conscience and constrains the individual" (Davydova and Sharrock 
24 
Durkheim expresses his conception of ethics explicitly: "...our idea of ethics derives from the observable 
manifestation of the rules that are functioning under our eyes and reproduces this schematically." (Durkheim 
1972. p. 89). 
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2003, p. 359). Hence, the science of morality conceives substantive contents as given facts 
and explains their causes and functions amid the society just as other social facts. 
In this regard, Parsons evaluates Durkheim's science of morality and reveals its 
difficulties. First of all is the problem of relativism. Since "on a positivistic and at the same 
time sociological basis it becomes impossible to transcend the relativity of actual and historic 
codes of ethics" (Parsons 1937，p. 371). Secondly, it is unable to distinguish clearly between 
fact and ideal (ibid.). Thirdly, Durkheim tends to identify the moral with the social，that is, 
equates morality with norms. It gets into trouble in suspicion of promoting social conformity 
when the personal attribution to the formation of norm is overridden by internalization of 
norms. Despite these criticisms, however, science of morality is regarded by Parsons a 
feasible and valid approach if it has further amendments. As long as an ideal is an element of 
social action, Parsons suggests that normative elements in sociological research have to be 
handled as factual elements, "otherwise they would not be observable and would have to be 
denied a place in a body of scientific knowledge" (ibid., p. 397). Hence, ethics and morality 
are absorbed into his AGIL analytical systems to be the cultural system fulfilling an 
integrative function (Parsons 1977, p. 355). Through this functionalization of ethics and 
morality the problem of objectifying ethics and morality of those positivists can be 
resolved—and hence further developed by Luhmann. Yet, along with the development of the 
discipline, one can see that ethics and morality had been gradually distanced from the 
normative side and being conceptualized to become neutral components of society. It can be 
construed as the progress and maturity of sociology insofar as it obtains specific methodology 
and ontology different from philosophy. 
Durkheimian science of morality emphasizes social functions of ethics and morality 
instead of effects on the individual value orientation, in which sociological interpretation is 
perhaps over-emphasized. Against this tendency of sociologism, Bauman ruthlessly criticizes 
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this line of explanation that construes moral phenomena as non-moral institutions with 
binding forces (Bauman 1989, p. 170). Conversely, moral phenomena, according to his 
affinity with postmodernism, should be closely related to the moral institutions, otherwise 
immoral social consequences could probably occur (Bauman 1989). In this light, he agrees 
with Parsons’s critique on Durkheim about social conformity, but in turn runs into extreme to 
assert that in sociological theory "moral behaviour becomes synonymous with social 
conformity and obedience to the norms observed by the majority" (ibid., p. 175). Ethics and 
morality in sociology, in Bauman's eyes, assume moral relativism, and thereby suspicious of 
leading to the Holocaust. By introducing Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenology of Other, 
Bauman relinquishes the social nature of morality with the assertion that the essence of 
morality is an unconditional responsibility for the other as a human being, which is totally 
freed from the considerations of reciprocity which may unintentionally slip into the social 
conformity (Davydova and Sharrock 2003, p. 362; Bauman 1993). For him, ethics and 
morality only have secondary significance in sociology, because the essence of morality is 
fundamentally subjective or intersubjective, but can never be an objective social fact that 
scientific sociology pursues. 
This line of argument is the corollary of Weber's waver between ethics emanated from 
the embodiment of personal and subjective moral experience through constructing life order, 
which can be revealed only by interpretation, and a societal and objective function for the 
social development, which can be conceptualized by way of scientific observation and logical 
deduction. While Weber attempts to articulate both ends dynamically by means of 
emphasizing the personal quality of a researcher with value-neutrality as well as 
value-relevance (cf. Chan 2002, pp. 191-192)—which needs to coordinate idea with historical 
factors—other sociologists would readily be tempted to unlock the vulnerable linkage 
between these two ends and focus on one aspect, inasmuch as the personal domain cannot be 
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readily integrated into the social domain without any tension or conflict.^^ 
The above biases are common in the discourse of fact/value distinction. Nevertheless, 
some theorists challenge the validity of the distinction as such, and Peter Winch is the one par 
excellence. In fact, the sociological tradition constructed by Durkheim and Weber is revised 
through the reflections on the distinction between natural science and cultural science. In 
other words, this metatheoretical reflection on sociology and ethics and morality per se 
questions the nature of social phenomena, deep into the ontological foundation of society. 
Winch avows that moral conduct can transgress the limitation of the reflective-rational 
(scientific) and habitual-irrational (cultural) dichotomy through incessant reflections. In effect, 
"moral conduct is reflective by virtue of being meaningful, of being the product of 
understanding. It also intrinsically involves a possibility of an alternative" (ibid., p. 366). In 
so doing, moral conduct is not merely an irrational habitual behavior which is opaque for any 
theoretical and rational observation, but becomes the blind spot of the scientific sociology that 
is incapable to understand meaning. In short, any observation of the social world, "as far as 
they produce meaningful descriptions, involve[s] a strong element of evaluation" (ibid., p. 
367). The fact/value distinction has, so to speak, already presupposed the separation between 
natural science and cultural science, which will eventually impede deeper understanding of 
the social world as well as the construction of sociology of ethics and morality. 
To use Weberian distinction between formal rationality and substantive rationality can 
reveal the underlying problematics of sociology of ethics and morality: from an objectivist 
perspective, ethics and morality are objective manifestations of the social actors' value 
To add, the controversies on the status of idea in Weberian sociology have not yet settled. One may focus on 
Weber's developmental history (Schluchter 1981); one may concern the development of idea in the religious 
rationalization (Tenbruck 1980); one may emphasize the life order and the humanistic ultimate concerns 
(Kennies 1983), and one may try to balance idea with other factors (Bendix 1977). In this thesis I prefer to 
Schluchter's interpretation that construes Weber's oeuvre as a schematic theoretical project to map out the 
developmental history of the West, and ethics is one of the factors that can furnish historical variants for 
societal configuration (cf. Schluchter 1981，pp. 39ff; 1996’ pp. 95ff). 
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preferences which can materialize as facts; from a subjectivist perspective, ethics and 
morality are subjective individualistic internal realization processes of value which can 
precede any social constraint, d la Bauman. This antinomy entraps sociologists in the 
circulation of the fact and value opposition which are incapable to comprehend moral 
phenomenon comprehensively. Breakthrough is awaited for any theory which can supersede 
this unproductive distinction, and Habermas and Luhmann are two successful exemplars. 
n .b.3. Habermas's and Luhmann's Breakthrough 
Although there are differences between the conception of ethics and morality of 
Habermas and Luhmann, both of them uncover the full complexity of ethics and morality by 
eliminating the fact/value distinction. The crux of the matter is that this unproductive 
distinction is based on the antinomy between subject and object, which is actually the remnant 
of the obsolete philosophy of subjective consciousness.^^ Habermas's discourse ethics and 
theory of communicative action transforms subject-object relationship into intersubjective 
discourse by grounding all social activities on linguistic communications. Through this can 
one conceive and understand an action only by communication, which is basically 
intersubjective. For sociology of ethics and morality, thus, participation and observation一that 
pertain to subjectivism and objectivism respectively一are synthesized in communicative 
action and rational discourse, since participation and observation are two sides of the same 
coin一one cannot understand the others without revealing one's own validity claims.^? 
More radically, subject-object relationship is discarded and replaced with 
system-environment relationship in Luhmann's systems theory. Fact and value are 
subordinated to the more fundamental systemic operations, in which fact and value are 
一 
26 See section 3.1. 
See section 1.1.1. 
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systemic constructions and systemic semantics respectively. The result of this change of 
paradigm clarifies the methodology of Luhmannian sociology of ethics and morality by two 
orders of observation. One can operate with only one order of observation but not other, that 
is, conversely, one cannot be both observing and observes how oneself is being observed at 
the same time. For sociology of ethics and morality—as a sub-subsystem of science which 
aims at knowledge production—second-order observation is preferable and observation of 
observation not only can observe the factual characteristics of moral phenomenon, but the 
value and meaning of morality can also be thematized via binary schematism and drawing 
distinctions. In short, participation versus observation is basically an erroneous opposition for 
sociology, given that sociology is used to produce knowledge rather than practice directly. 
Both Habermas and Luhmann notice that contemporary society is distinguished from the 
postwar modernity by its unprecedented complexity, and thus a more general theoretical 
framework is required to supersede the obsolete philosophy of consciousness. Agreeing with 
Weber's diagnosis of modernization, ethics and morality, in Luhmann's theorization, are 
abstracted to be their purest operative form at the social level, and left with substantive 
contents at the personal level.^ ^ Hence a de-moralized society against the Enlightenment ideal 
is anticipated by Luhmann in order to depict a precise description of society~~of course not 
the only one but one among many descriptions (Luhmann 1988). Above all, from the 
problematic of fact/value dilemma we can see the transformation of paradigms from 
substantive and unified action into formal and relational communication. Complexity 
generated in contemporary society infringes the boundary of pattern maintenance of Parsons's 
static system. Instead, dynamic reproduction of normality and social order, whether in the 
forms of reflexive rational discourse or communication, is more appropriate for sociology of 
28 Notably, Luhmann defines the nature of the social different from the mainstream sociology, including 
Habermas's one. "Social" here does not preordain with an anthropocentric definition that based on humanity, 
but merely refers to the probability of communications. More details will be shown in section 2.2. 
30 
ethics and morality. 
III. The Framework 
Ill.a. The Use of Metatheory 
Metatheory is employed for this thesis as a theoretical framework for the sake of 
resolving the theoretical disputes to pursue a deeper understanding on the related themes (Part 
I & II), and at the same time abstinent to the immediate normative judgments and the 
unreflected ideological self-justifications. Besides interpretation of the general sociology of 
Habermas and Luhmann, the extracted elements of the sociology of ethics and morality 
implied in their theories are compared for the sake to anticipate the development of the 
sociology of ethics and morality (Part II). At this metatheoretical level, similarities and 
differences are thematized, and therefore the prospect of sociology of ethics and morality can 
be mapped out (Concluding Reflections). All these theoretical interpretation and comparison 
can be undertaken inasmuch as metatheorizing seeks to a comprehensive and authentic 
understanding of theories, which can extricate the readers from the conventional dichotomy of 
morality/immorality and hence their understanding on morality and immorality is upgraded. 
In this case, metatheory is especially applicable owing to its amoral nature of reflection which 
precedes moral judgment. Yet, it is not to claim naively that everyone must reflect on ethics 
and morality sociologically before a moral judgment is made. Hence, the function of 
metatheory is to provide a vantage point to observe sociology as such, and this is one of the 
roles of the intellectuals to refrain from ideologies, especially when ethics and morality are 
the subject matters of the theoretical reflection. 
According to George Ritzer, metatheorization of the fundamental ground for sociology 
of ethics and morality is worthwhile 1. to provide a deeper understanding of sociology as such, 
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and 2. to prelude to the development of new theoretical perspectives, and perhaps 3. to 
overarch sharply contrasting theories (Ritzer 1990，p. 4). All these can only be achieved by 
metatheorizing, which can discern the normative agenda implied by social ethics from an 
analytical understanding of the character, possibility, and condition of sociology of ethics and 
morality (ibid.). Metatheoretical reflections that examine their special understanding of 
crucial sociological concepts and reflect on their conceptions of society, social implications 
and the nature of sociology will elucidate the underlying assumptions, presuppositions, and 
predispositions (Furhrman and Snizek 1990, p. 26), and will state the intellectual, societal, 
and historical contexts of theory (Tiryakian 1992, p. 74). 
To clarify, metatheorization employed by this thesis does not recede to any 
transcendental position that overviews two sociologists objectively from an outside or a priori 
position, inasmuch as "meta" means "to come after" (Turner 1990, p. 38). Metatheorizing 
does not necessarily give rise to a (transcendental) synthetic conclusion, so far as each 
particular sociological theory has their irreducible specific context, presuppositions and 
theoretical orientations. Rather, a relatively descriptive and conceptual delineation and 
analytical investigation on their theoretical foundations and their theory of society is sufficed. 
Yet, this approach should not be subjected to criticisms of sheer relativism in that sociology as 
such does not aim at a monolithic unity of all theories but fosters interactions between 
theoretical discourses—as analogous to the concept of ecological diversity. In so doing, the 
range of possibilities of sociology of ethics and morality is thus drawn by reflecting on the 
possible outcomes of two general theoretical systems. Certainly, as Ritzer and Turner 
suggested, metatheorizing can produce new theory (Ritzer 1990，p. 4; Turner 1990, p. 38); yet 
here this task will be left to the concluding chapter to sum up the sociology of ethics and 
morality. 
The meaning of metatheorizing employed herein is not squarely transplanted from 
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Ritzer's denotation. Instead of excluding metasociology with the reason of anti-transcendent 
synthesis of theories, a broader meaning of metasociology that simply reflects sociology as 
such—somehow finds its connection to the reflexive sociology and the sociology of 
sociology—is assimilated in this thesis (cf. Chan 2002, chap. 5. and 6.IV). And reflection 
via this conception of metasociology does not necessarily contradict the functions of 
metatheory suggested by Ritzer~to understand extant theories, to create new theory, and to 
overarch extant theories.^ ^ Unlike Ritzer's incomprehensive review of metasociology (Ritzer 
1991, p. 14. n. 8), according to Chan's splendid elucidation (Chan 2002, p. 348. n. 21), 
sociological metatheorizing aims at abstracting from the value presupposition of a particular 
theory for the sake of a broader and deeper exploration of the vision endowed with sociology. 
While, additionally, metatheorizing is so-called "meta-" in that the value presupposition of a 
particular sociologist should be refrained from the theorization process. It does not amount to 
the regression from social reality and then plays intellectual games; rather, the interferences 
from reality are neutralized in metatheory and a more realistic picture is thus provided. 
III.c. The Limitation of this thesis 
Some readers may find that the approaches adopted by this thesis一general sociology, 
theory, even metatheorizing~cannot directly answer everyday perplexity regarding moral 
phenomenon, and inadequate to undertake empirical social researches. I have to admit that the 
applicability of this thesis may not be squarely fitted to current social researches, especially 
29 The difference between metasociology and sociological metatheorizing is construed by George Ritzer as 
merely the different levels of specificity within sociology: "To my mind, metasociology in general, and 
metatheorizing in particular, are parts of sociology, subareas within the larger field." And remarkably 
metasociology is conceived by Ritzer and Turner to transcend the extant theories, which may not be the case 
if the subject matter of their metatheorizing is interchanged with metasociology, that is, a totalistic reflection 
on sociology at the abstract level, see Chan 2002, part 3. 
All three functions of metatheory are demonstrated in Fiske and Shweder (1986). 
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the discrepancy between the methodology I used here and the qualitative and quantitative 
methods popularly employed in mainstream empirical sociology. Nevertheless, I have to draw 
a boundary for this thesis, that is, to reiterate, a reflection on sociology of ethics and morality 
via using Habermas and Luhmann as exemplars. In other words, the goal of this thesis is to 
review and thereby reconstruct the possibility of sociology of ethics and morality in the 
contemporary amoralized society. While the linkage of this thesis to application is not yet 
completely built up, but at least a blueprint of the sub-discipline is tentatively drafted for 
those who are interested in this problem, and advice to the current sociological literatures 
which involved in ethics and morality are briefly given in the conclusion. 
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Part I. Habermas and Luhmann as the Exemplars of 
Sociological Inquiries of Ethics and Morality 
Habermas's and Luhmann's theories are the subject matters of this part. Their sociology 
of ethics and morality—though they have never claim exactly what specific sociological 
perspectives are used to conceptualize ethics and morality in their theories—are extracted 
from their general sociology. What this part seeks to accomplish is to link up the fragments of 
discourse on ethics and morality in their general theory and attempts to construct a whole 
picture about their sociology of ethics and morality. Further, this allows for comparison in the 
next part be undertaken to draw research results. 
Although discourse ethics has little apparent linkage with the code of the moral, the 
result of inquiring two theoretical edifices is that ethics and morality therein are closely 
related to the problem of social order, and specifically moral order. Discourse ethics as a 
reflective form of communicative action recovers moral order (in a value-neutral sense) by 
rational discourse that can redeem validity claims rationally and morally. ‘ Similar to 
Durkheim, what is normal is moral as well (see table 2). The sociological meaning of 
discourse ethics, but not its philosophical or political interpretations, illustrates the normal 
state of social life which is not a pregiven automated patterning, but is instead a collective 
endeavour that requires our participations. 
However, ethics and morality in Luhmann's sociology do not have such privileges. 
‘ W h i l e discourse ethics inevitably grounds on the communicative action within the lifeworld, it leans on the 
argumentative discourse rather than the communicative action. In fact, as Habermas noticed (cf. Habermas 
1990a, pp. 100-101)，discourse ethics, to a certain extent, calls for a higher standard of rational self-reflection 
but not a taken-for-granted communication. In most situations the latter resolves disagreements in light of 
authority, norms, or commonly defined situations rather than overt argumentations (cf. Rehg 1994，pp. 34-35). 
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Rather than an overarching position for social integration, such as Parsons's value consensus, 
Durkheim's social solidarities are engendered from normal division of labour, and Habermas's 
discourse ethics, ethics and morality for Luhmann are subordinated to systemic operations 
and become semantics for complexity reduction. In so doing, social order is amoralized in 
Luhmann's general sociology, in which other semantics, e.g. risk, anxiety, and intimacy, can 
replace morality at both the social and inter-human levels. More important is that social order 
is self-produced according to the order from noise principle, and therefore no additional a 
priori institution (e.g. value consensus) is needed to impose upon the situation of double 
contingency, in that order is emerged from noise (below) but not from prescribed patterns 
(above). In short, what is normal is not a matter of moral or immoral, but amoral; and ethics 
and morality are not the explanans of social order but an a posteriori explanandum. 
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Chapter 1: Habermas's Discourse Ethics and The Theory of 
Communicative Action 
To respond to the predicament of the subject-oriented social theory, two different 
approaches are developed to expound from the Cartesian pursuit of the first philosophy that 
ontologizes subject to be the elemental unity of society. We are going to see that, together 
with ethics and morality as the social phenomena, substantive and concrete social units are 
gradually de-substantiated by formal procedures and then deconstructed by systemic 
abstractions into form. We certainly do not aim at prescribing any evolutionary development 
in sociology by merely comparing Habermas and Luhmann, but rather postulate that in order 
to understand ethics and moral phenomena in the contemporary society, theories—as an 
intellectual construction for a general understanding of reality on the one hand, and reflects 
societal condition as a description on the other hand~concerning substantive content and 
concrete unity are no longer convincing in this regard. Based on these postulates, the 
contemporary complex society inevitably can be handled only with a sociology formulating 
on the dynamic social relations but not the static and concrete social units, in this way social 
relations are interpreted differently in terms of communicative actions mediated linguistically 
among social actors, and in terms of communications dovetailed by system selections. As 
such ethics and morality in sociology go beyond the limitations of facticity and subjective 
ideation by attributing to substantive units, and then developed into communicative 
procedures and sheer communications. Hence, this chapter begins with Habermas's linguistic 
approach to see how can ethics and morality be incorporated into sociological discourses. 
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1.1. Discourse Ethics 
Discourse ethics is not designed specifically for sociology. It involves discussions on 
moral philosophy and political ethics that increases the difficulty to extract appropriate 
sociological insights. However, the philosophical and political origins of Habermas's general 
theory are indeed influential to the construction of discourse ethics, thus discussions in this 
chapter will inevitably involve other aspects of discourse ethics. But, conversely, this 
theoretical complex highlights the peculiar totalistic nature of discourse ethics, which is 
closely related to his theoretical origins, e.g. critical theory, Max Weber, pragmatics, etc. 
Hence this chapter would like to discern different aspects of discourse ethics, and at the same 
time correlates their contributions to Habermas's sociology of ethics and morality; also, this 
chapter demonstrates the transition of Habermas's philosophical interest on ethics and 
morality to a sociological one. 
To begin the discussion, first and foremost, the salient overtone of reconstructing and 
continuing the legacy of Critical Theory—partook by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adomo, and 
Herbert Marcuse—of discourse ethics should be highlighted (Wiggershaus 1994, pp. 636ff).^  
This legacy is closely related to the continuation of the project of Enlightenment to provide 
practical direction for social life by the coupling of rationality and morality. For Habermas, 
the Frankfurt School theorists' relentless critiques of the purposive-oriented rationality 
prevalent in modem society are still bounded to the conditions of the philosophy of subjective 
consciousness, exemplified in the aesthetic mimesis, which have already exhausted the 
potential of both the critical and self-negation power of the consciousness (Habermas 1984, 
1 The aim to construct the theory of communicative action by Habermas is, of course, not for the theory as such, 
notwithstanding, to solve the aporias of the social theories that all fail to extricate from the deadlock of the 
"dialectic of enlightenment", either by means of immanent critiques (a la the Frankfurt School) or by 
irrationality which undermines the foundation of rationality {d la postmodernists). In this regard, the theory of 
communicative action seeks to supersede both of them by embarking on the critique of society that suffused 
with the functionalist reason (Habermas 1987a, pp. 374ff). 
38 
pp. 389-390). Following Weberian diagnosis of the societal rationalization, into which 
formidable purposive rationality penetrates almost ubiquitously the subjective consciousness 
and the objective social reality, the only way out suggested by Frankfurt theorists is to discard 
purposive rationality and replace with negative dialectics to eschew the entwinement of 
reason and myth at the outset of the Enlightenment.^ Negative thinking instead of positive 
pursuit of identity is the indirect strategy to subvert social suppressions of the capitalistic 
machine; however, the concomitant skepticism and moral relativism undermine the normative 
societal structure as well as the possibility of positive social reconstructions. It signifies the 
apex of the philosophy of subject and then stuck into the impasse of post-modem thinking, 
and yet the situation after this negative theorization has not gotten worse (Habermas 1984，pp. 
386ff; 1987b, pp. 106ff). 
The only way out of this aporias is to reconstruct social theory with the long ignored 
fundamental linguistic competence of language—as dialogue was once the heart of human 
essence in Socrates's eyes一and pragmatism to pursue the authentic framework of human 
praxis in practical discourses (Bernstein 1988，pp. 196-197). Even the rationality achieved by 
aesthetic mimesis can only be released in communicative action through the communication 
of the authenticity of subjective expressions (ibid., p. 390). In short, the theory of 
communicative action is a new hope to reflect on the development of societal rationalization 
and this sort out the possibilities to evade from the paradoxical predicament, and likewise, the 
ethical competence of everyday life action is rehabilitated by communications and discourses 
among linguistically competent speakers. Under this background discourse ethics should not 
2 Refer to the thesis of the "dialectics of Enlightenment", the entwinement of myth and enlightenment shows 
that rationality as the myth of enlightenment could be easily slipped into a modern barbarism, as the goal of an 
action is replaced by the means and thus reason shrinks into the purposive rationality. Echoed with Weber's 
paradox of societal rationalization一instrumental rationality overrides value rationality and thus neutralizes 
the substantive content of an action—the critical theorists extend Weberian thesis by exhausting the 
philosophy of consciousness in the way of negation of negation without any hope of a synthesis, and as a 
result the negation power of a subject is self-undermined. Cf. Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
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be a sheer philosophical ethics that pursuing the completion of the theoretical system, but 
rather a socially-relevant metaethics that can contribute to the conceptualization of sociology 
of ethics and morality. 
1.1.1. Discourse Ethics as the Sociology of Ethics and Morality 
Discourse ethics as a sociology of ethics and morality should not be confined to the 
philosophical ethics, as long as its sociological relevance is identified to distinguish it from 
other ethical theories. Characterized by the discursive procedure, discourse ethics is a 
''sociologized" Kantian ethics by virtue of the intersubjective participations which is 
essentially social.^ To distinguish this meaning of "sociologization" from the social ethics, 
one needs to focus at the methodology and analytical level of discourse ethics, in which a new 
light of rational understanding of the meaning of action is shed via the analysis of the 
linguistic components of communicative action. Discourse ethics aims at a higher level of 
understanding of ethics and morality in society, instead of a general description and then an 
ad hoc normative judgment, which cannot be grounded on social philosophy unless the 
sociological concept of action, meaning, and understanding are introduced. 
Enlightenment (1972) and Adorno's Negative Dialectics (1973). 
3 Kantian ethics has long been imputed as a self-centered elitist moral idealization, that is, a deduction of the 
universal moral principle by intellectual self-reflection and justification of a moral maxim as the ultimate 
ground of morality. Empty formalism and incapability to cope with moral virtues are two detrimental 
problems of this line of argument; yet more importantly, it more or less justifies the elitist enactment of moral 
rules for the public by the reason of their virtuosity. Hence Kantian ethics cannot discriminate the Nazi's racial 
extermination to be immoral as long as the massacres are justified to be moral by Nazis' own conscience with 
the disguise of racism and nationalism. In this light discourse ethics allows intersubjective participation and 
forms the consensus by considering, and at most includes, all affected. Therefore a true collective will 
formation instead of an elitist moral imagination is actualized, and in the progress of discourse the social 
contexts of participants are brought along with them for discussion, together with everyone's lifeworld. That is 
why we can say that discourse ethics is a "sociologized" Kantian ethics in terms of entailing and considering 
social conditions. Under this sociologization, analysis and normative concern can be assimilated in the 
sociology of ethics and morality, and this synthesis also extends to mediate individual subjective viewpoints 
(e.g. rational choice theory) with collective action systems (e.g. Parsons) by constant communicative 
practices. 
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Unsurprisingly, the methodology of sociology of ethics and morality depends heavily on 
the ideas of the preceding sociologists. Understanding meaning as the basic element to 
coordinate interactions in social life is neither subsumed to the positivistic nor the 
hermeneutic tenets, whereas the meaning of moral action can be understood only if one 
participates and observes simultaneously during discourse (Habermas 1984, p. 132). That is, 
understanding is possible only if one joined in discussion and raised claims explicitly to 
reveal the underlying meaning (cf. Habermas 1984, chap. 1.4.). Pure participation in action 
situation in an ethnomethodological approach is unable to obtain objective and general 
meaning of social and moral phenomena. Likewise, an objective and external observation in a 
positivistic attitude is also incapable to penetrate the actor's subjective meaning and thus 
restore the authenticity as well. Only by participating in rational discourse can both 
advantages be synthesized. Therefore the fact/value distinction along the discussion on ethics 
and morality in sociology is resolved by the common ground of fact and 
value~communicative action. The presupposition of the antinomy of subject/object in the 
philosophy of consciousness is transcended by pragmatic structure, in which both fact and 
value are communicative results instead of being pre-established state of affair or subjective 
meaning. 
Besides this new breakthrough in sociology, the philosophical aspect of discourse ethics 
contributes much to the formalization of ethics and morality. Discourse ethics relies much on 
the formalistic, universalist, deontological, and cognitivist position of deontology,< yet the 
4 Discourse ethics is deontological because "moral judgments serve to explain how conflicts of action can be 
settled on the basis of rationally motivated agreements [and] to justify actions in terms of valid norms and to 
justify the validity of norms in terms of principles worthy of recognition" (Habermas 1990a, p. 196), which is 
contrasted to the consequentialist ethics which justify action and validity by the measure of success. Discourse 
ethics is formal because the formal rule that explains "how something is looked at from the moral point of 
view" (ibid., p. 198), but do not evaluate by fuzzy contexts. And formal ethics provides principles of 
universalization only at the expense of separating moral judgments from examinations and justifications of 
needs and interests (Warren 1995，pp. 178-179). Discourse ethics is cognitive insofar as "normative rightness 
must be regarded as a claim to validity that is analogous to a truth claim" (Habermas 1990a, p. 197)，but do 
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residues of the philosophy of consciousness—monological deliberations on morality stemmed 
from the human conscience一are further revised by intersubjective discourse, and thereby a 
justification procedure of validity claims lies in discourse substitutes the monological 
self-enactment of moral maxims (Habermas 1990a, pp. 196-198). To revisit Kantian 
cognitivism is not to return to the abstract contemplation of ethics and morality, rather, Kant's 
conception of Enlightenment that closely related to his deontology can be realized unless the 
difficulties of the philosophy of subject is superseded by language. And the realization of the 
Enlightenment ideal, as overtly avowed in Habermas's writings, by recovering the coupling of 
reason and morality is apparently the normative telos of social theories. 
Yet, different from most moral philosophies, analysis of the linguistic structure underlies 
moral phenomena in modem society is emphasized as well. In fact, what brings Habermas's 
theory to fame is its excellent synthesis of both normative concern and analytical rigor into a 
novel normative and analytical social theory of ethics and morality without entrapped into the 
conventional misrecognition of the absolute dichotomy between normative and analytical 
theories. It can be done in that language as such is an analytical yet normative structure 
characterizing our social life via communication, and precisely at this point, reason and 
morality can be integrated in communicative action, instead of depends on the integrative 
capacity of the solitary practical reason postulated by Kant. Only thus can Habermas's 
theoretical project be called the continuation of Kantian Enlightenment ideal. 
Indication of the authentic conceptualization of moral phenomena, in addition to an 
appropriate method of probing, requires clarification of the basic unit of morality—value, 
which involves political meaning as well. Habermas's participative observation definitely 
opens a third way for the rivalry of value universal!sm, as represented by liberalism, and 
not relinquish the factual character of morality. And finally, discourse ethics is universal because the moral 
principle itself is universally valid, in contrast to the contextualists' perspective that moral validity solely 
underpins by its context and tradition. 
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value contextualism, as represented by communitarianism. Participative observation demands 
sociologists to join in a discourse by asking, defending, justifying, and describing one's 
validity claims linguistically, in which substantive values are sublimed to a universal level as 
a result of consensus. That is to say, communitarians' claim to the irreducible context and 
liberals' claim to the necessity of generality and universality is mediated by practical 
discourse—not about the meaning of semantics nor the structure of syntax, but the use of 
language according to particular situation that can be eventually articulated and deliberated to 
bcome a mutual understanding, namely, consensus.^ In this way, ethics and morality are not 
particular private values or abstract ideal indifferent to everyday life; discourse ethics is in 
fact a practical procedure of justice based on the pragmatics of everyday life language. 
In so doing the distinctiveness of Habermasian sociology of ethics and morality can be 
demonstrated by distinguishing its sociological aspect from moral philosophy and political 
ethics. Unlike philosophy, discourse ethics pinpoints that ethics and morality are not 
independent and isolated to social situations, as long as under the condition of modernity the 
illusion of value pluralism pervades and any claim to moral universality is ruthlessly 
challenged. According to this situation, discourse ethics is more flexible than moral 
philosophy in that sociological analysis of everyday language is undertaken to supplement the 
loose linkage between theory and dynamic social reality in philosophy. Moreover, 
sociological analysis distances discourse ethics from strong normative claims_but not 
non-normative like Luhmannian theory—vis-a-vis normative ethics, by virtue of the 
analytical elements in his rational reconstruction that lies in the theory of communicative 
action. Thus, discourse ethics can be safely called a sociology of ethics and morality resides at 
5 Under this meaning, universality of discourse ethics is a situational universality, that is, a particular consensus 
is universal for those effected but do not necessarily have identical effect for others who stay out of that 
particular discourse. Most communitarians missed this point and mistakenly disavow the transcendental 
universality which is not prescribed in discourse ethics. 
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the metatheoretical level.6 
However, the relation between discourse ethics and political ethics is equivocal. 
Realization of discourse ethics in the way of deliberative democracy entails both ethics and 
politics/ in which ethics and morality are disengaged from its substantive contents, such as 
collective sacredness and private transcendental experience, but merely functions to be a 
conflict resolution mechanism for politics (cf. Cronin 1993, p. xii; Rehg 1996, p. xvi). In this 
respect, consensus generated by the just procedure rather than compromises based on strategic 
self-interests is expected by Habermas, and only thus can action be called 
"moral"—concerning the general interest instead of personal preference. 
To respond to these intertwinements between Habermas's sociology of ethics and 
morality with other disciplines, the totalistic character of discourse ethics should be clarified 
to explain its multi-purpose nature, that is, it can by no means arbitrarily separated into 
distinctive political ethics, sociology of ethics and morality, and moral theory. What we can 
do, at most, is to accentuate its correlation to sociology with the supplementary social 
theoretical orientations to politics and philosophy, and to state the purposes of discourse ethics 
may help to conclude its multi-facet formulations. 
One of its purposes concerning sociology, which have already been alluded to in his 
theory of communicative action, is that to supply "Critical Theory with foundations in a 
6 The rational reconstruction of the linguistic basis in the theory of communicative action aims at mapping out 
the pre-theoretical knowledge of the existential condition of human activities (Habermas 1979, pp. 8ff; 
Bernstein 1985，pp. 16ff.). Against Chambers's incomplete understanding of the reconstructive nature lies in 
the theory of communicative action and discourse ethics (Chambers 1995，p. 233), neither descriptive nor 
normative, but a metatheoretical reflection is more appropriate to denote Habermasian sociology of ethics and 
morality. 
7 The concept of lifeworld underpins morality and justice in both ethics and politics, provided that "...discourse 
succeeds in establishing the authority of a rule or norm, then the resolved issue moves, as it were, from 
politics to the background of 'lifeworld' understandings that we share and take for granted. This is why 
politics has the peculiar quality of demanding moral competencies of i nd i v i dua l sone dimension of 
autonomy—without having moral foundations." (Warren 1995, p. 177). 
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concept of rationality broad enough to escape the paradoxes endured by the earlier Frankfurt 
School" (Rehg 1996，p. 21), and thus a rational and ethical grounding for social critique is 
supplied with. Related to moral philosophy, another purpose is to recover moral objectivity in 
a post-traditional world by justifying Kantian principle of universalization argumentative!y (cf. 
Habermas 1990a, p. 44). The third purpose is inferred from the second one, yet with political 
meaning, namely to resolve value conflicts by formulating a normative procedure which can, 
at least minimally, articulate individual interests and thereby transcends them into collective 
interest incarnated in a consensus. 
Despite the entwinements of discourse ethics and moral philosophy and political theory, 
the social functions of discourse ethics should be accentuated to sharpen its sociological 
significance. Social integration and social order that once had been maintained by morality, in 
the form of social solidarity, becomes marginal and thus loses its integrative function, as 
Weber correctly presented. However, for Habermas, this is only the consequence of the 
monological philosophy of consciousness that undermines the coupling of reason and 
morality. In fact, the integrative function of morality can be redeemed so long as it undergoes 
a linguistic transformation by the theory of communicative action, and thereby social conflicts 
based on different value spheres can be settled peacefully under the overwhelming consensus 
generated by rational discourse. This message is always overlooked in critiques against 
Habermas, in which societal plurality instead of unanimous consensus increases by the 
mediation of discourse: 
The transitory unity that is generated in the porous and refracted intersubjectivity of a 
linguistically mediated consensus not only supports but furthers and accelerates the pluralization 
of forms of life and the individualization of lifestyles. More discourse means more contradiction 
and difference. The more abstract the agreements become, the more diverse the disagreements 
with which we can nonviolently live. (Habermas 1982, p. 140. Italics added). 
In this way the paradox of rationalization can be resolved rationally and morally, and as we 
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have seen, ethics and morality are understood and functioned as a conflict resolution 
mechanism. Recalling the argument posed at the beginning of this chapter, Habermas's 
procedural transformation is a significant step to generalize and universalize moral 
phenomena with a paradigmatic change from theory of units to theory of relations, and from 
the substantive to the formal. Of course it is not an explanatory claim that misplaces the 
concreteness of reality, but a descriptive and analytical statement for the observable tendency 
in sociology, how it relates to the nature of sociology which will be elucidated in section 3.7. 
1.1.2. The Logic of Discourse Ethics 
Discourse ethics, vis-a-vis Kantian categorical imperative, enacts moral rules as well as 
validates moral norms from the discursive procedure based on intersubjectivity, but not 
depends on the practical reason of a person who follows a maxim to universalize a moral 
norm (cf. Kant 1996, pp. 82, 380). In short, discourse ethics, in terms of moral philosophy, is 
a procedure of validation in place of Kantian practical reason that rest on individual 
conscience, by transforming solitary human conscience as the evaluation criterion into the 
intersubjective procedure. In this way, discourse ethics goes beyond subjective ethics which 
remains entangled with the paradox of the philosophy of consciousness.^  
This paradigmatic transformation from the monological enactment of universal moral 
g 
The deficit of the subjective ethics can be summarized as follows: by virtue of the practical reason embodied 
in any rational human being, conscientious individuals can envisage universally valid moral norms by 
following maxims. That is to say, "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law" (Habermas 1990a, p. 197). It is fundamentally flaw in that no 
prominent objective structure can secure the universality of that moral law. What one adjudicates as moral 
does not necessarily coincident to the others; thus Kant in fact exaggerated the will power and reasoning 
power of the individual one-sidedly and was faithful to the potential of every mundane person, which may 
consequently subject to moral decisionism. In short, Habermas accuses the reduction of morality into the 
individual intention implied in Kantian morality, and only discourse ethics, according to his saying, can 
mediate intention avowed by deontology with consequence avowed by consequentialist through 
intersubjectivity. 
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rules into the dialogical argumentation based on intersubjectivity can be clearly demonstrated 
in Habermas's reformulation of the moral principle, that is, the criterion for generalizing 
maxims of action via rational discourse, into his two principles: the principle of 
universalization (U) and the principle of discourse ethics (D): 
(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone 's interests (and these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (Habermas 1990a, p. 65). 
(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all 
affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse (ibid., p. 66). 
More clarifications are needed; (U) is the condition for every valid norm but not embodied 
with any normative claims (ibid., p. 65), in other words, it is neutral in its own right. (U) sets 
up the impartial procedure for all ethical deliberations to yield a general consensus一in the 
sense that morality is upheld by everyone's consent—and it can be enacted via rational 
argumentation among those affected by that enacted norm. However, (D) has already 
contained the distinctive idea of an ethics of discourse; it presupposes that, we can justify our 
choice of a particular norm by arguing and vindicating the validity claims (ibid., p. 66).^ 
Habermas proceeds to vindicate that (U) is possible and necessary in the moral 
argumentation by resorting to the validity of the universal (or formal) pragmatics (ibid., p. 
82).⑴ Moreover, Apel's transcendental pragmatics helps discourse ethics to draw the criteria 
of entering a moral discourse, as long as "any subject capable of speech and action necessarily 
makes substantive normative presuppositions as soon as the subject engages in any discourse 
with the intention of critically examining a hypothetical claim to validity" (ibid., p. 85). In 
this vein, any speaker, in his/her very beginning, must presuppose "the structure of their 
communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the better 
See section 1.2.2. 
See section 1.2.2. 
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argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the cooperative search for 
truth" (ibid., pp. 88-89). Otherwise, the speaker will be caught up in the performative 
self-contradiction, 11 namely one has to presuppose the structure of argumentation in advance 
to any objection of discourse ethics, otherwise one becomes self-contradictory insofar as one 
criticizes what enable oneself to criticize. 
However, despite (U) as the structure of argumentation that requires every locutors to 
assume in advance, it needs additional conditions for the success of argumentation, no matter 
how ideal and counterfactual they are. On the one hand, everyone should understand what are 
his/her real interests, and on the other hand it requires an equal opportunity to express these 
interests. Obviously, ideal speech situation as the counterfactual presupposition is formulated 
to guarantee argumentation processes.'^  
To elaborate the logic of discourse ethics, William Rehg ingeniously and concisely 
formulates a detailed derivation of (U) in ten steps to clarify the logic of discourse ethics. 
Rehg, at first, explicates the assumptions in the derivation of (U). In the first place is to 
specify the precondition of entering a discourse: 
We understand what it means to discuss hypothetically whether norms of action ought to be 
adopted (Rehg 1991，p. 36). 
And then we begin to assume that social norms have an effect of social coordination in two 
ways: 
(1) A social norm is to be understood as a shared behavioural expectation whose general 
observance: 
(a) has the immediate consequence of coordinating action in potential conflict situations by 
regulating the satisfaction of the relevant interests of those involved (in light of a value or 
values the norm defines as having priority for all); 
“ S e e section 1.2.5. 
12 
Ideal speech situation is a necessary idealizing state for the rational discourse. See section 1.2.5. 
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(b) has the further consequences and side-effects o f contributing to (or at least not hindering) the 
formation o f a specific social order (ibid., pp. 36-37，40).^^ 
Next, we assume the members of a community, though sometimes counterfactually, aim at 
arriving at a norm through argumentation: 
(2) The members o f a pluralistic group strive to arrive at a norm (regulating potential interest 
conflicts) through argument, i.e. on the basis of good reasons (ibid., p. 40). 
(2) is crucial for discourse ethics. This assumption bridges Kantian deontological ethics to 
dialogical discourse ethics, that is, practical reason is articulated and assimilated to practical 
discourse. Besides, the condition for a rational argument requires further assumption: 
(3) Assume that i f a group strives to arrive at a norm through argument, they commit themselves 
to a discourse which: 
(a) is open to all competent speakers on the issue; 
(b) gives each participant equal chances to raise and question claims, and to express his or her 
needs and interests; and 
(c) is subject to no internal or external coercions (ibid., p. 41). 
It is not difficult to notice that (3a, 3b, 3c) are closely amounted to the ideal speech situation 
(Habermas 1984, p. 26; 1993, p. 56). After postulating these assumptions, a hypothetical 
thesis (4) can thus be drawn from (1, 2, 3): 
(4) The members o f this group strive for a norm supportable by reasons which each affected 
person can accept as good, i.e. reasons surviving after each has been free to question them (1, 2, 
3) (ibid.). 
A key advance is marked by (4); the formal universality in (3a) is boiled down to the more 
substantive situation. The specific situations for a rational discourse are here identified by (4) 
and the conclusion is rationally and discursively drawn if the formal conditions (1, 2, 3) are 
all fulfilled. It vindicates the criticisms of empty formalism of a rational argumentation 
13 We can recourse to (U) which states that the consequences of the acting of that norm require all persons who 
entail in the enactment to accept (Habermas 1990a, p. 66). 
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process, and yet without entrapped into the contextualist self-limitation on the 
incommensurability of contexts. However, one must note that (U) actually grounds on two 
premises beyond the pragmatic rules of the argument to avoid performative self-contradiction, 
that is, the semantic of social norm (1) and a description of the modem pluralistic situation 
⑵.丨4 
After these four steps of derivation, (U) is substantiated by (5): 
(5) One can accept a norm on the basis of good reasons if, and only if, one is rationally 
convinced that the norm's general observance: 
(a) coordinates action according to a value with priority for all; 
(b) has acceptable consequences for social order (ibid.) 
As we can see, (5) is the substantive version of (1) and (4)，to which (5) corresponds the ideal 
generation of norms with observance to (1’ 2, 3). After that, (5) is elaborated by (6) to 
illuminate the standard of evaluation in a discourse: 
(6) One is rationally convinced that a value has priority for all if, and only if, one rationally holds 
that an orientation according to that value may be expected of oneself by others, and of others by 
oneself (i.e. reciprocal behavioural orientation) (ibid.) 
Hence we can see that intersubjectivity takes effect in the evaluation in the way of reciprocal 
orientations, which can be referred to Mead's notion of "generalized other" (Habermas 1984, 
pp. 37-40). But this mutual orientation would be at stake if not secured by (7): 
(7) One rationally holds a reciprocal behavioural orientation only if one supposes that one's 
perception of the interests of both oneself and of others is not distorted by the language, 
conceptual framework, or notion of social order one holds, i.e. that such perception is mediated 
by an appropriate language, etc (Rehg 1991，p. 42)” 
(6) and (7) refer to the condition of the lifeworld certainty—for actors to normally 
"Habermas does not deny that discourse ethics is an ethics closely related to the modern democratic society (cf. 
Habermas 1998，pp. 39-41). 
15 This thesis can be founded in Habermas's vindication of the ideal speech situation (Habermas 2001，pp. 97ff). 
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communicate in the lifeworld—and this certainty is buttressed by the tacitly accepted validity 
claims. As such one can assume that the communication is undistorted by resorting to the 
norms that are observed generally: 
(8) One can suppose one's perception of interests undistorted only if one can convince others, in 
terms they consider appropriate, that the norm's general observances: 
(a) coordinates action according to an interest-regulating value having priority for all; 
(b) has acceptable consequences for social order (3，5, 6, 7) (Rehg 1991, p. 42). 
The intersubjectively enacted consensus appears again, insofar as this perception of values 
and interests is guided by a norm which survives a dialogical give and take. The crucial turn 
appears here as we can see in (8) that the logic of discourse ethics turns back upon itself, in 
that one must suppose a rational conviction on the part of the others (ibid.). In other words, 
what holds for oneself in (6), (7)，and (8) must likewise hold for the others (ibid., p. 43). As 
such the subject of evaluation in (6) and (7) at this moment becomes precisely those "others" 
(the original addressees) (ibid.). Thus we can conclude that: 
(9) One can suppose their terms appropriate only if one is convinced that those terms do not 
distort their perceptions of interests, both theirs and one's own, i.e. only if they can show to one, 
in one's own terms, that the norm's general observance 
(a) coordinates action according to an interest-regulating value having priority for all; 
(b) has acceptable consequences for social order (6，7，8) (ibid.) 
Last but not least, we can draw our conclusion of the logical derivation as: 
(10) A norm is reached on the basis of good reasons, and a rational consensus thereby attained, if 
and only if 
(a) each of those affected can convince the others, in terms they hold appropriate for the 
perception of both their own and others' interests, that the norm's general observance (i) 
coordinates action according to a value having priority for all and (ii) is compatible with 
social order, and 
(b) each can be convinced by all, in terms one considers appropriate, that the norm's general 
observance (i) coordinates action according to a value having priority for all and (ii) is 
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compatible with social order (ibid.). 
To conclude, the acceptance of "the consequences and the side effects" denoted in (U) 
purports that 1. the intersubjectively deliberated value has a priority for all participants, on the 
one hand; and 2. the enactment and observance of a norm have further consequences which 
are compatible with an acceptable social order (Rehg 1991，p. 43)—the conviction overtly 
explicated in discourse ethics and the theory of communicative action~on the other hand. At 
the same time, one should be reminded that 3. the moral point of view conventionally 
endowed with individual subject is now decentered, and then reintegrated in the course of 
rational argumentation—the fusion of the lifeworlds—implies that rational argumentation is 
not a logical circle but a constant progressive coordination of discursive practice undertaken 
by concrete individuals.^^ In this respect, though rational subject is no longer the point of 
reference in the enactment of moral norms, we have to discern that interests, values, and 
needs are nevertheless essentially stemmed from the respect of individual, albeit the definition 
of these "goods" are intersubjectively adjudicated in the lifeworld (Habermas 1987a, pp. 
135ff).i7 
For this intersubjective domain of ethical deliberation, two theoretical implications are 
salient. On the one hand, individuals are allowed to decide their own interest and need 
voluntarily through discourse ethics, inasmuch as only procedures are stipulated formally in 
this procedural ethics, while the "inputs" and "output" contents of the ethical discourse are 
depend on the context and the subjective preference of the participants. On the other hand, 
this voluntary action is secured insofar as the individual needs and interests are transformed 
into the intersubjectively normative arguments underpinned by a mutual consent. This dual 
character of moral reciprocity is proclaimed by Habermas in terms of the inseparability of the 
16 That is, a re-structuring or reproducing the consensus and norms—somehow similar to Anthony Giddens's 
structuration process. 
17 It replies the communitarians' criticisms on the ultimate status of the definition of good as a "hypergood" 
(Taylor 1989, p. 63). Also see section 1.1.3. 
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principles of justice and solidarity (Habermas 1990b; Rehg 1991, p. 44). The principle of 
solidarity is vividly demonstrated in (10b) as far as the moral objectivity claimed by each 
individual must be submitted to the intersubjective validation. As such the principle of justice 
is expressed in (10a) by which a valid consensus, that is, a just norm, can only be enacted by 
each individual who has equal and open rights to allege their own position in light of their 
interests (Rehg 1991, p. 44). In short, rational conviction must be something we arrive at 
together in a more or less similar direction, but this direction is also a rationally justified 
1 o 
direction result from the intersubjective discourse. More importantly, besides the 
philosophical significance of discourse ethics, the principles of justice and solidarity 
correspond to the process of individuation and sociation, which are the conditions for social 
integration and the very possibility of social and moral order. In this way the political 
significance of discourse ethics as a conflict resolving apparatus is all together superseded.'^  
1.1.3. Morality and Ethical Life: From Philosophy and Politics to Sociology 
It is without doubt that discourse ethics is very much entangled with moral philosophy, 
and as shown in the preceding sections, discourse ethics provides an overwhelming 
universalist perspective to mediate two ends of moral universalism and virtue ethics. Yet, 
formalism of universal ethics gets a new transformation from solitary maxim examination to 
dialogical communicative situation, which is significant to reveal the successfulness of 
18 Some communitarians claim that insofar as every actor has their own telos for their action, this telos can only 
be derived from the context and tradition, but not from the formal procedure (Kelly 1990，p. 70; Maclntyre 
1981, p. 139). As Habermas reiterated, certainly action as a whole must be teleological (Habermas 1984, p. 
101)，but one should question the foundation of their own tradition and context, which are originally created 
intersubjectively via communicative actions. That is to say, "there are tradition-dependent moral principles 
which are nonetheless justified by discourse ethics so that they are able to transcend their tradition" (Kelly 
1994, p. 73. Italics added). 
19 Certainly, its application is cultural-dependent and somehow Eurocentric_since the theory is formulated on 
the ground of Western conceptions of democracy, individuality, justice and rights一and yet at the international 
level discourse ethics, at least, poses the direction of a possible way to yield a consensus peacefully. 
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proceduralism over either Kant's relatively empty formalism and virtue ethics. Conversely, 
the disputes between universalist and contextualist can as well have resort to the polemic of 
modernity versus postmodemity. In this regard, three levels of practical reason designed by 
Habermas would provide a socio-political framework for mediation between plural values. 
Also, this framework depicts the possible condition of justice and solidarity, which are the 
two underlying dynamics of a normative social (moral) order. 
Inasmuch as discourse ethics as a procedural ethics is indeed a metaethics that does not 
imply and prompt any normative action (Habermas 1993，p. 14)严 it can contribute to the 
sociology of ethics and morality by reflecting and observing ethics and morality through 
communicative rationality. As a result, the moral procedure of universalism and the discursive 
practical discourses correspond to the communitarianism are mediated (cf. Bernstein 1988, 
pp. 226-228). 
The most prominent philosophical significance of discourse ethics is to assimilate 
universalist and communitarian ethics. As such discrimination of discourse ethics (as a theory 
of argumentative justice) from the virtue ethics (that concerns the goods of life) should be 
clarified. The following paragraphs review the definition of ethics (or ethical life according to 
Hegel, Sittlichkeit) and morality {Moralitdt) reformulated in discourse ethics and the 
differentiation of practical reason into three dimensions—morality, ethical life, and 
pragmatic一is elucidated (ibid., pp. 7-8).21 
20 Habermas saliently contends against the critique on the incapability of motivation of the moral action by 
claiming that discourse ethics is "a purely cognitive undertaking and as such cannot compensate for the 
uncoupling of moral judgment from the concrete motives that inform actions." (Habermas 1993，p. 14. Italics 
added). However, his normative orientation that relevant to the entire project of the theory of communicative 
action should not be overlooked. See section 1.1.1. 
21 The disputes on the relations between morality and ethics, or precisely, on the priority of morality and ethics 
have long been polemic in the history of moral philosophy: beginning from Hegel's objection to Kantian 
morality and to contemporary debates between liberal-rationalist (e.g. John Rawls) and communitarians (e.g. 
Charles Taylor) as well as neo-Aristotelian (e.g. Alasdair Maclntyre). Habermas in this regard can be 
considered to be a liberal-rationalist, with which a rational procedure for moral deliberations and thus a 
collective will formation are demonstrated—actually he follows what Kant embarks on (Habermas 1990a, pp. 
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Table 3 Dimensions and Features of Practical Reason 
x T Levels of 
X ^ Practical Ethical-existential Moral-practical 
X ^ s o n Pragmatic discourse discourse discourse 
Features 
Area of Concern Empirical, rational choice Hermeneutical clarification To clarify legitimate 
of an individual's behavioral expectations in 
self-understanding, clinical response to interpersonal 
questions of a happy or conflicts, the justification and 
not-failed life application of norms that 
stipulate reciprocal rights and 
duties 
Ideal State Suitable technology or a Correct conduct of life, the An agreement concerning the 
realizable program of action realization of a personal life just resolution of a conflict in 
project the realm of norm-regulated 
action 
Applications Technical and strategic Clinical advice Moral judgments 
directions for action 
Dimensions of Arbitrary choice of a subject Striving for self-realization Ought is directed to the free 
"ought-ness" who makes intelligent and thus to the resoluteness will of a person who acts in 
decisions on the basis of of an individual who has accordance with self-given 
contingent attitudes and committed himself to an laws 
preferences that form his authentic life 
point of departure 
Arena for The faculty of rational choice Operates within the horizon It is autonomous in the sense 
Rationality does not extend to the of a life history that it is completely open to 
interests and value determination by moral 
orientations themselves but insights; 
presupposes them as given Only a will that is guided by 
moral insight, and hence is 
completely rational, can be 
called autonomous 
Sources of From empirical knowledge From the context of specific Only those norms proposed 
Validity only, do not relate to the life history that express a common 
addressee interest of all affected can 
win justified assent 
Relations between No internal relation; only Reason and the will condition The autonomous will is 
Reason and Will related through subjective one another reciprocally, completely internal to reason 
goal determinations and though the latter remains 
preferences embedded in the 
life-historical context 
[thematized 
Source: Habermas 1993，pp. 8-13. 
Some clarifications for this table have to be made. In the category of rationality, 
instrumental rationality is adopted in pragmatic discourses to resolve practical and technical 
196ff). Yet Habermas distinguishes himself from Rawls by way of which discourse ethics embarks on the 
dialogical and intersubjective moral discourses, whereas Rawls remains entangled in the monological 
self-contemplation of the universal moral norms which is still under the shadow of Kant. See Cohen (2002) 
and Murphy (1994) for more details. 
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problem in daily life, such that ends are already given, and only the means is available for 
rational examination. Ethical-existential (or simply ethical) discourses, by the way, refer to the 
self-reflective interpretation of individual interests and needs by rationally reflect on one's life 
course. And finally, moral discourse relies on the communicative rationality and thereby 
universalizes and transcends particular contexts. 
On the dimension of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, pragmatic discourse and ethical 
discourse remained egocentric and monological in contrast to the moral discourse. In other 
words, moral discourse should be universal and intersubjective, in that the moral point of 
view is defined as the consideration of all affected by a discourse. Egocentric perspective is 
being transcended in this regard because the consideration of the other cannot be performed 
by solitary actor only, though speakers in discourse with one another deliberate and act upon 
the moral norm according to a maxim (Habermas 1993, p. 
In so doing, the moral point of view emerges "as soon as my actions affect the interests 
of others and lead to conflicts that should be regulated in an impartial manner" (ibid., p. 5). In 
other words, justice as morality has to be distinguished from ethics. A call for justice initiates 
the moral discourse, whereas the pursuit of personal telos of life through a self-reflection is 
the question of the ethical life, as long as personal ethos does not infringe the others' personal 
welfare and well-being (ibid., p. 6). Hence we can say that morality is identified with justice 
and goodness with ethical life in discourse ethics, and their corresponding concepts of norms 
and values are thereby justified,^^ and it is important insofar as morality is formalized and 
22 Kantian monological ethics confers the power of moral deliberation on the subject only, as shown in his 
'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals': "act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will 
a universal law of nature" (Kant 1996，p. 73); also one "is subject only to laws given by himself but still 
universal" (ibid., 82). 
23 Habermas demonstrates the contrast between norms and values in four points: 
Norms and values therefore differ, first, in their references to obligatory rule-following versus teleological 
action; second, in the binary versus graduated coding of their validity claims; third, in their absolute versus 
relative bindingness; and fourth, in the coherence criteria that systems of norms and systems of values 
must respectively satisfy. The fact that norms and values differ in these logical properties yields significant 
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universalized to yield its sociological meaning. 
Besides, ethical life is not necessarily egocentric, if it is linked up with intersubjectivity. 
The boundary of ego can be transgressed by ethical life insofar as one's identity, life history, 
and interests are all related to the framework of an intersubjectively shared form of life 
vis-a-vis other's maxims (ibid.). Therefore, morality and ethical life intersect on the plane of 
maxim—actually it is the core of value—because it ramifies two kinds of question that are 
directed to them distinctively. For ethical life the question of whether a maxim is good for me 
is asked, and private consideration is adopted in this regard; whereas the question of whether I 
can will that a maxim should be followed by everyone as a general law is raised in morality, 
which has already extended the discourse to others (ibid., p. 7). If the maxims (or generally 
speaking, value) conflicts with one another, morality instead of ethical life will obtain a higher 
priority because the preference is given to universality and generality that can integrate 
maxims by the principle of justice. That is to say, obviously, the problem of distribution一that 
relates to the political justice—is more important than the problem of self-fulfillment, since 
more participants are involved in the former problem and it is the prerequisite to resolve the 
latter question. 
Likewise, the dialogically generated consensus through morality discerns itself from the 
monological strategic compromise, though the latter is commonly adopted for conflict 
resolutions. Needless to say, morality is not the only means to resolve value conflicts, but we 
can call it moral as long as the point of departure is not from self-interest but from the interest 
differences for their application as well (Habermas 1996, p. 255) 
From these definitions, the differences between norms and values, and between moral claims and ethical 
claims are elucidated. Although both claims imply oughtness and imperative, the moral c la ims_fol lowing 
Kant一are essentially grounded on the deontology and its dual i ty_fol lowing Durkheim一are manifested; 
nevertheless ethical claims are teleological that orient to realize goods and values (Habermas 1996，p. 255; 
Rehg 1994, p. 94). As such norms are in the binary form of valid or invalid, while values are allocated in a 
hierarchical stratum. 
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for all.24 Therefore the utilitarian sense of ethics is essentially immoral in this light, likewise 
the communitarian ethics that confined in the individual deliberation and realization of virtues 
within a particular community failed to arrive at moral claims. Rather, enforced in-group 
solidarity and inter-groups conflict are resulted, such that an ethics instead of morality is more 
pertinent to their virtue-based communal solidarity. 
Furthermore, in Habermas's conception, values enter into moral discourse as materials 
(Rehg 1994, p. 101). Moral norms, similar to other norms, can never be an empty formal 
norm with absolutely neutral rules of procedure. In this respect, moral norms and ethical 
values intermesh in application and yet remain separated analytically?^ That is why we call 
three dimensions of practical reason but not three kinds of practical reason. Conversely, 
however, while we attempt to justify a norm among others, one must at least have a sense of 
goodness, both to him and to other's (see postulate (4), p. 48), insofar as moral norms by 
definition are yielded intersubjectively, in which a certain extent of sympathetic 
understanding of the other's needs is necessary.^ ^ Following this vein, various ethical values 
and definitions of a good life can be articulated by morality, and thereby can be transcended 
and universalized by the argumentative procedure. 
24 It forecasts the shift of Habermas's formulation from morality to law: "[legal] regulations touch not only on 
moral questions in the narrow sense, but also on pragmatic and ethical questions, and on forming 
compromises among conflicting interest." (Habermas 1998, p. 256. Italics added). At this point, the further 
development of discourse ethics indicates the change of interest of Habermas from the justification of the 
condition of procedural ethics to the institutionalization of the procedure of justice. O f course, these 
developments have reached out the boundary of this thesis. 
25 Habermas may distinguish them in the way that justice pertains to "those structural aspects of the good life 
that can be distinguished from the concrete totality of specific forms of life." (Habermas 1990a, p. 203), and 
"the necessary conditions for such a life." (Habermas 1985，p. 215; 1982, pp. 262-263). Nevertheless, these 
delineations are still equivocal, such that we can infer that the distinction is only analytically separated. 
26 Prejudice, inclinations, and perspectives are inevitable yet essential for every understanding of meaning in 
social life. Cf. Philosophical hermeneutics, especially on Gadamer's conception of understanding meaning (cf. 
Habermas 1988, pp. 162ff; Gadamer 1994). We can also see Habermas's vindication and insistence of the 
situational universality of an intersubjective discourse: " I f the actors do not bring with them, and into their 
discourse, their individual life-histories, their identities, their needs and wants, their traditions, memberships, 
and so forth, practical discourse would at once be robbed of all content." (Habermas 1991, p. 255). 
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Conversely, the tensions between formal and substantive in moral and ethical claims are 
salient. Moral claims cannot and do not oblige to illustrate its substantive content; instead, the 
formal justice of the procedure is their concern. Therefore, speakers are mediated through 
formal procedures in the moral claims which are independent of the materials. Whereas 
ethical claims, as long as it pursues individual (group) values monologically, must reflect 
upon itself for the sake of adjudicating its telos (Rehg 1994，p. 95). While ethical discourses 
move within particular life history and tradition with all materials it needs, moral discourses 
nevertheless assimilate these materials to discover and create potential connections and 
commonalities across different self-understandings of the participants by the formal 
independent procedure with minimal materials entailed (ibid.). 
Regarding to Habermas's three levels of practical reason, there are three reasons to 
justify the priority of morality. Firstly, the perpetuation of social order formed by 
communicative rationality is the most basic as well as ultimate condition for any further moral 
argumentations and ethical evaluations, insofar as value conflicts can no longer be settled on 
the obsolete metaphysical basis (cf. Rehg 1994, p. 99). Secondly, the definitions of the good 
are rudimentarily intersubjective and communicative insofar as mutual recognition on that 
particular good is the very starting point of consensus. Morality, so to speak, is essentially the 
condition for individual pursuit of goodness. Even if we strategically resolve value conflicts 
by compromise, it must still refer, at least indirectly, to moral consideration that governs the 
fairness of the compromise (Habermas 1996，p. 108). In other words, in the same vein as 
Durkheim's social explanation of signing contracts, compromise has its moral 
grounding—fairness—to enable strategic communications. Thirdly, combined with previous 
arguments, different conceptions of good life and identities can arise only if social 
cooperation is established to a certain extent, or certain expectations (i.e. validity claims) are 
formed that can resort from previous norms and consensus. That is to say, the tacit 
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background of expectation and conviction to cooperation exist precedent to further pursuit of 
goodness. More importantly, if these expectations are violated and disrupted at any rate, 
explicit discursive amendments must be undertaken to secure other technical or value pursuits 
(cf. Habermas 1990a, pp. 199-202; 1990b, pp. 243-247). 
To accentuate the synthetic and totalistic nature of discourse ethics, its philosophical, 
political, and sociological meanings are discerned. Discourse ethics as cognitive analysis and 
justification of morality and as sheer procedure for collective will formation cannot extend to 
decide what constitutes goodness of a human life, whereas it can only direct and instruct 
particular goods to become a collectively and rationally motivated pursuit of good life based 
on the principle of impartially (Habermas 1990a, pp. 196-197). As such, morality shifts from 
the misconstrued role of active enactment of moral action to the correctly assigned role of 
passive delimitation of the pursuits of individual happiness, in the way of articulating the 
others' pursuits of happiness to be a condition for one's particular pursuit. 
In this way discourse ethics (as a political ethics) can be conceived as a regulative 
procedure for various conflictive value positions affecting one another, as Habermas would 
term it as the "generalized values" or "abstract basic values" (Habermas 1987b, pp. 344-345). 
In this way, value does not juxtapose with ethical values at the same level, nor a "metavalue" 
in the sense that overrides other values from the top of the value hierarchy, but a "metavalue" 
that motivates the universalization of interests, goods, and needs. 
Thus, the voluntarism posed in Parsonian theory is hereby assimilated in this metavalue 
by way of participants raise challenges and justifications for the others' validity claims, as 
well as vindicate against criticisms by redeeming validity through rational justifications. As 
such social order built up not only by the suffusion of the division of labour, which may 
eventually fall into the necessity of reciprocity of functions in systems, but also constitute of 
interactive practical discourses in which meaning and lifeworld are neatly integrated. 
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The above intertwinement of different aspects of discourse ethics also appears in 
question of justice and solidarity. Habermas prompts that discourse ethics has the integrative 
power to ground justice and the common good (Habermas 1990a, p. 202). As we have already 
explained (postulate (10)), the principle of universalization is endowed with solidarity as the 
outcome. In derivation (10b) we can find the principle of solidarity demanding the submission 
of each individual's claim to moral objectivity to the intersubjective testing (Rehg 1991，p. 
44). However, this form of solidarity is rather a "weak form" inasmuch as discourse ethics 
requires participants to evaluate norms out of one's own conscience, but at the same time 
transcends them as an intersubjective endeavour (Rehg 1994，p. 107).^ ^ As such solidarity is 
the "reversed side" of the same coin of justice, but not something additional to the latter 
(Habermas 1990b, p. 244; Rehg 1994, p. 107). This solidarity generated by discourse ethics 
"socializes" participants—in contrast to justice which "individualizes" speakers in the 
discourse—by forming the tacit elements of the moral discourse: individual autonomy, 
concern for the welfare of the individual, and concern for the integrity of the shared lifeworld 
(Rehg 1994, p. 107; cf. Habermas 1990a, p. 200). 
1.2. The Theory of Communicative Action: The Sociological Foundation of 
Discourse Ethics 
The sociological meaning of discourse ethics can be emphasized to extract pertinent 
sociological elements to construct Habermas's sociology of ethics and morality. Following 
previous sections, it is not difficult to note the redemptive character of discourse ethics. For 
this section, what discourse ethics seeks to redeem is in fact the tacit communicative situation 
conducted by communicative action and backed up by shared lifeworlds. In this respect, 
27 
By contrast, the "rigor form" of the solidarity can be anticipated as the completely internalized conviction to 
the collective values. Unlike its counterpart, no further rational justification on this coincidence is needed. 
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discourse ethics can be construed as a conscious and reflective redemption, yet if it is 
conceived at the societal level, Habermas believes that communicative action and discourse 
ethics are two interdependent elements of an unconscious reflexive process, since the 
discourse situation constituted by universal pragmatics is endowed with the potential of 
reason and morality. It does not mean that discourse ethics is one of the autonomous recursive 
systems of ethics, but this reflexive process requires certain empirical conditions to initiate. 
However, the idealizing tendency of discourse ethics engraved in pragmatics will never be 
lost even if social reality cannot provide sufficient underpinnings, and thus it is modest to say 
that Habermasian sociology of ethics and morality in fact anticipates a normative moral 
order~an order maintained by coupling of reason and morality (see table 1 in introduction). 
Besides its theoretical aspect, the features and methodology of discourse ethics can be 
traced back to the theory of communicative action as a general theory of society. In fact, 
discourse ethics is only one stream of it as long as it rests on one of the three discursive 
justificatory claims to validity, that is, normative rightness claim. The dichotomy of fact/value 
is bridged up by means of allocating them into different validity claims in everyday 
discourses, thus fact and value have a common grounding and normative claims hereby shares 
objectivity with science. The implication of the grounding given by communicative action 
points to the core yet often neglected human activity in everyday life~communication. 
Neither semiotic nor structuralist approaches is adopted by Habermas, instead, pragmatics is 
introduced to reconstruct the underlying rational element of our speech acts and illustrates our 
condition of social life. And in a broader sense, the dynamic of social life could not bypass 
lifeworld, through which moral order is thereby maintained. 
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1.2.1. The Paradox of Rationalization and the Paradigmatic Change 
Everything begins with the problem of philosophy of consciousness. Weberian 
rationalization thesis that shared in the philosophy of consciousness inherits to Horkheimer 
and Adomo's dialectic of enlightenment, in which the hope to emancipation is likely 
annihilated owing to the entwining dialectics of myth and enlightenment. According to 
Habermas, they have exhausted the potential of the philosophy of consciousness and the only 
way out is to discard their foundation (Habermas 1987a, p. 339; 1987b, pp. 295-296). Under 
the framework of the philosophy of language, Weber is fundamentally erroneous to say that 
value spheres must conflict with each other and only the purposive rationality can be the ideal 
type of rationality. This one-sided understanding of the rational action ignores the 
communicative type of action that prevails in everyday life. In other words, Weber is blinded 
to the two separated levels of fact and value, formal and substantive. Besides, while the 
particular contents of the value spheres conflict with each other, universal and formal 
standards of value secured by argumentative redemption of validity claims is still possible 
(Habermas 1984，p. 249). Moreover, the particularity of substantive conflictive values and 
coordinates action mediated by purposive rationality can be transcended by procedural 
rationality and thus understanding instead of success is the inner telos (ibid.). In short, 
purposive rationalization is merely one but not the only one possibility.^^ 
The philosophy of consciousness begins in the purification of consciousness by 
28 We can, precisely, say that Weber conceptualizes the formal/substantive distinction merely as the 
objective/subjective distinction, but cannot coordinate and synthesize these two ends into a broader meaning 
of rationality. In this regard, Habermas reconstructs rationality by introducing formal pragmatics as the 
linguistic basis of social life (Habermas 1987b, pp. 322-323). See section 1.2.2. for more details. 
29 Habermas demarcates the "logic of the developmental possibilities" from the "dynamics of worldview 
development" (Habermas 1984, p. 195). The former refers to the evolutionary logic of social differentiation 
and social rationalization; particularly he specifies the rationalization of the life world as such. This logic of 
rationalization is universal and irreversible. On the contrary, the latter denotes the historical trajectory of 
rationalization, in which the systemic rationalization is insurmountable and the colonization of lifeworld is 
witnessed. This kind of rationalization is historically specific. Weber only discovers the dynamic of 
development but neglects the developmental logic (ibid., pp. 194-198,220-222). 
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self-reflection in Cartesian philosophy, exemplified in the famous slogan "I think therefore I 
am". Self-consciousness is in this light the basic reference point of the world, that is, the 
world exists by virtue of the perception of the self. Segregation of subject and object is the 
corollary as the basic cognitive and ontological framework, and reconciliation of both sides is 
conceived from either the perception of subject (Subjective Idealism) or the incorporation of 
subject into object (e.g. Hegel's "absolute Spirit") (Habermas 1987b, pp. 21-23). Nothing but 
Reason is the only agent and capacity of subject to mediate with the objective world 
constituted by the physical environment and the social environment (i.e. other people). 
According to the Cartesian-Kantian Rationalist tradition, Reason is fragmentized and 
confined to the cognitive domain; and subjectivity endowed with reasoning power has tried to 
provide a substantive foundation for other spheres, e.g. belief, morality, and art (ibid., p. 19).^ ^ 
This postulation of the principle of subjectivity and the structure of self-consciousness 
residing in reason are sufficed to be the source of normative orientations is sharply criticized 
by Hegel (ibid., p. 20). Such that in his Phenomenology of Mind Hegel gives us his basic 
principle of self-estrangement to explain the dialectics of Reason—that a rational being 
through its deliberation must generate its estranged other, thus breaking the bad faith of 
reason that can encompass freedom, reflection, and unification of subject-object at the same 
time by the incessant dialectical processes. Subjectivity, therefore, is transformed into the 
realization of dialectics that oriented to the absolute, and, after all, reaches the absolute Spirit 
embodied in pure Reason. 
The underlying intention of evading from the Cartesian-Kantian notion of Reason, which 
is demonstrated in French Revolution, is that humanistic Reason has long been accompanied 
with terror (ibid., p. viii). The development of the philosophy of consciousness after Hegel 
Kant's attempt can also be shown in the chronology of his publication of three "Critiques": The Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781) (truth and belief), The Critique of Practical Reason (1788) (morality), and The Critique 
of Judgment {\19Qi) (aesthetics). 
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follows the track of anti-rationalism, which repudiates the metanarrative of a "universal", 
"abstract", and "a priori" Reason, exemplified in Nietzsche, Horkheimer and Adomo, 
Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault—all of them seek to evade from the entwinement of Reason 
and terror (ibid., p. ix). Ethics and morality are hereby sterile as long as they incur to the 
complicity to conflict advocators (as pluralistic incommensurable values and cultural 
traditions). For those anti-rationalists, rationalization and Enlightenmentor simply speaking, 
reason and morality—cannot bring us a better future of emancipation but even a darker winter 
with totalistic repression. 
Numerous attempts seek to disentangle from either Rationalist or irrationalist approaches, 
for example, Dieter Henrich's formulation of subjectivity aims at extricate from the 
self-referential vicious circulation of self-consciousness by assuming an ego-less 
consciousness. However, he failed by virtue of fading into mysticism and objectivism without 
solving the paradox of self-referential subjectivity (Habermas 1984, pp. 394-395). Any form 
of self-reference of subjectivity, including Luhmannian autopoietic systems, cannot eschew 
the paradox unless another "dialectical synthesis" in everyday life (ibid., pp. 396-397). 
Rehabilitation of Reason can be achieved not in the way of reviving any form of 
value-oriented rationality resting on individual conscience, but instead an intersubjective 
sense of rationality mediated by language., and actually this normative orientation underlies 
Habermas's whole theoretical project. 
1.2.2. Universal Pragmatics: The Foundation of Moral Order 
In addition to the normative aspect of discourse ethics, another no less, or even more 
important side—analytical reconstruction of the human condition linguistically, that is, as "a 
reconstruction of everyday institutions underlying the impartial judgment of moral conflicts 
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of action" (Habermas 1990a, p. 119)—has to be seriously considered. Universalization of the 
cognitive conditions of every social action is grounded on the universal pragmatics as a 
reconstructive science (Warren 1995, p. 180), in which argumentations can be undertaken 
rationally according to the justification and redemptions of validity claims with a scientific 
status—"to elucidate the depth grammar and rules of 'pre-theoretical knowledge'." (Bernstein 
1985，p. 16). 
Elaborated from Habermas's standpoint, the quasi-transcendental theory of language is 
the most feasible and desirable way to supersede the philosophy of consciousness which 
n 1 
ultimately leads to social pathologies. This transcendental argument for retaining rationality 
without concomitant with the self-preservation of self-consciousness is based on the idea that 
"the possibility of unconstrained rational consensus is something presupposed by the most 
fundamental use of language: its use to arrive at what he calls 'reaching understanding'" 
(Wood 1994, p. 237; Habermas 1979, p. This transcendental power of language 
transcends the particularity of self-preservative subjectivities in light of universal pragmatics 
as the mediation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity—in which that latter is identified 
31 Language is so-called "quasi-transcendental" because Habermas claims that language is the ultimate and 
universal basis for action, as well as "a priori" in the sense that the structure of language exists before any 
particular individual born. However, language is transcendental in the sense of a situational universality 
instead of K.-O. Apel's a priori structure of language, which is still resided in the tenet of the transcendental 
philosophy (cf. Habermas 1979, pp. 21-25). Differences between them can be enumerated: 1. universal 
pragmatics concerns language rather than self-consciousness which is pertained to the transcendental 
philosophy; 2. universal pragmatics is empirically grounded on the observable linguistic competence of 
speakers, yet self-consciousness relies on the intuitive intellection; 3. universal pragmatics does not claim to 
provide an a priori knowledge, whereas self-consciousness proclaims its a priori status (cf. ibid., p. 24). 
32 
We have to specify what does "reaching understanding" means. Habermas explicitly explains that reaching 
understanding in fact is a process of reaching agreement between speaking and acting subjects. This 
agreement is not a de facto accordance but a rationally motivated consent to the content of an utterance. In 
short, it is an agreement among speakers with different interests and cultural backgrounds that based on the 
common convictions (Habermas 1984, p. 287). As Habermas explained: "Coming to an understanding 
[Verstdndigung] means that participants in communication reach an agreement [Einigung] concerning the 
validity of an utterance; agreement [Einverstdndnis] is the intersubjective recognition of the validity claim the 
speaker raises for it." (Habermas 1987a, p. 120). Consensus, in this regard, is not a political or practical 
consensus but a cognitive consensus (Warren 1995, p. 180). More discussion on it will be shown in section 
3.2.2. 
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with the social and the collective. 
The significance of reaching understanding has to be clarified. Understanding via 
communication is actually the cognitive and normative conditions of social life. Without 
understanding, actions cannot be coordinated because of the perplexed interactional situation. 
Therefore, only through reaching understanding can meanings be mediated and social life be 
possible. This is the cognitive condition. Regarding its contribution to the normative condition 
of social life, reaching understanding prescribes a normal social life, which is as such rational 
and moral. Rational and moral social life are construed value-neutrally, in which what 
constitutes the criteria of reason and morality are open for discussion, but the normal form of 
social life, according to Habermas's theory, should be the outcome of the coupling between 
reason and morality, and that the fundamental condition that enables the appearance of social 
order is reaching understanding as well. 
Back to the discussion of language, not all types of language, but only pragmatics, are 
considered to be the justificatory foundation of moral universality. Simply speaking, universal 
pragmatics is a formal analysis of the use of language performatively. It differs from the 
analysis of syntactic structures (syntax of a particular sentence) and the semantic meaning 
(meaning of the words), in the way of an analysis of speech acts or utterances (Habermas 
1979，p. 7). It aims at providing "an explicit description of the rules that a competent speaker 
must master in order to form grammatical sentences and to utter them in an acceptable way" 
(ibid., p. 26). Under this meaning, these pragmatic rules are universal for all human beings as 
long as one can manage the use of language, which means a "general and unavoidable 
presuppositions of communication" (ibid., p. 23). The rational element of speech acts, which 
constitutes communicative action, appears at the formal level of the argumentative 
-JO 
redemption of validity claims (Habermas 1984，p. 249). Hence, subjective speakers uttering 
Four types of validity claims that reside in the formal pragmatics insofar as speakers utter speech acts; they 
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speech acts that oriented to understanding obtain an "illocutionary force" to coordinate 
interpersonal relationships. 
Each illocutionary speech act represents a "universal-pragmatic category of meaning" 
(Habermas 1979, p. 44). This linguistically-constructed meaning directs speakers to argue 
with the acceptability of validity claims in each speech act, and thus orients them to reach 
understanding by rational justification and rational doubt to the validity of speech. In short, 
the goal of a speech act is to be accepted by the hearer. Habermas refers to J. L. Austin's 
analysis of pragmatics to discern three kinds of speech—locutionary, illocutionary, and 
perlocutionary—to indicate different kind of linguistic coordination of the objective, 
intersubjective (or social), and subjective formal worlds relations.34 Once the speech is 
performed, it is already endowed with an effect of action by denoting a truth claim, rightness 
claim, or sincerity claim. In short, all speech acts have a cognitive and a communicative 
dimension. 
An illocutionary act can be called successful if both parties of a communication reach an 
understanding and accept each one's validity claim (ibid., pp. 290-291). In so doing, the 
are: 1. claim to comprehensibility; 2. claim to truth; 3. claim to the normatively right; 4. claim to truthfulness 
(or sincerity). All refer to the precondition of understanding a speech act, whichever it is comprehensible, 
describes a true state of affair, speaks appropriately in certain situation, or expresses one's authentic 
subjective feeling (Habermas 1979，pp. 2-5). Habermas in his later works reduces four validity claims to three 
types, by assuming that comprehensibility is the precondition of communication (Habermas 1984, pp. 10, 39). 
Moreover, the validity claims of speech acts are in principle open to criticisms because they are grounded on 
the formal world-concepts, that is, the validity claims correspond to different worlds一the objective world, 
the intersubjective social world, and the subjective world respectively (ibid., p. 50). All three worlds and 
validity claims are related to the world simultaneously by stressing any one of them thematically (Habermas 
1987a, 120). Thus language via validity claims which obtain both normative and factual characters is able to 
connect to the factual reality (ibid.), and that different formal world-concepts only act as the references 
conferred by speakers, insofar as they communicates in the lifeworld, but not connote that three types of real 
world other than the lifeworld (ibid., pp. 125-127). 
34 These arguments are summarized in figure 16, p. 329 (1984). Locutionary speech depicts the content of a 
prepositional sentence, thus expresses a state of affair which refers to the objective world that can be 
evaluated by the true/false description of a particular affair (Habermas 1984，p. 288). Illocutionary act, 
however, means that a speaker performs an action in saying something, for example, "I hereby promise (or 
command, or confess) you that p" (ibid., p. 289). 
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validity claims of the utterance are measured against the understood norms stemming from 
the lifeworlds—which is the commonly presupposed criterion shared by the speaker and the 
hearer (Wood 1994，p. 239). In most situations, both partners accept the validity claims in 
everyday life tacitly, in that we understand the speech of the others and respond to him/her 
with another utterance without any doubt to his/her validity. ^ ^ This taken for granted 
consensual communication will perpetuate unless a challenge to the validity claim is raised, 
and then the consensual situation would be hereby bracketed, suspended, and disrupted, 
leading to a rational discourse for the sake of resuming the consensual status (cf. Habermas 
1990a, pp. 201-202).36 Above all, the ethical implications underlying rational discourse and 
communicative action become salient, in that "argumentation is a reflective form of 
communicative action and the structures of action oriented toward reaching an understanding 
always presuppose those very relationships of reciprocity and mutual recognition around 
which all moral ideals revolve in everyday life no less than in philosophical ethics." 
Munch provides an excellent example to demonstrate the mechanism of communicative action (Munch 1994， 
pp. 242ff). A football fan wants to re-enter the stadium through the main gate after went outside for a while 
without his ticket. The gate official tries to stop him, unless he can present his ticket. Therefore the fan and 
the official interact in different possible manners, and the best possible way is that the official knows the fan 
and thus allows him to access directly, in which the silent mutual understanding of communication is 
demonstrated. I f it is not the case, then the fan needs to persuade the official for the permission to access. The 
fan may justify his re-entry by saying that he does not have a ticket in hand because he left it in the bag on the 
seat. The official may (or may not) suspect the fan's sincerity and ask for more justifications. Then the fan 
says he just went out for a while and hope that the official recognizes him. This claim also opens the 
possibilities of being accepted or rejected. In this light, the communication goes on by way of argumentation 
based on the rational justification of each one's validity claim. Indeed, the fan can use another means rather 
than persuasion to achieve his goal, for example, to beat the official or to bribe him; however, this surrender 
of rational discourse will only lead to conflict and suppression. Yet, this situation remains entangled in the 
paradoxical situation of rationalization, and an unstable basis for ongoing interaction is resulted (Cronin 1993， 
p. xxix). Likewise, the fan may perform strategically to deceive the official; however, Habermas would argue 
that the strategic action that based on the perlocutionary speech act also requires reaching understanding as 
the precondition of coordinating speaker's and hearer's actions: "not only do illocutions appear in strategic 
action contexts, but perlocutions appear in contexts of communicative action as well" (Habermas 1984, p. 
331). 
36 Ciaran Cronin neatly summarizes the relationship between communicative action and discourse: "Habermas 
describes discourse as a reflective form of communicative action~only in discourse is the issue of validity 
thematized in a universalistic manner that transcends the limits of a particular community" (Cronin 1993，p. 
xxix. Italics added). 
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(Habermas 1990a, p. 130).^ ^ 
Alternative communicative means, however, are also possible insofar as the speaker 
intends to impose an effect upon the hearer through perlocutionary speech acts, and orients to 
success as long as the hearer acts according to the speaker's perlocution (Habermas 1984, pp. 
289ff). In this respect, perlocutionary act indicates the integration of speech acts into contexts 
of strategic interaction (ibid., p. 292)，and this is a special class of strategic action, contra 
communicative action, that employs illocutionary act as the means of action coordination 
(ibid., p. 293). Even strategic action cannot be exempted from the stipulation of universal 
pragmatics in that strategic actors find their basis on mutual recognition to coordinate actions 
in the course of strategic maneuvers and compromises. Again, the cognitive and 
reconstructive characters of universal pragmatics are recapitulated to be the condition of any 
possible communication. 
To conclude, universal pragmatics finds its significance in the theory of communicative 
action as 1. it identifies the unavoidable presuppositions in communication, whether 
strategically or communicatively performed; 2. "it is not concerned with the pragmatics of 
particular speech situations but with a general "species" competence" (Fultner 2001，p. ix); 
and 3. it reconstructs the formal rather than substantive conditions of reaching mutual 
understanding (ibid.), namely, procedural collective will formation transcending particular 
37 In so doing, the possibility of a redemption of validity claims, which is equivalent to the conditions for the 
validity of an utterance, can only be secured by the rational justification. Moral correctness can thus be 
defined concisely as "that we could redeem this claim in an ideal conversation. To put this in another way, to 
believe something is right is to believe that we have good reasons to hold this position." (Chambers 1995, p. 
233). Therefore, in a rational discourse, both partners are motivated to reach an understanding and agreement. 
In reality, of course, limitations on rational discourses exists all the times, however, "the presence of distorted 
communication patterns does not constitute an argument against the universal pragmatic[s]" (Benhabib 1994， 
p. 293), in that the theoretical logic and its application are clearly demarcated with the reason of which 
discourse ethics is merely a metaethics without any strict normative prescriptions, and reaching understanding 
and agreement are only the “condition for arguing about this or that fact or norm or procedure; otherwise we 
would have no cognitive basis for arguing at all." (Warren 1995, p. 180). 
38 
While communicative action are performed procedurally and formally, nevertheless, compare to the semantic 
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and substantive individual interest by the binding and bonding force of speech acts, which is 
the indispensable foundation of social and moral order. That is to say, everyday taken for 
granted consensus has already embodied ethical life and rational discourse as a theory of 
justice is in itself moral—moral in this regard is also to be understood neutrally. 
1.2.3. Communicative Rationality and the Life world: The Redemption of Moral Order 
Precisely point out by Strong and Sposito, "[the] theory of communicative action makes 
the case that rationality is a relevant moral social concept." (Strong and Sposito 1995, p. 263). 
This link is achieved by understanding meaning through communicative rationality, as 
mentioned in section 1.2.2. Understanding the meaning of social action without the flaws of 
positivism and hermeneutics—reduce human agency into objective social facts and relative 
subjectivity respectively—is mediated specifically by pragmatics. Literally and in fact 
theoretically, language and practice entailed in pragmatics are the crux to communicative 
rationality. Understanding the meaning of a social action intellectually does not exhaust all its 
content; in fact, the horizon mediated by language includes the element of praxis, as shown in 
Gadamer's formulation, which is the core of understanding meaning via communicative 
action (Bernstein 1988, p. 224). Yet, the rich phenomenological understanding of the dialogue, 
conversation, and questioning rooted in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics nourish the 
theory of communicative action, and yet the latter is supplemented with a rational redeeming 
mechanism. In so doing, arguments can be rationally criticized and justified, such that moral 
actions are subjected to rational argumentation. During rational discursive process, objectivity 
and subjectivity are organically integrated in the discursive practice, and this is, in fact, the 
theory which concerns sentences rather than utterances, we can see that Habermas concurs to the pragmatic 
theory of meaning in place of the semantic theory which is completely abstracted from contexts of usage 
(Habermas 1992, pp. 57ff). Here comes the profound contrast between Habermas's theory that based on the 
formal procedure yet related to the substantive contents indirectly by pragmatics, and Luhmann's theory that 
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methodological foundation of the Habermasian sociology of ethics and morality. 
Methodological advancement of Habermas's sociology has to resort to the problem of 
understanding meaning again. Since lucid explications of action rarely appear in everyday life, 
the meaning of social action is unlikely to be exhausted by social observer (Habermas 1984， 
pp. 112ff), The crux is that the observer~as a social actor—is symbolically and socially 
structured indeed, therefore one cannot evade from the situation of "double hermeneutic" 
(ibid., p. 110)39—that is, subjective meaning is contingent and opaque to the others and thus 
rational understanding becomes an empty word as long as both participants and observers are 
situated in the commonly shared lifeworld, in which any observation will actually participate 
in the construction of the action situation. Conventional conception of rationality is thereby 
undermined by the fact that practice is a holistic unity mediated by language, so that 
transformation of the concept of rationality is called for. Validity claims as a shared linguistic 
structure locating connecting points for rational deliberation composed the main skeleton of 
the rational redemption in Habermas's universal pragmatics. In communicative rationality, the 
linguistic competence of every participant is assumed, and the overall direction of a rational 
discourse is guided by ideal speech situation, in which only the force of reasoning is admitted 
as the yardstick of rational and moral evaluation. Subjective meaning is thus evaluated 
objectively—based on the rational justification and redemption of the validity claims一such 
that the underlying subjective meaning of moral action should be examined discursively. 
In this way, the ethical component of the communicative rationality becomes salient. 
Communicative action and rational discourse are conducted in a consensual, or according to 
Habermas, moral yet rational manner. Not only in its analytical sense, but also in its 
based on the pure form of semantic structures and systemic operations. See section 3.2.1. 
39 Observer can understand an object only by interpretation, and it can be possible because in the communicative 
process one "must be able in principle to participate in their production; and participation presupposes that 
one belongs" (Habermas 1984’ p. 108). 
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normative sense, rationality and morality are closely coupled in his theory of communicative 
action as a reconstructive science and as the exit from the paradox of modernization. Certainly, 
Habermas's theoretical strategies based on linguistic practice successfully overcomes the 
unproductive dichotomy of objectivism and relativism by probing into the real situation 
(Bernstein 1988, pp. 233ff), however, someone may question that only focus on practice will 
readily confine rationality to the presence of the locuter. To reply to this criticism, another 
mechanism to buttress the potentiality of rational discourse is necessary. Simply speaking, the 
reproduction of lifeworld nourishing culture and meaning supplements communicative 
rationality for the perpetuation of social order. As mentioned above, the interchange between 
communicative action and rational discourse appears at the point of doubting another one's 
validity claim(s) (see figure 1 below); unlike rational action theorists, non-rational elements 
of the social life~culture and meaning in the lifeworld—rather than rational calculation 
coordinates social actions in the form of solidarity."^ ^ 
Figure 1 The Relation between Rational Discourse and the Lifeworld 
(Normal state) 
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Following this vein, as the ultimate horizon of the possible (including normative) human 
40 Individuation and sociation as the elementary constituents of social life are delegated by rational discourse (as 
a theory of justice) and communicative action (as a theory of solidarity) respectively. According to Habermas, 
"identity is produced through socialization, that is, through the fact that the growing child first of all 
integrates itself into a specific social system by appropriating symbolic generalities; it is later secured and 
developed through individuation, that is, precisely through a growing independence in relation to social 
systems." (Habermas 1979, p. 74). 
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actions, lifeworld has different levels of meaning. One of them is to be construed as a moving 
horizon in a phenomenological sense—as in the case of Gadamer~that is linguistically 
constituted and structured (Habermas 1987a, pp. 119，123). Nobody can step out of this 
horizon as it is always at their back (ibid., p.l25), because we act against the background of 
the linguistically structured culture and norms, and "there are no completely unfamiliar 
situations" (ibid.).*' We cannot imagine that we come across with a completely unintelligible 
situation culturally, normatively, or linguistically. In this way, another level of lifeworld is 
highlighted in light of this pre-interpreted and pre-reflective linguistic and cultural domain 
(ibid.)—as "a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns" 
(ibid., p. 124)—in which the interpretive patterns are invisible to the participants if their 
validity are not challenged (ibid., pp. 121’ 124). In short, "the lifeworld appears as a reservoir 
of taken-for-granted, of unshaken convictions that participants in communication draw upon 
in cooperative processes of interpretation" (ibid., p. 124). Metaphorically speaking, lifeworld 
is the ultimate motherland for the possible rational evaluations in the discourse. Validity 
claims are linked with the lifeworld by communicative rationality in the sense of 
"reasonableness"~concerning the criticizable and groundable validity claims evaluate by the 
practical rationality (Habermas 1984, pp. 8-22)—rather than sheer rationality focusing on 
intellectual calculation. "Reasonableness" embraces the mutual consent that transcends the 
substantive content by an intersubjective formal procedure, and as a result particularities are 
universalized and transcended without precluding the contextual significance. Rather, a sheer 
41 The range of application of Habermas's theory is delimited to the social with the presupposition of an 
established social world. On the contrary, the complete unfamiliar situation to the observer, for example, a 
new borne baby, is included in Luhmann's theory. Habermas, certainly, would not treat baby as a social actor, 
however, in Luhmann's case, communication of a baby (as a autopoietic system and more importantly, it is 
treated as an alter ego) can be coordinated to the others (as other autopoietic systems) to resolve double 
contingency and resulting in the emergence of social system. This fundamental difference finds its cause in 
the conception of action/communication coordination: norms embedded in the lifeworld are essential for 
action coordination in Habermas's theory, but only pure cognitive and behavioral coordination of expectation 
are the essence of communication in Luhmann's theory. 
74 
theoretical or intellectual rationality leans heavily on formal calculation will succumb to the 
substantive context of an empty formalism, in that pure reason can readily become an 
irrelevant self-contained pure form to the social reality. In sum: 
The lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they 
can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subject ive)? 
and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and 
arrive at agreements (Habermas 1987a, p. 126. Italics added). 
1.2.4. Communicative Action and Strategic Action: The Possibility of Immorality 
Recalling Habermas's concern on the normality of social order, in which only the 
coupling of reason and morality by communicative rationality can be called normal, immoral 
order represented by immorality of social life is all other categories apart from reason and 
morality; for example, instrumental rationality (rational but immoral), and moralism (moral 
but irrational).44 Yet, similar to Durkheim, abnormal social life can be explained by the 
theory of communicative action, and more importantly, Habermas claims that even immoral 
action一that is, strategic action~cannot eschew the cognitive and normative condition of 
social life. As such, Habermas's sociology of ethics and morality is normative in the sense 
42 These three worlds are merely formal world-concepts as a reference of different types of action (Habermas 
1987a, p. 125-126). Teleological action refers to the objective world, normatively regulated action refers to 
the social world, and dramaturgical action refers to the subjective world (cf. Habermas 1984, pp. 87-94; 
Habermas 1987a, p. 127). They are the frameworks, or categorial scaffold, to classify and denote the action 
situations in the lifeworld, but not empirical discrete worlds separate from the lifeworld (Habermas 1987a, p. 
125). 
43 A shared common lifeworld emerges when participants open their own meaning reference during interaction, 
and at the same time the exchange of meaning via communication enables the fusion of lifeworlds. That is, 
conversely, if no interaction is happened, or more basically, no encounter, then no shared lifeworld would be 
happened at the level of interaction. Of course, by definition, all human beings with linguistic competence 
resides in the lifeworld, but people can keep himself in solitude that isolated from the everyday 
communications, that means the fusion of lifeworlds is not a necessity. It clarifies Habermas's inclination to 
social theory instead of philosophy, in that the theory of communicative action does not, and cannot, be an 
imperative Utopian vision, but formulates the communicative condition which is dependent to the interaction 
between human volition and social circumstances. 
44 See table 4. 
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that it contends with functionalist rationality and social bureaucratization by acclaiming the 
moral orientation of communicative action; whereas it is non-normative as well at the societal 
level, in that the normality of social life includes both morality and immorality is as such 
moral. 
To explore the immorality of social life, Habermas revises Weber's typology of action in 
light of subsuming strategic action stemmed from perlocutionary act in one category, and 
contrasts it to communicative action constituted by illocutionary acts.^ ^ Strategic action aims 
at influencing the decisions of a rational actor by utterances through perlocutions (Habermas 
1984, p. 285), whereas communicative action coordinates actors not through the egocentric 
calculations of success, but instead via action oriented to reaching understanding (ibid., pp. 
285-286). One should note that Habermas's usage of different types of action, as Miinch and 
Berger correctly point out, strictly remains analytical in character (Miinch 1994, p. 241). In 
normal everyday life, "two types of action are intermingled as aspects of concrete action, with 
one or the other taking the lead" (ibid.). "Just as communicative action contains teleological 
components, so teleological action contains communicative ones. One can communicate 
successfully and succeed communicatively" (Berger 1994, p. 182), which depends on which 
perspective is taken at the particular level of analysis. Ernst Tugendhat, notwithstanding, 
suspects the validity of using teleological/non-teleological distinction to distinguish two types 
of action, and concludes that consensus-oriented communicative action should be 
subordinated under the broader realm of teleological action (Tugendhat 2002，pp. 219-222). 
This subversion overlooks the significance of communicative action and in turn cancels the 
consensus-formation character of communicative action and returns to the Weberian strategic 
45 Allen W. Wood argues that Habermas's differentiation between communicative action and strategic action that 
analogous to the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary is too far-fetched, because 
perlocutionary in Austin's terminology does not necessarily points to the success-orientation (Wood 1994, pp. 
242-246). However, we can still claim that Habermas's reconstruction of the typology of action remains 
significance, because even though perlocutionary action does not necessarily identify to strategic action, but it 
still covers most strategic actions that mediated linguistically. 
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action. As already regarded in the theory of communicative action, Habermas pinpoints that 
"the teleological structure is fundamental to all concepts of action [...] But only the strategic 
model of action rests content with an explication of the features of action oriented directly to 
success" (Habermas 1984, p. 101). Hence, as both MUnch and Berger have noticed, the 
analytical distinction between two types of action has already implied. This distinction is 
crucial inasmuch as strategic action induced (systematically) distorted communication in 
which true consensus is impeded by the concealed deceptions and leads to communication 
pathologies manifested in the lifeworld (cf. Habermas 1987a, p. 143).46 
These pathologies can only be redeemed by the consensual-oriented communicative 
action by virtue of "communicative action takes place within a lifeworld that remains at the 
backs of participants in communication. It is present to them only in the prereflective form of 
taken-for-granted background assumptions and naively mastered skills" (Habermas 1984, p. 
335. Italics added). As McCarthy neatly concluded in his introduction to Habermas's book, 
communicative action does not only mediate between meaning and validity in everyday life 
immanently by means of mutual understanding of the norms, but as such readily transcends 
local context and thus can be indefinitely criticized, vindicated, and revised (Habermas 1987b, 
pp. xvi-xvii).47 Constant reflections in practices characterized Habermasian sociology of 
ethics and morality, in which practical reflectivity endowed in communicative action and 
rational discourse does not prescribe a path to collective goodness, instead, a more 
conservative and passive strategy is reserved, namely accountability and redemption. 
46 Even strategic action can be divided into two types that depend on their different consequences. 
Systematically distorted communication, akin to the ideology in the Marxian perspective, arises from the 
unconscious deception, whereas strategic speech engenders what one consciously deceives and thereby 
manipulates the hearer (Habermas 1984, p. 333). 
47 Here Habermas contributes to the rational interpretation in social sciences by adding rational criticism in the 
hermeneutical interpretation. In contrast to Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer 1994)，the 
theory of communicative action excels hermeneutical circular understanding in light of allowing rational 
criticisms based on validity claims without being entrapped in the unreflective reproduction of meaning as 
such (Habermas 1988, pp. 171ff). 
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Enlightenment, according to Habermas, should not be a social agenda like Rationalism and 
state socialism.48 Rather, momentary reformations, refinements, criticisms, and redemptions 
are more appropriate to understand the authentic meaning of Enlightenment一to transform 
from self-incurred constraint into 5e//-engendered emancipation.49 
The possibility of immoral action explains the current immoral situation (or too 
moralized by foundationalism) of capitalist societies, in which social order is still viable even 
ethics and morality are marginalized. To note, Habermas never denies that strategic action is 
incapable of coordinating interactions, but what cannot be confused is that the foundation of 
normal social order should be rested on communicative action rather than strategic action. 
And so long as the people would like to make their claims by reason, the possibility of 
Enlightenment could not be totally discarded. 
1.2.5. Ideal Speech Situation: The Unavoidable Cognitive and Normative Condition of 
Social Life 
Discussions on the theory of communicative action are completed at the point of ideal 
speech situation, which describes the unavoidable presuppositions and formal conditions of 
argumentation (Habermas 1993，p. 56). That is, ideal speech situation is the criteria and 
yardstick to adjudicate whether the generated consensus is moral or not. Only those 
discourses with an idealizing tendency can be called moral discourse, However, idealizing 
here does not necessarily embrace any sense of value preference, but merely as a functionally 
irreplaceable prerequisite of rational discourse (ibid.). To add on the point of idealization, the 
48 According to Habermas, the possibilities of the existing socialism are exhausted, but the socialism-as-critique 
remains a source of hope (Habermas 1987a, pp. 374-403). 
49 Emancipation should not be imposed from outside, but in fact has already endowed in our linguistic 
competence. This understanding of Enlightenment may be more relevant to the pluralistic situation of modern 
societies. 
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meaning of ideal herein represents not the Utopian social harmony, but on the one hand, an 
ideal re-balancing of lifeworld and system; and on the other hand, as a formal condition of 
social life, given that the well being of humanity are irreducible to any societal systems and 
bureaucracies. Without the idealizing of speech situation, communication would only be 
subordinated to power and money, such that authentic human interest for individual and for all 
would be suppressed. 
Ideal speech situation is assigned the role of guardian of moral order because it is a 
counterfactual formal situation for those endowed with linguistic competence, and thus enable 
reflexive argumentation in the discourse. A discourse, as one type of communications, can be 
construed as rational and moral if the following requirements are fulfilled in an ongoing 
communication: 1. Everybody can raise statements with equal rights without temporal, factual, 
and social constraint to a large extent; 2. Everybody can question and criticize statements with 
equal rights; 3. The acceptance of a statement can only be justified by reasons in the course of 
argumentation; 4. Of two competing statements, the one that can be justified by better 
arguments will be accepted; 5. As long as everybody agrees with a statement under conditions 
1, 2, 3, and 4, a statement is taken as valid (cf. Habermas 1984, p. 26; 1993, p. 56; Munch 
1994, p. 247). If a statement is generated from this ideal form of communication, then we can 
say that it is a true statement with consensual truthfulness, normatively rightness, and 
authenticity. To reiterate, this idealizing tendency is not a U t o p i a n imagination, as 
misrecognized by most critics (e.g. Benhabib 1994), but an intuitively endowed rational 
competence for everybody: 
Every speaker knows intuitively that an alleged argument is not a serious one if the appropriate 
conditions are violated一for example, if certain individuals are not allowed to participate, issues 
or contributions are suppressed, agreement or disagreement is manipulated by insinuations or by 
threat of sanctions, and the like (Habermas 1993, p. 56). 
Also, idealization is not a rare activity in knowledge production, for example, "[P]hysical 
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measuring operations also rest on the counterfactual assumption that we can approximate 
ideal quantities to an arbitrary degree of exactitude." (ibid., p. 55). Hence, if our 
communications does not actually fulfill the assumed condition, as if a perfectly level plane 
would never exist, we have acted under a counterfactual presupposition (ibid.)； otherwise no 
scientific principle can be found, and actually, we act with these presuppositions without 
serious consonance of ideal situations. 
Counterfactual presupposition is, whether consciously assumed or not, our conditions for 
the possibility of speech and interaction (Habermas 1993, pp. 55-56); otherwise, we would be 
paralyzed in the "performative self-contradiction", so to speak, one would be self-defeating to 
speak against our possible condition which enables us to raise this objection per se (Habermas 
1990a, pp. 80-81). "[T]he point is [...] that if we want to enter into argumentation," even if 
we would like to argue against the plausibility of ideal speech situation, "we must make these 
presuppositions of argumentation as a matter of fact, despite the fact that they have an ideal 
content to which we can only approximate in reality" (Habermas 1993, p. 164).^ ^ Therefore 
we cannot avoid these presuppositions “performatively’’ when we engage in any discussion, 
unless we choose not to speak; and that is why Habermas's discourse theory is based on 
pragmatics rather than semantics, which reflects the pragmatic condition of participation in 
any discourse—a self-reflective practices—instead of sheer analysis of meaning. 
To summarize, ideal speech situation as such can be understood as the model of ideal 
communication, as well as the condition of the possibility of linguistic communication, and a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment of a rationally motivated consensus 
on the controversial validity claims.^' Privilege status is given to ideal speech situation in that 
Cf. Habermas 1990a, pp. 77ff. Habermas criticizes the moral relativists who fall into the performative 
self-contradiction, insofar as they unavoidably prescribe certain presuppositions to the activities they are 
engaging in. 
We must be careful on this point: ideal speech situation is necessary for communication and thereby 
engenders rationally motivated consensus in an approximation; however, it is not a sufficient condition for the 
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even though "[rjational discourses have an improbable character...[but] [a]t the same time, 
they constitute an irreducible order and cannot be replaced by functional equivalents" 
(Habermas 1993, p. 56).^ ^ Only discourse with idealizing tendency is able to generate a moral 
consensus that secure interests of all concerned; otherwise authority and power would distort 
the rights to question validity claims and strategically control the consensus without any 
rational reflection. Also, its institutionalization in contemporary societies—that is, actualized 
in positive law—helps to prove the validity of discourse ethics insofar as the ideal speech 
situation is to a very large extent realized in the legal systems of Western societies. 
1.3. Concluding Remarks 
So far the normative and analytical elements of ethics and morality in Habermas's theory 
of communicative action and discourse ethics are extracted modestly, in which methodology 
and substantive theory are two prominent aspects of his sociology of ethics and morality. 
Regarding his methodology, emphases are shed on the elimination of the false dichotomy 
between fact and value, objectivism and subjectivism. In fact, objectivist and subjectivist 
perspectives are the communicative outcomes. In other words, both perspectives are two sides 
of the same coin, which cannot be empirically separated as long as we understand social 
consensus-building, as Seyla Benhabib and Agnes Heller argued (Benhabib 1994, pp. 301-302; Heller 1994, p. 
281). They claim that, in effect, cultural traditions and socio-political norms are pregiven for every individual 
before they enter into a discourse. Yet, Benhabib and Heller miss the point that, as what Habermas formulated, 
values and norms of individual and society are encompassed in the lifeworld that allow changes according to 
the learning process. Also, they criticize the vicious circularity of the ideal speech situation as long as it is 
engendered from values and norms, but at the same time challenge that very values and norms. I f one 
construes values and norms stem from the lifeworld are relatively fixed and unchangeable, then their critique 
may be relevant. Unfortunately, lifeworld itself is a hermeneutic horizon of meaning, in which knowledge, 
values, and norms are accumulated on the one hand, and reflections on them by sliding to another position is 
possible on the other (cf. Habermas 1987a, pp. 119-136; 1993，pp. 164-165). 
52 According to Munch's clarification on the status of ideal speech situation in the theory of communicative 
action, "[t]he truth of the theory does not depend on whether or not the conditions of the ideal speech 
situation really exist, with nothing but rational discourse influencing the development of knowledge." (Miinch 
1994, p. 252). 
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phenomenon through communication. 
Reaching understanding, as the crux of the matter, distinguishes sociology of ethics and 
morality from philosophical and political ethics. Neither justification of moral formalism and 
universalism, or as a conflict resolving mechanism (section 1.1.3.) can fulfill the requirement 
of sociology. The moral order of normal social life, rather, is what concerns sociology. 
Through a formal procedure of discourse, normative concern of the aporias of modem society 
and analytical understanding of the structure of pragmatics are assimilated under the flag of 
moral order. Lifeworld consensus and its problematization requires rational discourse to 
restore the normality of social life, in which reason and morality are modestly coupled, yet the 
possibility of social plurality is secured as well. The whole process is reflective and reflexive. 
Speakers with adequate linguistic competence are free to raise challenges against one's 
validity claims and reflection on the discursive situation is thus undertaken. Also, the 
reflexivity of rational discourse is embedded in language and its actualization does not 
necessarily rely on conscious problematization, but generally realized in unconscious 
everyday discourses一the feeling of unreasonable claims has already anticipate rational 
justification. 
As a concluding remark, the most common question about whether Habermas is a 
promoter and idealist of social harmony can be clarified by a deeper interpretation on his 
understanding of moral order. Criticisms usually and inexorably dismiss Habermas's 
idealization by teasing with that "given enough time, given interlocutors of goodwill, and 
given a constraint-free environment, everyone would come to the same conclusion as we 
have." (Chambers 1995, p. 233). Yet, as already explained above, and as contends by 
Habermas, discourse ethics does "not regard the fully transparent society as an ideal." 
(Habermas 1982, p. 235). Reaching understanding and consensus formation is rather a 
cognitive condition for all argumentation instead of political and practical anticipation. To 
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project a possibility of discursive responses to, and negotiation of, conflicts does not signify 
the monolithic consensual society, which goes against the democratic ideals (Warren 1995, p. 
1 8 1 ) . 
However, elaborations and appraisals on institutionalization of morality in law may 
increase the plausibility of discourse ethics by explicating the institutionalized legal system as 
the arena of rational discourse (Habermas 1996). To epitomize, Habermas's development of 
the sociology of law from his groundwork of ethics in fact provides another complementary 
picture for the mediation between social integration and system integration. Legitimation 
yielded by rational discourse in the legal system would consolidate the plausibility of rational 
discourse by articulating moral reasoning with other social institutions (e.g. administration, 
legal system, political decision making, etc.). Through this legal procedure the participants set 
limits to one another and thus discourse can perform a corrective function to the 
self-referential institutions reside in system (Miinch 1994，pp. 268-269). In addition, the scope 
of application of Habermas's theory can be expanded from the moral universal level of 
practical reason to all three levels of practical reason through the institutionalization of 
morality. 
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Chapter 2: Luhmann's The Code of the Moral and Systems 
Theory 
2.1. The Code of the Moral 
Luhmann's sociology of ethics and morality gives us another picture of morality which is 
stemmed from his unique yet peculiar social epistemology and ontology. Methodologically, 
the fact and value distinction as based on the philosophy of consciousness becomes sterile in 
that subject is deconstructed herein and replaced by an observing system, and that social 
reality一as it is real for particular system—is self-constructed by observing system and value 
is formalized to be a system function, that is, to reduce complexity. In this way ethics and 
morality at the social level are understood as system functions and moral phenomenon is 
captured by systemic observation. 
Following this vein, for the substantive theory ethics and morality are marginalized in 
contemporary society inasmuch as their overwhelming primacy and overarching control of 
social actions are replaced by systemic explanations of social behaviours. Grounded on the 
distinction of system and environment, ethics and morality as the attributes of human psyche 
are excluded from social arena and are allocated to psychic systems. Morality appears at the 
social level so long as moral communication is initiated for whatever reason, in which the 
form of moral communication rather than the substantive content of morality is considered. In 
short, ethics and morality are further formalized—that Habermas still reserve a place for 
speakers in discourse—and totally detached from their content, and this formalization has 
important implication. Hence the primacy and foundational meaning of ethics and morality in 
society are exploited and thus their overwhelming integrative function of society is deprived 
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(Luhmann 1993a, p. 1004; 1995, p. 235). 
Marginalization of ethics and morality implies the de-moralization of social order. By 
virtue of the systemic operations, it is sufficed to reproduce social order alone, ethical 
elements of consensus, norms, culture, and value that embraced by Durkheim, Parsons, 
Habermas, and other humanistic theorists thus lost their grounds. Normal and abnormal social 
order are maintained and redeemed by communication only—which is amoral and 
non-normative in its own right—but not exclusive to normative means in any rates. Under this 
amoralization and non-normative conception of social order, ethics and morality remain 
viable only if they are functional to communication, and this indeterminacy of ethics and 
morality may help us to understand moral phenomenon comprehensively—that all moral, 
immoral, and even amoral social communications are explained. 
Some details of Luhmann's approach to sociology of ethics and morality can be listed to 
provide a prima facie of his peculiar theoretical formulations. 
First, similar to Habermas, Luhmann gives us nothing about moral theory, neither 
devising how to facilitate and promote social "goodness", as in philosophical ethics,' nor 
taking ethics and morality as presumed social values for maintaining social order, as in 
Parsonian sociology. Rather, ethics and morality become one of the observed codes and 
communicative semantics to manage societal complexity. 
Second, in this respect, their social integrating functions become somehow obsolete in 
modem society, insofar as the de-centering process of functional differentiation of society 
deconstructs transcendental moral consensus and ethical societal norms. While ethics and 
morality are still attractive in contemporary society, value conflicts would be the result of 
partisan maneuvers of moral codes to defend oneself against the other parties, instead of 
1 "We cannot and do not want to pursue the possibilities of the construction of ethical theories here any longer." 
(Luhmann 1989，p. 141. Italics added). 
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relying on one-sided belief on goodness. • 
As such, consensus formation is no longer the major function of ethics and morality in 
the way of integrating different members in society, rather, complexity reduction in light of 
incorporating or excluding the others by moral appraisals and reproaches is the general form 
of moral communication.^ In other words, ethics and morality are not necessarily "good" by 
projecting a consensus, rather, they may provoke conflict as long as rival groups retain their 
value as "moral" or "ethical" (Luhmann 1989, p. 140)，as exemplified in the conflict of 
civilization or everyday moral condemnations. 
Hence the code of the moral explicates the dual codes of the moral—good/bad, good/evil, 
moral/immoral, esteem/disesteem (or respect/disrespect in other translations)——which are 
equally true and possible, and their values depend on particular historical and social context 
(Luhmann 1995, pp. 156-157)—unlike Habermas's discourse ethics一instead of a universally 
applicable doctrine or imperative. 
2.1.1. The Code of the Moral as the Sociology of Ethics and Morality 
The value-free theorization of ethics and morality briefly demonstrated above begins 
with laws of form, as a pure logic, to conceptualize the world. Luhmann's obsession to the 
logical universality configures the formation of systems theory, by using the concept of 
protological observation,^ autopoiesis,"^  and system/environment distinction to comprehend 
Complexity is the overloaded realization of the possibilities in the world (Luhmann 1979, p. 6), it implies 
unmanageability, disturbance and instability because the unpredictable forthcoming events that may probably 
impede the following operations. Precisely, by the fact that each element is impossible to connect with every 
element, those elements without connection would become idle, or perhaps worse, would become noise that 
inhibits further connections. In other words, complexity would lead to the incapability of connection between 
elements with relations, and thereby the need of the reduction of complexity is called for, which could in turn 
enforce selection (Luhmann 1990, p. 81). In this way, the selectivity of elements constructs an order out of 
noise and thus the coordination of operations becomes possible. 
3 Protologic is the original foundation of logic which grounds every logical deductions (Clam 2000，p. 68). Here 
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not only the social world, but also the world as such. In so doing, social order is reproduced 
by the self-referential systems but not ethics, morality, or value consensus as conceived by 
action theories. In addition, the conception of "order" has undergone drastic revision from 
static and normative patterning and maintenance of social actions in Parsonian sociology to 
the uncertain, contingent, and non-normative communicative relations that focusing on 
reproduction in Luhmann's systems theory (Bailey 1998, p. 142). The integrative function 
contributed to the maintenance of social order is thus conferred to the system emergences, 
rather than relied on ethics and morality. Therefore normality of social life is as such 
non-normative when ethics and morality are only part of functions of social communication. 
Discussion on the form of ethics and morality can begin with the moral code. 
Codification and form of ethics and morality into binary schematism of esteem/disesteem are 
considered herein, but not their substantive connotation, e.g. moral experience and moral 
feeling. This kind of formalism is different from procedural ethics, in which formality of the 
latter is retained for the sake of the universal justification of morality, while the functional 
forms of ethics and morality in moral communication are observed to gain knowledge on 
moral phenomenon,^ which is in fact an amoral purpose. Thus we can say that ethics and 
morality are “functionalized” to be one type of social communications in systems theory, 
which could be possible only by virtue of the abstraction from its content. Certain indifferent 
distance from moralization should be adopted to isolate from the results of communication, 
whether they are good or bad. 
In this regard, analyzing moral code would eschew the seduction of moralization, unlike 
those social theorists undertaking theorization with moral concern. Sociological 
Luhmann refers to Herbert Spencer Brown's "law of form" (Spencer Brown 1969). See section 2.2.2. 
4 But there are challenges to this innovative yet vulnerable introduction (cf. Wagner 1997, 1998; Mingers 2002; 
King and Thornhill 2003b; Joas 1996; Viskovatoff 1999). 
5 To note, communications in systems theory indicate the formation of social systems, since social systems use 
communications as their sole system operation. See section 2.2.4. 
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understanding of morality, according to Luhmann, should be abstinent to moral practice 
because the application of moral code would be easily confused with other codes in 
communication. For instance, the misuse of morality in political system—as moral-political 
values—by confusing powerful authority with what is good, and identifying powerless civil 
subversions with what is bad, or vice versa, would destroy the normal functioning of the 
political system. In so doing, objective understanding of morality is not possible owing to the 
interference of personal moral judgment and preference. It is not difficult to imagine that 
Luhmann incisively opposes critical theorists' Marxian critique to modem society, who 
embarks on a detrimentally incorrect premise that would blind them to the real world一in that 
they one-sidedly presume the goodness of morality. This deficiency can only be recovered by 
strictly adherence to the sociological observation that repudiates from any normative 
preference, and this belief guides the formation of the non-normative sociology of ethics and 
morality. 
Also, sociology as a reflexive knowledge production system—a subsystem under science 
system—a "moral supercooling" is needed to produce knowledge on the one hand (Luhmann 
1987, p. 118; quoted by Rasch and Knodt 1994, p. 6)，and to scrutinize the operation of moral 
code to prevent moralization by ethics on the other hand. Literal to its conventional meaning, 
Ethics as a knowledge built on reflections of morality herein performs guardian function to 
delimit the application of morality, lest moralization to contaminate other social systems. 
Above all, sociology of ethics and morality under systemic interpretation alerts us to the 
tendency of reducing to social ideology and one-sided understanding of morality in the 
humanistic ethics. Only by sociological reflection, as a second-order observation, can help us 
to uncover the "truth" about ethics and morality, which is the only goal of sociology of ethics 
and morality.^ 
6 The system of the sociology of ethics and morality is the sub-system of sociology, and the sub-sub-system of 
the system of social science, and the sub-sub-sub-system of science which is one of the social systems that 
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The amoralization of ethics and morality in sociology is furthered by the methodology of 
systems theory. Luhmann's methodology for his sociology of ethics and morality clings to 
first-order observation and second-order observation for the sake of a higher level of 
observation on social phenomenon.^ This can be achieved by distinguishing two levels of 
observations, in which observer observes one side of the binary schema in the first-order 
observation and observes the distinction of the binary schema drawn in the second-order 
observation. Two approaches are thus applicable to understand morality; but for a relatively 
comprehensive understanding, only second-order observation can accomplish this goal. 
Esteem and disesteem are employed to participate in moral communication as the first-order 
operation; however, the sociology of ethics and morality rests on the second-order observation, 
in which the unity of the esteem/disesteem distinction is observed in this regard. Unlike 
discourse ethics, if one stays at the first-order level, one cannot enter the second-order 
observation at the same time, yet can only shift in between them in different time and 
situations. Participation in or observation of ethics and morality are two contradistinctive 
levels of methodological practice, rather than the unity of participation and observation in 
discourse ethics, which would not yield any productive knowledge in Luhmann's eyes. This 
pursuit of knowledge not only abstract the function of morality in social communications, but 
more radically builds up an isolated observation distance to eradicate any residue of ethical 
elements in sociological theorization. 
However, these claims seemingly violate our common understanding of social life, in 
that moral evaluations embedded in human conscience cannot be readily detached from social 
constitutes society. 
7 Observation, in its very meaning, is the basic analytical operation of systems. First-order observation means 
that system (the observer) observes a particular side of the binary code, e.g. legal in the legal/illegal distinction, 
and then communicates with this side. Second-order observer observes what the first-order observer observes, 
that is, observes how can first-order observation observe legal in the legal/illegal distinction. Simply speaking, 
the second-order observer observes what the first-order observer cannot observe, i.e. its very distinction that 
one depends on for any observation. Hence the second-order observer seems can observe more by 
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practices, and it is indubitably true that morality still haunts everyday interactions. Yet all 
these arguments are convincing only if human subjects are assumed to be the sole constituent 
of society. In the case of systems theory, the de-substantiated systems with their 
communications一rather than human subject—underpin all social phenomena including 
ethics and morality.^ This post-anthropocentric turn is plausible enough because personal 
systems are clearly cut off from social systems, not in the sense of structural 
separation—which is impossible as long as society contains human being—but in the sense of 
mutually excluding operations，Inasmuch as systems are self-referential in operation, 
personal systems would only be the intervening environmental noise from the perspective of 
social systems. Morality as a substantive moral action can therefore enter the social level only 
if it is thematized in communication. As such it is not difficult to imagine that Luhmann is 
sometimes called anti-humanistic theorist in that human agency is excluded from social 
domains. 
A few points have to be noted as a short conclusion for this section. Formal abstraction 
and indifferent scientific and logical analysis are the main features of Luhmannian sociology 
of ethics and morality, which is backed up with the ontological presupposition of system in 
place of human subject. Claimed to refrain from any normative presupposition, only 
observation of observation yields knowledge, and thereby the pure form of morality is 
revealed. 
"debunking" the code as such, and only by this can knowledge be built up. 
Subject has long been the basic unit of society, which is in itself a substantive ontic unity. However, subject in 
this regard is deconstructed and its role is relegated to the observing system, thus the subject/object 
relationship is replaced by the system/environment relationship. See section 3.1. 
9 See section 2.2.3. 
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2.1.2. Features of the Code of the Moral 
As mentioned above, morality as the integrative value of society in the past is now in 
doubt. Under systems theory, morality becomes the binary schematism for overarching social 
interpenetration as well as interhuman interpenetration (Luhmann 1995, p. 234).⑴ That is to 
say, to be the means to coordinate two types of interpenetration instead of integrating different 
function systems under the title of "society" is contemporary situation of morality, because 
conflict is anticipated in moral communications as well as consensus (ibid., p. 235). Morality 
has long been conceived as the major way to engender consensus, but most of us rarely 
acknowledge the other side of morality. Distinguishing morality from immorality must 
involve evaluation by the distinction of esteem/disesteem, accusing someone as immoral will 
irritate the others' dissent. Hence reaching consensus by morality is only part of it, but 
following binary schematism, consensus as the result of moral evaluation should be 
accompanied with conflict; otherwise moral evaluation loses its meaning by losing contrast. 
The dethroned morality is assimilated as merely one type of communications, which has 
no privilege than other types of communications, and only in moral issues would 
communication connect to moral code. This poignant result can be retraced to the history of 
morality in Western society. From the outset, morality was intertwined with religion to 
perform social integrative function." Whereas in the course of evolution society is 
transfigured from segmental to hierarchical differentiation and then to functional 
differentiation, in which religion and morality become more and more far apart. By late 
sixteenth century, morality was independent of religion and theology (Luhmann 1991, p. 82), 
and then transformed into a humanistic social integrative value. From that utilitarian and 
Luhmann describes the relations between systems as "interpenetration". It can be defined as systems 
reciprocally make their own complexity available for the construction of another system (Luhmann 1995. p. 
213). See section 2.2.5. 
11 For more details on the evolution of morality and law, one can refer to Schluchter's reconstruction of Weber's 
developmental history (Schluchter 1981，chap. IV & V). 
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deontology representing two tenets of ethical reflection commenced on the nature of morality 
from the standpoint of human nature (Luhmann 1995, pp. 237-238). Since then social 
sciences try to correlate moral phenomena to their particular subject matters: economics, 
12 
sociology, political science, and legal studies. In the eighteenth century, law acquired its 
independency from morality, in which the former is conferred with the external constraint and 
the latter retained the internal constraint (Luhmann 1996, p. 34). This separation represents 
the furthering of systems autonomy in the way of liberation from the moral constraints in 
jurisprudence. Human freedom is thereby protected by law in which the possibility of being 
unreason and immoral is widely opened (ibid.).'^ As long as different social systems acquire 
their autonomy by specific operative binary coding, ethics and morality as a normative value 
are expelled from them and only formal moral codes are left. The code of the moral precisely 
denotes the codification of morality in order to be functional during communication, and after 
the coding process only form persist, and the rest are left in the environment. 
Concerning its function in social communications, moral code assists to mediate between 
social and interhuman interpenetration since it "is a symbolic generalization that reduces the 
full reflexive complexity of doubly contingent ego/alter relations to expressions of esteem" 
(ibid.), such that the interpenetrating relations can be generalized by symbols of esteem or 
disesteem, for example, verbal appraisal, enacting moral rules, giving merit publicly, approval 
of behaviour with positive reaction, and so on, to reduce the contingent relation at both social 
and interhuman levels. Connectivity of communications, therefore, can be facilitated in that 
"[e]steem [is] a generalized recognition and evaluation which honors the fact that others 
accord with the expectations one believes must be assumed for social relations to continue." 
12 Adam Smith, Auguste Comte, and Durkheim, to name a few, tried to ground ethics in the economic system, 
science system, and social system respectively. 
13 This can be paralleled by Weber's avowal of the pluralistic social arena of the modern world, as well as 
Durkheim's endeavour for the reestablishment of modern morality by means of consolidating organic 
solidarity of the occupational groups and internalizing these norms through moral education. 
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(ibid.). Thus, "[t]he foundation of morality [lies] in the communicative requirement to attain 
and maintain personal [esteem]" (Neckel and Wolf 1994, p. 80)，esteem in this regard is the 
generative principle of all morality (ibid.).^^ 
Esteem and disesteem in the code of the moral are understood as the semantic of 
morality that changes in socio-historical evolution, in which the binary form instead of 
substance or content of morality is considered (Luhmann 1994a, p. 30).'^ Shared with the 
same mechanism with other binary codes of other function systems, moral code has dual 
character of assignment of esteem/disesteem to the other person (Luhmann 1996, p. 30). 
Provided that all participants involved would consent on the usage of the code, even if the 
criteria (or program) of esteem/disesteem distinction is relative to different coupling persons, 
the form remains invariant. Not all communications entail moral code, it is employed to 
ascribe the other to be good or bad only when dispute arises (or one want to initiate a dispute). 
Like other binary codes, moral code operates in a universal yet specific manner. On the one 
hand it has already exhausted all possibilities that can be interpreted in moral terms', only 
good or bad, esteem or disesteem, but no other (ibid., p. 31). On the other hand moral code 
emerges specifically in context, that is, it correlates to the disputing persons. Hence codes are 
invariant, yet programs_the criteria and contextual element for evaluation—are various and 
change historically, and through this the structure of the societal system changes as well 
(ibid.). 
As long as morality is indeterminate, moralist may prescribe their act as good when 
applying moral code upon the others, namely, arbitrarily legitimating one's distinction on 
Recalling the non-foundationalist theory abided by Luhmann, esteem is construed as the connecting points 
between two kinds of interpenetration that mediates personal with social systems. However, esteem as a 
historically dependent semantic that attributed to the whole person cannot be readily assimilated into the 
universal form of autopoietic operations. See Neckel and Wolf (1994) and Sixel (1983). 
15 The meaning of "form" here we used is referred to Spencer Brown's laws of form (Spencer Brown 1969)，also 
see section 2.2.2. 
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good or bad is good per se, e.g. I believe, for whatever reason, my moral reproach to you is 
morally good and right. But, in fact, someone, e.g. Marquis de Sade may consider morality, 
together with its form, are bad as such—moral evaluation as such is immoral ！ (Luhmann 
1993a, p. 996). Nevertheless, if we conceive moral code in terms of laws of form, then we 
must concede that there is no logical justification to assert that distinguishing between good or 
bad is as such good or bad. Moral code, thus, can only be a distinction, like all other forms of 
distinction and binary codes, rudimentarily grounds on a paradox (Luhmann 1996, p. 30).^ ^ 
That is to say, distinguishing good/bad (as distinction) cannot be decided to be good/bad (as 
unity). Applying the code to itself leads to paradox that blocks further observations (Luhmann 
1989, p. 140). 
Paradox of the moral code also appears in its application. To mention again, drawing 
moral code does not necessarily lead to a peaceful consensus; quite the contrary, in most of 
the cases conflict would be the result. Actually it can be understood by common sense: moral 
code is applied exclusively to the whole person by imposing esteem/disesteem to the others 
(Luhmann 1991，p. 84), which may provoke the constitution or destruction of the integrity of 
self-identity, that is, the others personality is being praised or devaluated in the form of 
appraisal, respect, insult, disdain, or disesteem. 口 Together with that loving/hating 
distinction—loving of good and hating of bad—is the polemic origin of morality (Luhmann 
1989, p. 140), application of morality would more or less give rise to acute conflict and 
probably resolve by other more guaranteed communications to terminate the dispute: violence 
or law (cf. Luhmann 1991’ p. 86; 1996b, p. 34). 
16 Distinction as such is paradoxical because one can only observe by drawing distinctions without consideration 
of the rationale of the distinction being drawn. For example, one can distinguish goodness by indicating what 
is bad, but one cannot reflect on why this indication is like this but not otherwise. In the simplest form of a 
distinction, A= -A is paradoxical, and A=A is tautological. Hence one can see that we cannot escape either 
paradox or tautology, as A only has two forms (A, -A). Cf. Luhmann 1988. 
17 This conceptualization of morality as an esteem-giving communication can be compared to critical theory's 
similar conception, despite Axel Honneth's deviation from the "orthodox critical theorists" (Honneth 1995)， 
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Regarding to the in variance of moral code but variant programs, flexibility is set in: 
"Nobody can avoid the moral implications of his or her own statements but everybody can 
choose the [programs] that favour their own interests and opinions" (Luhmann 1996, p. 31). 
Only thus can the consistency in form and variety in content be explained in the course of 
social transformations. In the past, the most common program that was used in moral code is 
value, whether transcendental or utilitarianistic ones. The popularity of values to be the 
program can be explained by several reasons, one is that: 1. they are indisputable and able to 
elude from the explicit communication (ibid.). Anyone in moral communication can resort to 
1 R 
his/her own value(s) and worldview which cannot be readily challenged and dissuaded. 
Moreover, 2. values can be, and usually are, taken for granted and "this taken-for-grantedness 
can also be taken for granted" (ibid.). In other words, values can be communicated 
inconspicuously, because "value denotes preferences the validity of which can safely be 
assumed in social communication without having to face disagreement" (Luhmann 1988, p. 
32). In modem pluralism, we always take value expression as merely the expression of 
personal preference and adhere to the principle of inviolability of personal integrity, and this 
delay the potential to acute conflict. 3. added with the custom that we seldom totally disclose 
our own value to prevent criticisms, and "since sufficiently general values [—for example, 
mutual tolerance, mutual indifference—] are easy to find, the latency of values can also be 
tactically to suppress disagreement" (ibid., p. 33), values becomes the excellent program to 
connect communication without further ado. 
Following this vein, interpretation instead of argumentation on values is commonly 
undertaken in moral communication (Luhmann 1988, p. 33). During interpretation another 
which shows that morality can be built up on struggle and conflict besides consensus. 
18 
Of course one can try to change the other's value by persuasion, violence, or other sanctions (e.g. norms, law, 
rules), but on the one hand, value in its very definition cannot be readily altered by persuasive rhetoric. On the 
other hand, violence and other sanctions in turn will terminate moral communication and direct to another 
kind of communications (cf. figure 3). In so doing, either agrees to that value, or establishes another value for 
one's own interest and opinion, that is, adopts another program, will be the only reactions. 
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one's observation is being observed without reflecting to the observer's own observation, 
namely, the observing observer observes the others' value by taking his own value as the 
criteria of evaluation. This limitation of observation~one cannot observe one's rationale of 
drawing distinction when one is commencing on that distinction一makes value to be a good 
"blind spot" for systems to observe and act (ibid., p. 32). This blind spot facilitates 
communication inasmuch as it decides nothing, and seems to succeed but actually fails to 
allocate the values of "good" and "bad" to concrete behaviors (Luhmann 1996, p. 32). In this 
way values blind value judgment from the fact of indeterminacy of decision and maintain 
taken-for-grantedness for further communication in light of producing a semantic camouflage 
for the unresolved conflicts. 
Paradoxically, if the above arguments are justified, then morality and moral code as such 
cannot make any moral judgment (Luhmann 1989, p. 140)，since moral judgment requires 
certain detachment to the moral code which is impossible as long as observation remains at 
the first-order cybernetic level. In other words, one uses good or bad to esteem or disesteem 
other people cannot at the same time decide one's own decision is correct or not. Only in the 
second-order observation can observer observes how one observe the others by moral 
communication, but in the meanwhile one cannot perform moral communication because 
esteem/disesteem distinction is not the code being communicated. In short, participation in 
moral communication pertains to the first-order observation, and reflections on the unity of 
the moral code, that is, observing good/bad as a unity, is a second-order observation (ibid., p. 
141; Luhmann 1993a，p. 1008). 
Two observation levels are significant in Luhmannian sociology of ethics and morality in 
that ethics functions to be the second-order reflecting mechanism upon morality to delimit the 
operation of moral code in communications. Similar to the conventional definition of 
ethics—primarily as an academic theory concerning the justification of moral judgment 
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(Luhmann 1994a, p. 30)~ethics in systems theory enables observers to observe two sides of 
the moral code simultaneously, and thereby make a judgment on coding and its program. 
Through this can the paradox of moral code—the coexistence of good and bad—be resolved 
in light of observing the unity of moral code—the distinction of good and bad (Luhmann 
1989, p. 141). Nonetheless, ethics as an observation can observe the paradox of morality by 
virtue of its unreflective character on its own blind spot. Ethics like moral code cannot explain 
its unity by selecting one side but not the other, such that the unity of ethics is itself a paradox 
in much the same way. 
Thus Luhmann argues that by no means the paradox of ethics and moral can be totally 
resolved; rather, ironically, this irresolvability enables the functioning of ethics and morality. 
The reason is simple, because only the irresolvable paradox leaves traces for connection, 
therefore we should not aim at resolve paradox by elimination, which will eradicate the 
distinction altogether and no more observation is possible. Instead, de-paradoxicization of the 
paradox performed by the second-order observation is a more practical and productive 
solution, by which paradox is concealed and deactivated the system's delimitation.'^ Only 
thus can moral communication continue with ethical reflection and further reflection and so 
on. 
As indicated by Luhmann, this formalization of ethics and morality makes them no 
longer the central dynamic of modem society. In a functionally differentiated society, morality 
cannot be readily integrated into any one of the function systems as there is no meta-code for 
the whole society (Luhmann 1996, p. 35). As long as function systems close their boundaries 
by operating their specific binary code exclusively—as if the binary code of economic 
systems cannot be functioned in political systems—moral code fails to enter any social 
systems and thus wander around the environments of social systems. 
See section 2.2.2. 
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However, the retreat of morality from the central position of society does not amount to 
the "decline" or "collapse" of morality. Rather, moral code and its values as a semantic should 
be redefined according to different socio-historical context. In other words, its withdrawal 
from other social systems is demanded and sanctioned by itself (Luhmann 1994a, p. 29). 
Imagine the opposite case by our common sense, it is definitely immoral if we equate moral 
code to any system, such as to regard holding political office to be morally good, and not 
holding political office to be morally bad in political system; or attributing legality to what is 
moral and illegality to what is immoral. Therefore, morality is an intruder, or a disturbance 
factor, from the perspective of social systems (Luhmann 1995, p. 240)，in the way of 
intervening functional operations of social systems by fusing two untransferable types of code, 
which will annihilate the binary coding and the abnormality of system operations as a 
result—morality loses its meaning of being moral, and legality loses its meaning of being 
legal. 
In this regard Luhmann proclaims the higher amorality of social systems in which all of 
them isolate itself from morality in order to maintain their purity of operation (Luhmann 1991， 
p. 86). Although moral integration should be renounced for the sake of the normal functioning 
of the social systems, nevertheless, it does not mean that morality resigns from society totally. 
Moral inclusion, especially by means of values, prevails as before—illustrated by various 
group ethics embraced by different religious groups, for example一but the idea of moral 
integration of the social system is relinquished (ibid.). In sum, morality is no longer the 
emanation of the transcendental reason, the mystical ontic "nature", or inviolable "Humanity". 
The distinctive characteristic of the code of the moral is its amorality, which can go beyond 
entanglement with the complexity of the "moral consciousness" internalized in the psychic 
system which is essentially impenetrable, and additionally reduces complexity by the 
emergence of moral communication that operates on the manageable binary code. 
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As such morality breaks from its conventional image of peaceful consensus and its 
maintenance of social order by unanimity value conformity. One remarkable point, agreed by 
in 
Habermas as well, is that moral communication rarely emerges in normal cases, yet most 
likely appears in pathological or dangerous situation in order to reinstall social 
communication by conflict (Luhmann 1991, p. 84).21 Similar to Habermas's discourse ethics, 
only in the situation of dissent will morality be the focus of communication, that is, moral 
communication emerges to mediate between contradictory personal evaluations. Despite the 
similarity between Luhmann and Habermas, reaching understanding is not the inner telos of 
moral communication, because full understanding will immediately terminate any 
connectivity of communication; 22 nothing can be talked about when full mutual 
understanding is reached since the complexity would be exhausted and thus any possibility of 
further communication would be annihilated, that is, no further reference point. 
To conclude, sociology of ethics and morality, according to Luhmann, does not aim at 
replacing (philosophic) Ethics, but seek to substitute normative and anthwpocentric 
moral-social theories that resort to the human nature and then leave the complexity of it 
unexplained (Luhmann 1995, p. 236). Variation of different programs of the moral code 
should gain attention in the course of the socio-historical evolution, instead of static, artificial 
construction of the moral ideal cut off from the social reality, (ibid., p. 238). From that one 
can observe the displacement of themes in relation to morality, but not replacing philosophic 
ethics to enact moral rules and their applications. To reiterate, the possibility of Ethics is not 
totally precluded by Luhmann, but for a sociological research, a productive survey on ethics 
20 Comparing Habermas's distinction between communication and rational discourse to Luhmann's moral 
communication will highlight the similarity between them. Also see their convergence on the concept of trust 
in section 2.2.5. 
21 
Conflict has a function to recover and introduce innovations into communication in order to enhance 
connectivity. Thus, conflict has a latent function to save social communications in emergency (cf. Luhmann 
1995，chap. 9). 38 
Communication actually functions as a means to seek information, thus a full understanding will in turn 
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and morality by Ethics can be yielded only insofar as the subject matters are reformulated in a 
non-paradoxical manner, which is hitherto impossible~owing to Ethics operates on good/bad 
distinction (Luhmann 1989, p. 142). Before this paradoxical situation can be prevented, 
sociology can only adopt its second-order observation of ethics and morality by ways of 
elucidating its emergence, and transformations, with an amoral observation, by means of 
which useful scientific knowledge can be produced. 
2.2. Systems Theory: Approaching a Non-normative Social Order 
Legitimation of the code of the moral comes from systems theory, with which specific 
terminologies and theoretical logic are provided. It is undeniable that Luhmann's systems 
theory is too complex for this thesis and thus, using the logic of systems theory itself, 
concepts which are relevant to sociology of ethics and morality are extracted and systemically 
constructed within the system of discourse of this thesis. Therefore, elaborations will begin 
with the ground and problematic of systems theory, that is, complexity and its 
resolution—binary schematism (section 2.2.1.). Binary coding follows the theory of 
observation, which is the epistemological and ontological foundation of systems theory 
(section 2.2.2.). However, problems occur when the question about the underlying dynamic of 
systemic operations is raised, which will uncover the fundamental irony of binary 
code—paradox and tautology. In fact, paradox and tautology are two pure forms of 
self-reference that makes operation blocked or looped. With de-paradoxization and 
de-tautologization self-reference becomes productive and thus the ontological ground of 
social life is thereby justified一recursive reproduction of social order (section 2.2.2.). This 
recursivity gives rise to the distinction of system/environment and its autopoietic operation, in 
which society is further clarified and ethics and morality are further relegated to the 
terminate its functioning. See more details in section 2.2.4. 
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environment of social systems—psychic systems (section 2.2.3.). Under this new conception 
of society, its constituents~communication一and derivative一action一are interpreted 
radically apart from current action theories and Parsons's structural functionalism (section 
2.2.4.). All these finally converge on the point of the emergence of order, which can be 
explained by the order from noise principle that examined through double contingency and 
interpenetration (section 2.2.5.). This reflexive and amoral social order replaces obsolete 
pattern maintenance in Parsons's social systems by the concept of autopoiesis. In this regard 
order is emerged from below, which is different from Parsonian theory that prescribes 
normative culture, norms, (moral) values etc. to preserve established patterns, and it may be 
unsurprising that Luhmann's sociology of ethics and morality is absolutely amoral, which is 
consistent with his general sociology. 
2.2.1. Complexity and Binary Schematism: The Basic Settings of the World 
Witnessed by anyone living in contemporary society, social differentiation has already 
been realized and the ever-increasing social complexity creates the problem of social order, 
which is in fact the leitmotif of Luhmann's general sociology. While Luhmann has avowed his 
theory a "presuppositioness" theory, apart from the mainstream sociologies which take certain 
presuppositions of humanity, norms, and interest, he nevertheless still presupposes the 
indubitability of the unmanageable complexity of our world (Luhmann 1979，p. 5). Two 
major advantages of taking complexity as a fundamental problem are given? One of them is 
that complexity has no boundary, such that it is not a system (ibid.), which means there is no 
unmanageable environment outside, and implies that complexity is the "non-foundationalist 
foundation"—as a horizonof systems theory. To become a basis of formulating a general 
23 For the background of introducing complexity into social theory, Medd gives a brief yet concise elucidation 
(Medd 2002, pp. 71-76). 
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theory, or even a "supertheory" (Luhmann 1995, pp. 4-5), system with boundary is incapable 
to fulfill the task assigned by virtue of the fact that there must be things outside the boundary. 
Thus the best way of theorization is to ground a boundless horizon that nourishes all 
beings—whether actual or potential, past or future, ego or alter~in the same world. As such 
Luhmann takes the "world" as the widest ontological horizon with complexity as its content, 
and hereby the problems of existence and maintenance of system becomes the dynamic that 
steer the elaboration of the theoretical logic.之斗 
Another reason supporting the presupposition of complexity is that a high degree of 
abstraction and universality is required by complexity which can effectively break the 
traditional demarcations of different systems and social science disciplines that impede a 
general and universal theorization (Luhmann 1979, p. 5). The innovation of systems theory is 
that communication and operation endowed with difference is employed and grounded on the 
basis of binary schematism. Complexity can thus be organized and reduced through the binary 
channeling of selections.^ ^ 
Complexity becomes the heart of the matter in systems theory, as well as the code of the 
moral when it is related to the contingent social interaction in everyday life.^ ^ Complexity 
exists by virtue of the intransparency of the consciousness of the interactive partners 
24 In addition, existence, maintenance and reproduction (the perpetuation of existence) is somewhat 
metaphorical to biology that concerns life and continuation of life by maintenance and reproduction, but they 
only differentiates at the point of autopoiesis (production and reproduction) that underpins existence (the 
reproduced state) and maintenance (continuation of autopoiesis). Hence it is not difficult to imagine that for a 
biological organism there is no intrinsic value of ethics and morality, but only existence or non-existence, 
dead or alive is the matter. That is why Habermas criticized Luhmann by which receding to not 
"metaphysical" but "metabiological" (Habermas 1987b, pp. 372-373). 
25 Complexity is Luhmann's theoretical presupposition that different from the mainstream sociologists, however, 
it has already been thematized in scientific theories, for example, general systems theory (Bertalanffy 1973) 
chaos theory and thermodynamics (Prigongine 1984)，cybernetics (von Foerster 1981)，and biology 
(Maturana and Varela 1980; Maturana 1981)，and thus Luhmann's pursuits of the scientific enterprise are 
revealed by his introduction of the concepts from natural sciences. Cf. Medd 2002. 
Simply speaking, contingency is defined as the occurrences that are neither necessary nor impossible 
(Luhmann 1998, p. 45). It can be further defined by "the negation of necessity and impossibility" (ibid.). 
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(Luhmann 1979，p. 7). Unpredictability of the alter yields the unbearable risk when we act 
against someone who we cannot, to a large extent, predict the others' action. Social 
occurrences are contingent because of every event that does happen could have been 
otherwise, that is, could not have taken place, and infinite possibilities of "otherwise" awaited 
for actualization. Thus it is impossible to say impossible as far as impossibility is not 
impossible but just not yet actualized. In everyday practices, expectations can be fulfilled or 
disappointed, and action coordination becomes improbable unless this contingency is reduced 
to a manageable extent. In this respect Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils propose the necessity 
of the value consensus embodied in social norms that can arrange social complexity generated 
by different intentions and interests, and thus ethics and morality are hereby entailed to be the 
integrative means for social order (Parsons and Shils 1951, pp. 3-29). This normative solution 
irritates Luhmann in that the rationale of existence of norms precedent to anything else is still 
in question, such that he formulates an alternative to this normative solution and probes 
directly into the true kernel of the matter一double contingency—without resorting to norms, 
culture, or extramundane being (Luhmann 1916)?^ Elimination of the contingency indicates 
the probability of ordering, and the emergence of system, without resort to any preceding 
ordered patterns, can only be rested on a random base, and the principle of "order out of 
noise" is thereby employed by Luhmann to be the ultimate ground of his sociology (Luhmann 
1995, p. 105).28 
This non-normative resolution of the problem of complexity is characterized by binary 
schematism. Similar to binary oppositions shared by the structuralists, binary dichotomy is 
used as the scheme for systemic operation in every selection of one side. Under this scheme, 
moral code is thus the functional form of morality in which esteem or disesteem are the 
selections in the course of the communication process. Binary schematism is crucial for 
27 More details will be illustrated in section 2.2.5. 
28 
See section 2.2.5. 
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systems theory in that morality with enormous complex intrinsic value can be abstracted to 
the relatively reduced social level, or precisely, the manageable moral communication 
emerges from (at least) two interacting psychic systems. In short, binary schematism is a 
complexity reduction mechanism vital to all systemic operations, inasmuch as code provides 
channel for selection, and basically selection constitutes the system and indirectly construct 
the world.29 
Let us draw some crucial features of binary schematism, which enable the complexity 
handling in a way of differentiating things into a binary manner~as "positive"/ "negation of 
the positive" in its purest form. Firstly, binary schematism (or simply binary code) functions 
to resolve tautologies and paradoxes encounter by any system—tautologies and paradoxes 
emerge from the unity of a system, either in the form of circular argument (e.g. legal is legal) 
or self-contradiction (one cannot legally maintain that one is legal). Fortunately, binary codes 
that rest on the principle of difference (the difference of legal and illegal) can help directing 
operations into either one side of it without raising the question of the unity of the code itself 
(Luhmann 1989，p. 37), such that law as a social system uses legal/illegal as its binary codes 
to process complexity. Everything can enter into, or precisely, being perceived by, this system 
insofar as it can be translated into either legal or illegal.^^ Things cannot pass through this 
translating process is excluded out of the system to be an environmental noise irrelevant to the 
system. Hence the system can use this difference to steer its operations by allowing the 
progression of selections. 
Second, codes are totalizing constructions (ibid., p. 38). For the system which uses 
particular code, the world (from the perspective of that system) is divided into two sides. This 
29 The existence of the world is relative to a particular system, as the world is a world for an observer what one 
observes. This radical constructivism will be briefly explained in section 2.2.3. 
The difference between how do information "enter" and "being perceived" is related to the nature of systemic 
operation, in which that particular information is allowed to enter insofar as the system actively "creates" that 
piece of information. Simply speaking, autopoietic system creates information for its own use. 
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distinction is exhaustive that the marked side and the unmarked side compose the world. Thus 
every system with different binary codes perceives the world in its own way, and no 
omniscient observing system can transcend or emerge out of its binary codes. 
Third, two sides of the code are equally valid for access; neither one side is necessary or 
more probable than the other one because the distinction itself is neutral. 
Fourth, codes are valid insofar as, e.g. in social system, communication chooses their 
domain of application (ibid.). One talk about a social issue from the perspective of 
legal/illegal has readily entered into legal system, and if the topic is shifted to the power 
holder or opposing parties, then political system emerges in this discourse without any trace 
of legal system, such that every system is characterized with non-transferable binary codes. 
Fifth, code is different from the criteria for correct operations (programming) (ibid., p. 
40). The different between codes and programs is that, the codes denote system 
closureevery value refers to this code but no other~whereas programming of the system 
defines the correct and suitable operations of system's codes. For example, legal system 
confines all communication along legal/illegal as its binary code, whereas its programming 
defines what is a valid legal norm, that is, for a correct handling of the values "legal" or 
"illegal" (ibid., pp. 47-48). For moral code, esteem and disesteem are the coding, but whether 
the attribution of the code to particular person is suitable or not, or in other words, will that 
attribution be followed by conflict or consensus, resulting in further moral communication or 
terminates moral discourse, is the matter of programming. 
Sixth, by the difference between code and program the combination of closure and 
openness in the same system is possible (ibid., p. 40). Codes leads to system closure, whereas 
program makes the entry of the external data possible, that is, to fix the conditions under 
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which one or the other value is posited. 
Seventh, binary codes exclude the third value that will lead to paradoxes or tautologies 
by reintroducing the unity of the code or assigning irrelevant codes to spoil normal operations. 
For example, legal system can only operate on legal/illegal, but operation blockage as a result 
when using legal (”【value)/illegal value)/legal and illegal (3rd value); or 
legal/illegal/suffering (the irrelevant value) (ibid., p. 41).^ ^ 
The last feature is that, eighth, binary codes signify the bifurcation of operations and lead 
to the constitution of a historically irreversible structure of complexity (ibid.), such as the 
construction of the written rules and laws that are independent to particular legal system. 
The prevalence of binary codes in society implies the fact that society is to a large extent 
differentiated functionally. Only self-referential meaning systems uses binary codes, that 
means binary codes do not exhaust all communication, inasmuch as binary codes are an 
evolutionary achievement of societal differentiation (Luhmann 1989，pp. 38，44).^ ^ Hence in 
this way systems theory should not be criticized by alleging an intellectualistic and ahistorical 
theoretical system. Evolution, in fact, is the crux of the matter in Luhmann's sociology to 
enhance its sensitivity to history and empirical reality, as well as to pave the way for the 
de-subjectivation of his theory (cf. Schwanitz 1996, p. 490).^ "^  
31 In other words, program introduces the possibility of definition and re-definition of the codes, which requires 
external input of information at its structural level but not at the operation level. Hence system is 
characterized with the operational closure by self-reference and structural openness as complexity 
"interchange". 
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It can be simplified in these logical representations: binary codes operate in light of A/-A, but neither by 
Ay-A/A and -A, nor by A/-A/B. 
They are exemplified as: religion with the code of immanence/transcendence; law with the code of 
legal/illegal; politics with the code of having power/having no power, or holding office/opposition; economy 
with the code of payable/un-payable; science with the code of truth/not-truth; art with the code of 
beauty/not-beauty; mass media with the code of information/not-information (King and Thronhill 2003a, p. 
23). 
"Evolution is a subjectless process set in motion by difference, in this case the difference between system and 
environment." (Schwanitz 1996, p. 490). 
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For any social issue, each system with its specific binary codes and programs operates 
self-referentially, as well as interpenetrates with each other and cooperatively organizes 
complexity for their own goods. Thus, society is no longer primarily organized with 
cultural/moral/normative integration but operated with their structures coupled by 
interpenetration and along binary schematization to reproduce the enforced selectivity and 
thus connectivity. Hence it is crucial that neither structures nor norms constitutes systems, but 
the binary code and programs build up the framework of operation of the systems (King and 
Thomhill 2003a, p. 23)—because only code enables a system to undertake self-reference and 
other-reference, and only program can fill the code with content (Luhmann, 2000, pp. 55-56). 
2.2.2. The Theory of Observation and Self-Reference: The Epistemological and 
Ontological Foundation of Systems Theory 
More clarifications of the logic of binary coding in systemic operations will be 
delineated with reference to the epistemological and ontological foundation of systems 
theory—the theory of observation and self-reference. Both of them replace the traditional 
foundationalist epistemology and ontology by a non-foundational one with avowing the 
primacy of relations between elements over the essence of substantive unities.�，From the 
perspective of the theory of observation, unity comes after difference as demonstrated in the 
Fichtian problem of self (Rasch 2002，pp. 4ff): the self is being comprehended insofar as the 
category "non-self can be drawn against the self to make a self/non-self distinction, in this 
35 Traditional ontology presupposes the "being" as a unity and "processes" are the attributes of "being". The 
world is constituted of the unified elements and their interrelated processes in time produce "events" that 
compose historicity. The distinction between subject/object is one of the prominent features of this 
essentialism. However, focus on deconstruction (Derrida) and power relations (Foucault) have uncovered the 
long concealed fact that essences are relative to the context, whether in social, political, or historical one, in 
which relations drawn therein define the "essence", such as the "essence" of female under patriarchal 
societies. 
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way the "essence" of self can only be contrasted by indication of "non-self, thus every 
attempt to comprehend the self will only be entrapped in the infinite regression of 
categorization, yet the self still cannot be found. Therefore what is being comprehended in the 
first place is rather the distinction that indicates the relationship between two sides than the 
identification of either on of the sides.36 As the theoretical and ontological foundation, the 
theory of observation does not pursue "Totality" that emphasized by the traditional 
philosophers. Difference instead of unity actually creates the scheme of the world by systemic 
operations. Ironically, this world created by the relation of difference can be called totalistic 
and universal, because both sides of the system/environment distinction are considered, 
instead of the obsolete subject/object distinction in the classical sociologies. Any traces of 
egoism in the philosophy of consciousness are eradicated hereby from a different 
approach—not via intersubjectivity advocated by the theory of communicative action, but 
through observation one is totally open to the possibilities of the world. Under this 
paradigmatic change ethics and morality rest on the substantive unities to be the attribution 
centre in the past are no longer valid in Luhmannian sociology. Instead, their social functions 
are being abstracted into two orders of observation, on which ethics as a second-order 
observation reflects the limitation, application, and efficacy of the morality observed on the 
first-order. 
Additionally, the corresponding epistemology uncovers the underlying operations 
beneath the code of the moral by asking a question: "How can understanding and knowledge 
thereby build up?" which could be answered by Mathematician George Spencer-Brown's 
logic of form: draw a distinction! (Spencer Brown 1969, p. 3). A distinction, however 
36 By using Spencer-Brown's example, to conceive a circle one should drawn a boundary on paper that separates 
what is included and identified as a circle and what is not: ^ ^ ^ 
The line marks what is a circle and what is its environment (i.e. the rest of the paper). Thus, distinction has to 
be drawn before anything can be understood (Spencer Brown 1969，pp. 3-4). 
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arbitrary, demarcates two states, which are essentially equal from any perspective. To begin 
with, the side we indicate to be the subject of observation and operation is called the marked 
state (ibid., p. 4). What make our comprehension possible are in fact the observations with 
which the indication of the marked state and the distinction drawn are unified (Andersen 2003， 
p. 65). To give a simple example, one's comprehends of an apple must at the same time draw 
the distinction regarding what is apple and what is not apple, and thus the apple is inferred, 
but not actually probing into the essence of the apple. If one cannot draw the distinction, then 
apparently one cannot comprehend anything, and the world presented to her is a flux of 
events. 
The theoretical overtone lies here is that not only does cognition need distinction, any 
operation can be possible insofar as observation—an operation of distinction with 
indication—is undertaken. As mentioned before, not the essence of a matter defines its 
attributes (relations), but the relation formulates its properties. In much the same way, the 
on tic being no longer retrieves its raison d'etre from another level of ontic being, however, 
selective processes in operations delimit the possibility of the event—the range of possibility 
of the "being"~emerged by drawing distinctions. This radical constructivism may be too 
incisive and irritating to mainstream philosophers, but Luhmann would defend that their 
obsession to the teleology is self-deceptive by eschewing the fact that difference and thereby 
the consequence of uncertainty are logically preceding to unity and certainty. In this respect 
difference rather than unity becomes the common ground for Luhmann's (social) ontology 
and epistemology, which can be reflected in his theory of observation. 
The meaning of observation does not limit in a mere perceptive sense, yet a broader 
logical denotation is employed. To define, observation is "any kind of operation that makes a 
distinction so as to designate one (but not the other) side" (Luhmann 1998, p. 47)，and 
functions to handle and manage distinctions (Luhmann 1995, pp. 36, 178). The underlying 
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binary schematism of observation follows the protologic of the operations resorting to 
Aristotle's logic一the logic of contradiction and exclusion of the middle (Clam 2000，p. 68).^ ^ 
In addition, Heinz von Foerster's second-order cybernetics explores the depth of 
interpretation of observation to conceptualize reflection theoretically, which is then 
assimilated in systems theory and one of its application can be illustrated in the code of the 
moral. Second-order observation is distinguished from the first-order one in way of using 
distinctions as the schema to indicate and distinguish what is being observed. However, 
first-order observation is blind to its rationale for drawing such particular distinction. Once an 
observer notifies this problem, observation hereby shifts to the second-order, in which 
observer observes the blind spot—the distinction itself~of the first-order observation. The 
mode of operation is exactly the same in both orders—base on binary schematism and the 
laws of form——thus there is no implication of any kind of metalanguage superior to the 
first-order operation (Luhmann 1998, p. 49; 2002, p. 114). However, second-order 
observation as an operation observing other's (or even self-) observation, can become 
first-order once it is being observed. Regressions of order are possible inasmuch as every 
observation is endowed with a blind spot of observation that, paradoxically, enable it to 
observe. In short, no "third"-order observation because observations are stratified into 
analytical level but not queued in the sequential position. 
Though second-order observation is another first-order observation once being observed, 
it is both more and less than the first-order one. In Luhmann's tricky language, 
it is less because it observes only observers and nothing else. It is more because it not only sees 
(=distinguishes) its object but also sees what the object sees and sees how it sees what it sees, 
37 The logic of contradiction can be simply represented in the formula: A 丰- A; and the exclusion of the middle 
means that the third value in the distinction is excluded: in a two value logic (A/-A), the distinction (/) of both 
sides is excluded in that it rests on another order of logic (second-order logic). In fact, these two formal logics 
are the result of the protologic, as Luhmann acclaims, tautology (A = A) and paradox (A = -A). 
38 
Observer can be all kind of systems, not only confines to the human consciousness. For example, a thermostat 
is also an observer observing its environment (temperature). 
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and perhaps even sees what it does not see and sees that it does not see that it does not see what it 
does not see." (Luhmann 2002, pp. 114-115). 
Hence one can see "everything" at the level of second-order observation in the sense that it 
observes what observer sees as well as what observer does not see, and the sum of the 
observed results constitute the whole set of the world. The crucial consequence implied herein 
is that complexity can thus be reduced by confining the area of operation to the marked state 
and leaves the other irrelevant state out of consideration (Spencer Brown 1969, p. 5)(see 
figure 2), in which the expulsion of moral complexity into the environment by social systems 
is justified. The unmarked state in this regard is not the residual category which should be 
discarded, rather, it functions as the potential possibilities for further observations and hence 
the source of connectivity. That is to say, the information value of the selected and indicated 
side will soon be consumed after that selection is actualized, thus recurrent generation of 
information via continuous observation and selection is vital for system operations; even if 
the regenerated information is actually identical with the previous one, re-selection and 
observation should still be performed. Yet one can only operate and comprehend exactly the 
marked state but not the unmarked state, otherwise the assigned unmarked state will turn into 
the marked state by this "perception of unmarked state". Above all, blind spot is ineluctable 
yet welcomed inasmuch as it is the very possibility of observation; it can be eluded instead of 
eliminated through second-order observation, and therefore more knowledge is yielded while 
at the same time high level of complexity can be managed. 
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Figure 2 The Distinction, the Marked State, and the Unmarked State 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
• • 
/ \ 
No operation because Draw a distinction. But Indicate one side as the Therefore the other side 
no distinction is still have no operation marked state to is the unmarked state that 
drawn. because the distinction asymmetrize the inferred from the marked 
drawn is symmetrical. distinction. state. 
One of the epistemological and ontological implications of the second-order observation 
is that, as mentioned above, complexity is being reduced and increased at the same time. In so 
doing, further distinction based on the previous distinction is drawn to cope with further 
complexity engendered—a self-referential process as such. Another crucial break from 
traditional epistemology and ontology is the repudiation of totality, which is underpinned by 
the primacy of unity and identity, and replaced with difference. Observer moves from one 
observation to another observation but still cannot reach the unmarked state to totalize the 
world (Luhmann 2002, p. 85), since, paradoxically, any distinction demarcates unmarked state 
from marked state, in which the unmarked side remains unknown because of its 
"unmarked-ness", or in Derrida's terminology, "diffrance", that defers forever.^ ^ Substantive 
unification of both sides of the distinction can never be achieved from the perspective of the 
theory of difference, but only the inferred form can be deemed universal. To speak of the 
formality of observation does not necessarily recede to intellectualism and neglect social 
reality, rather, Luhmann would claim that the theory of observation reveals the truth of social 
existence: everything has their negative counterpart, realized as the unmarked state that can 
only be comprehended by second-order observation. Hence the code of the moral, though 
deconstructs our beliefs of ethics and morality, opens the way to acquire deeper understanding 
39 For more details, see "Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing." (Luhmann 2002, chap. 4). 
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and more knowledge of the complicated moral phenomenon via systemic reduction of 
complexity. 
Cautious reader may notice that the theory of observation with binary code will give rise 
to serious problems, that is, tautology and paradox. Identification of one side, if not embark 
on Fichtian infinite regression, is simply what it is—a tautology; and except tautology 
self-identification by referring to the both sides of distinction at the same time incurs to 
paradox. Tautology means a distinction that does not distinguish. It explicitly negates the 
difference that it distinguishes (Luhmann 1988, p. 34). That is to say, it distinguishes itself not 
from identifying its negation but the negation of its negation (-(-A)), and A = A is thus a 
typical pure logical formulation of tautology: A can only be A because it is A. Observations in 
this regard is thus inclusively circulated by means of a pure circular argument and incapability 
to identify further "knowledge" from its original point. In a similar way, blockage set up by 
paradox when both sides of the distinction are true at the same time (A = A and -A), therefore 
operation is trapped in the excluded middle point inasmuch as one side canceling another side 
of distinction, and no further indication and operation are allowed because of the total 
indeterminacy (Luhmann 1995, p. 33). 
Following Luhmannian systemic ontology, everything in the world, including society, 
basically operates by way of observation, and thus tautology and paradox that symmetrize 
both sides should be prevented in observations. Because tautology makes no other-reference 
and paradox makes two equal other-references that in turn cancels each other. That is to say, 
two equal other-references re-symmetrize the distinction and therefore terminate further 
operation. Certain relieving mechanisms are undertaken to eschew this, paradoxically enough, 
ineluctable indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is caused by that no particular justification is 
preordained for choosing this side but not that one (i.e. no indication), therefore 
asymmetrization in a way enables indication of the marked state with excluding unmarked 
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state the other side is the strategies that Luhmann employs to de-tautologize and 
de-paradoxize. 
Various means can be used to accomplish this task: time, values, ideologies, anxieties, 
risks, and so forth (cf. Luhmann 1988). All of them suspend the indeterminacy to a certain 
extent by concealing its prime distinction. For example, time can move observation to a 
higher level of observation by observing the unity of distinction through the retrospective and 
prospective observation by the distinction of past/future (Luhmann 1995, p. 42; 
Gonzalez-Diaz 2004，p. 15). Values and ideologies—in which ethics and morality is one of 
the representations—are rather old means that offer specific descriptions (or identification) of 
society and foster particular programs for action (Luhmann 1988, p. 32). By taking certain 
values and ideologies, the other side of that value and ideology are deemed untouchable and 
unthinkable (e.g. evil in moral theory), thus blinding oneself to observe according to 
particular way. However, once they are being challenged, another set of values and ideologies 
can be used to "debunk" the previous description. In this way, the validities of values and 
ideologies cannot be questioned but can only be interpreted (ibid., p. 33). In modem or even 
post-modem society, all values and ideologies are facing ruthless challenges, since their 
impotency to provide a holistic description of society was exposed, hence another 
de-tautologization and de-paradoxization strategies are urged. Anxiety and risk are thus the 
next popular functional equivalences to take this role because they "cannot be disputed, 
refuted, or cured" yet no body can escape from i t , ' and thus can effectively "[block] insight 
into the problems of tautology and paradox" (ibid.). 
40 De-tautologization and de-paradoxization do not amount to resolve tautology and paradox. Instead, they are 
not resolvable since all observations depend on drawing differences and "observation cannot observe itself 
(Luhmann 1993b, p. 15). As such the tautological and paradoxical situation can only be evaded by 
"deceiving" the observing system for a while, that is, without questioning the rationale of drawing such 
differencedoes not observe the observed subject matter at the second-order level. 
See Beck 1992. More details in Luhmann's conception of risk communication, see Luhmann 1993b. Also 
refer to section 3.6.5. 
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Note that tautology and paradox, in fact, operate on self-reference which provides with 
circularity; notwithstanding, only pure self-reference would lead to tautology and paradox, 
other than these are the indispensable mechanism of the system operations. Because 
self-reference is the mode of basal operation of observation_in fact observer can only be a 
system in advance to indicate itself from the environment by drawing a distinction (boundary) 
to differentiate the gradient of complexity (Luhmann 1995, p. 176).'^ ^ In this vein, complexity 
can be managed insofar as events are connected selectively with specific "order" according to 
the systemic observations. Selections are indeterminate but not arbitrary, as they are 
connected to the selectivity of previous observation, which implies that selection enables 
selection as such—a self-referential operation. Asymmetry of distinction breaks the 
indeterminacy of the two equal sides and simultaneously creates connectivity of the further 
operations, which is different from the circular operation that wavers between two sides in 
tautology and paradox. 
In a nutshell, self-reference makes existence possible, inasmuch as every existence 
persists temporally by incessant self-reproduction of the operations to maintain their continual 
existence. Everything exists and can be maintained because they find their way of 
continuation, and binary schematism assists connectivity by selecting next event from one's 
own perspective. For example a cell lives insofar as it can maintain its operation by 
maintaining its cell membrane, and by refining its homeostatic balance, by controlling the 
information from the environment, etc.44 Through self-reference complexity would not be 
42 More details of self-reference will be elucidated in the section 2.2.3. 
43 In fact, the asymmetry of distinction takes effect when we conceive the wavering between two sides of a 
distinction~discriminating two sides, at least, on the temporal dimension: first at this side and then at the 
other side. That is to say, once an event can be thought of, imagined, anticipated, conceived has already 
presumed the operation of asymmetry; otherwise we cannot even think of them in that we are stuck in the 
paradox and tautology. 
Self-referential operation, but not self-referential structure, is what Luhmann pinpoints. For example, a cell is 
self-referential (or autopoietic in the biological term) in its operation; namely, its systemic operations are 
independent to its environment. But structurally a cell cannot be totally independent from the environment 
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eliminated, but reduced and organized by complexity (Luhmann 1995，p. 26). In short, 
complexity reduces (by focusing on the marked state) and produces (that a new unmarked 
state is demarcated) complexity for further complexity reduction at the same time. 
In so doing ethics and morality as one kind of values in society follows this mode of 
operation, functioning as a semantic for asymmetrization by discriminating what is normal 
and desirable to exclude deviance, evil, and immorality which are deserved for punishment in 
pre-modem society and disesteem in modem society. While the semantic of morality (i.e. the 
moral code) changes in society, its mode of operation~observation and 
self-reference—nevertheless remains the same. Esteem and disesteem are connected to further 
esteem and disesteem in moral communication by observing one's personality as a whole is 
appraisable or not, and then reacts to the moral accusations with different kinds of 
communication: either defend against accusation via rational justification (falls into scientific 
communication: esteem/disesteem follows by truth/non-truth), or disdaining the other 
(remains in moral communication: esteem/disesteem follows by esteem/disesteem), or silence 
(aims at ceasing moral communication: esteem/disesteem follows by indeterminacy) (see 
figure 3). 
which is the horizon for information, materials and resources, etc. However, structure is the result of 
self-reference, for example, the structure of cell membrane is the self-referential outcome of the operation of 
growth and development but not the self-reference of the structure of membrane. In the similar way, the 
structure of expectation during interaction is the outcome of constant communications built up by memory 
that resides in the psychic system, but they are not in itself self-referential. 
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Figure 3 The Self-reference of Moral Communication 
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2.2.3. System/Environment Distinction and Autopoiesis: A New Conception of System 
Ethics and morality are not social systems, rather, they are the residues of the social 
differentiation excluded from social systems with communicative value, and this explains the 
aporias situation of morality in modem society. Overwhelming ethics and morality pertains to 
pre-modem hierarchical society differentiated along the hierarchy of value. And ethics and 
morality as values are semantics of communication to describe society, but not in itself a 
self-contained system in that the crucial defining element—system boundary_ is absent. 
In Luhmannian sociology, system, from the outset, is not defined as an ontological entity 
such as what traditional ontology prescribes (especially Aristotelian ontology); nor merely 
conceived as an analytical concept in a whole-part relation that sociologists generally used 
(such as Durkheim and Parsons) (cf. Luhmann 1995, p. 18). Self-referential system 
distinguishes itself from all of the above with a basal distinction—the system boundary, which 
is absent in ethics and morality一that situates between system and environment, in which 
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system neither subsumes nor penetrates by its environment. System, in this regard, is not an 
open system that allows information from environment to enter directly into it and then 
produces the processed product to environment, nor a closed system that blocks all influences 
from the environment with a totally closed boundary. System relates to its environment by a 
special mechanism that—based on self-reference~enables both system closure and system 
openness simultaneously. This mechanism has long been invented for defining life in biology, 
namely, autopoiesis (Luhmann 1990, p. 1). 
Autopoietic systems, to use Humberto Maturana's own wordings, 
"are systems that are defined as unities as networks of productions of components that 
recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the network that produces them and 
constitute, in the space in which they exist, the boundaries of the network as components that 
participate in the realization of the network，’ (Maturana 1981, p. 21 quoted from Luhmann 1990, 
p. 1. Italics added).45 
Autopoiesis can be understood by resorting to its etymology from Greek, namely, 
self-production. 46 Self-production here means all elements as units used for systemic 
activities are produced by the system itself. Direct control from other systems or environment, 
as in totally open systems, is not the case for autopoietic systems. However, autopoiesis does 
not amount to totally self-sufficient closure that isolates and separates system from its 
environment, nor amounts to the total transparency that is dependent upon its environment. 
Instead, autopoietic system maintains its independence by closure of operation and still 
45 Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela introduced autopoiesis as early as in 1973 with a rather mechanical 
definition: "An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and 
transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; 
and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by 
specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network." (Maturana and Varela [1973] 1980, p. 
78). And "the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and cannot be described by using 
dimensions that define another space. When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, 
however, we project this system on the space of our manipulations and make a description of this projection." 
(ibid., p. 89) 
46 In Greek, autopoiesis means: auto - amo for self and poiesis - Ttoirjaiq for creation or production. 
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dependent on its environment by way of structural openness at the same time (Luhmann 1995, 
p. 127). In so doing, the boundary of an autopoietic system is essentially open and permeable 
into which information (strictly speaking, complexity) can enter the system from its 
environment. Yet, the criteria for selection of information are still conferred to the system 
alone by means of thematization along its own binary coding (see Luhmann 1995，p. 127)."^^ 
Luhmann provides an example to illustrate this peculiar feature of autopoiesis: just as the 
eye can only see the environment, but cannot operate within it, and that is why the eye can 
see (Luhmann 1995, p. 410). Simply speaking, the eye as an autopoietic system can perform 
its operation and processing only if it is independent from its environment, but not operatively 
embeds into it. Thus "seeing" as an operation presupposes that the eye as a system closes its 
boundary against its environment. In this sense the eye is an operatively closed but 
structurally open system—it can see all, infinite, visible things by its own rule of selection. 
The crucial status of environment can be shown in the system/environment distinction 
that gives identity through difference. To define, environment is a negative correlate of system, 
simply "something else" (ibid.). These "something else" are not a system as long as 
environment is boundless, so it cannot operate nor process any information, and that is why 
environment should be more complex than system—as the latter contains organized 
complexity. As mentioned above, environment is the result of the distinction that 
differentiated a particular system, thus other systems are immediately become environment 
from that system's perspective. To give an example, other autopoietic systems such as psychic 
systems, organisms, and machines are the environment from the perspective of social systems. 
Compared to a totally closed system, which precludes all in-and-out information between system and its 
environment, autopoietic system allows elements to pass through its boundary but with specific manipulation 
imposed upon the entered elements, or in other words, the system creates those elements actively by 
incorporating them into the system's internal environment. It can be analogous to a cell, which defines itself 
by a selectively permeable cell membrane. Also refer to Wagner's interrogation on Luhmann's biological 
metaphor on system differentiation for more details (Wagner 1998). 
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The former are incapable to operate from the eyes of social systems, because only 
communication can be entitled as operation in this respect. Other operations, for example, 
consciousness and life, are irrelevant in this system (social systems)/environment (non-social 
systems) distinction.'^^The system/environment distinction is essential for everything to be 
possible in a functionally differentiated modem world by managing relevant and useful 
information for continuing system operations, and this is the way we contact with the world 
by constructing reality from our perspectives. Thus, systems theory does not serve merely an 
epistemology, but as a whole provides an ontological foundation of society (section 2.2.2.). 
Based on autopoiesis, the world under the systems theoretical perspective is different 
from the traditional "whole-part" conception. Actually, autopoiesis covers all self-referential 
systems, whether they are living or nonliving, to constitute our world with different modes of 
reproduction and organization (Luhmann 1990, p. 2). See figure 4: 
Figure 4 Autopoietic Systems 
Self-referential autopoietic systems 
z/ \ \ 
Machines Organisms Social Systems Psychic Systems 
/ Z I \ 
Cells, brains, etc. Interaction Organizations Societies 
Sources: Luhmann 1990, p. 2; 1995, p. 2. 
Among all autopoietic systems, Luhmann accentuates the functions of social systems and 
48 This logic applies to all system/environment differences and thus complexity is hereby reduced by excluding 
irrelevant information. For instance, using Luhmann's own example, a political party does not interested in 
knowing whether its members brush their teeth in the morning, afternoon, or evening, or why leaves are green, 
or why suns are capable of remaining in a state of equilibrium (Luhmann 1995, p. 127). 
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psychic systems that constitute sociality together. Social systems emerge so long as events are 
being communicated. In a similar way, psychic systems emerge when one is conscious of 
something.49 They are self-referentially closed to each other, such that changes of the system 
status can only be made self-referentially. Even if a communication, for instance, reproach by 
your mother actually relates to you and most likely would alter your state of consciousness; 
whereas you can still consciously isolate from it with an indifferent attitude. You can also 
verbally comply with your mother's requirement but in fact you are daydreaming. All these 
could happen because of the mechanism of autopoiesis. In this light we can see that 
Luhmann's introduction of the concept of autopoiesis sheds a new light on 
system-environment relation, to which system no longer passively adapts to its environment, 
instead, systemic selections actively translate the environment for its own good. 
For Luhmann, as well as for sociology, most of the time we only concern about psychic 
systems and social systems, and leave organisms and machines as "asocial" things aside. Yet, 
all autopoietic systems are equal rather than allocated in a hierarchical order. For a runner in a 
competition, his body can be steered to its limit consciously, at this time psychic system 
seems to take control over organic systems. However, this asymmetrical relation can be easily 
reversed when his leg twitches. Relativistic de-centered systemic operations preclude any 
claims to center, end, or telos (cf. Luhmann 1995, p. 439), yet systems relates to other systems 
through system/environment distinction, in which from the perspective of system all other 
systems merely fused to become the inconceivable environment (ibid., p. 181). 
In the broadest sense, system/environment distinction theorizes not only society but the 
49 Here we talk about "something" in a phenomenological meaning, it includes intentionality, or intentional act 
{noesis) that brings our consciousness connected with the "thing" intended (noema). This intended thing can 
neither be confined to empirical things but also can be imagined idea, fantasy, or even nothingness (Cf. 
Zahavi 2003). And Luhmann may imply that phenomenology remains confined to the inquiry of psychic 
systems yet incapable to extend to social systems through a weak linkage of "intersubjectivity" proposed by 
Husserl. 
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world. This ontology based on difference seeks to show that every existence in the world 
exists by identifying its environment via distinction and thereby regains system identity. 
Recalling the arguments in the beginning of this section, it is not difficult to understand that 
ethics and morality can be comfortably marginalized in systems theory, insofar as the primary 
concern at the level of the world is existence or not-existence, being dead or alive, but not 
narrowly confined to order/disorder and moral/immoral, which has only secondary 
importance. 
2.2.4. Communication and Action: An Amoral Interpretation 
Functionalization and amoralization of ethics and morality can best be exemplified in the 
discussion on communication and action. Moral action in conventional ethical theory is 
generally related to action consequences (as the objective moral fact) and intention (as the 
subjective moral conviction and meaning) that ground upon human consciousness; and this 
approach actually orients to the essence of human nature since consciousness is the sole 
attribution centre of action. But this whole set of ontology of action is by no means valid 
under the system theoretical approach. Certainly communication and action are the attribution 
points of ethics and morality一much the same as discourse ethics一but systemic functioning 
deprives moral action of its substantive content, and then reduces it into functions during 
operation. In other words, realization of morality in the social realm will be construed as 
moral communication without consideration of its substantive, intrinsic and transcendental 
meaning. 
Under system theoretical interpretation, the meaning of communication is different from 
general understanding. In other communication theories (figure 5), the metaphor of 
transmission is generally adopted to describe communication process, in which sender gives 
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out something_whether action consequence, influence, signal, or message—to the receiver. 
As such communication is ontologized and materialized to a thing-like medium between 
sender and receiver. The identity of what is transmitted is also exaggerated, namely, 
information given and received are conceived as identical (Luhmann 1995, p. 139). This 
superficial common sense neglects the deferred and deviated meaning created by other 
possibilities of misunderstanding and intended misunderstanding (e.g. deception), which 
would violate the principle of difference in systems theory. Besides, the reduction of the 
communication process into two-part constitution in the conventional metaphor is subjected 
to revision: sender utters and receiver receives (ibid., p. 140), which has mistaken 
communication as an intermittent and ad hoc occurrence. Repudiation of this metaphor 
depends on the fundamental conception of communication that it is a selection process and a 
selective occurrence instead of transmissible ontic beings. Selection herein links up 
communication with complexity to be the steering media of a social system. 
Figure 5 Communication Model Adopted from Shannon and Weaver (1949) 
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Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-semantic/figure3.jpg 
It is not difficult to understand that communication is a self-referential selection of 
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information for a social system. What is uttered in a communication, therefore, is not merely 
something being selected, but also a selection (Luhmann 1995, p. 140). In so doing, 
communication cannot be conceived as a two-part intermittent process; instead a three-part 
continuous selection process is employed by virtue of the necessity of reproduction of 
connectivity in every self-referential operation. The importance of selectivity in this respect, 
therefore, should be included in addition to the sender and receiver in the communication 
process. Selectivity steers communication forward by attracting further communication to 
secure connectivity, such that communication is not a one-shot and ad hoc occurrence that 
rests on the actor's intention, action, or reaction; whereas communication communicates 
further communications by incessant understanding of meaning. But one should not confuse 
"communicative act" (action) with communication in systems theory as the former is not the 
basal self-reference of the social systems, but a secondary reduction mechanism (i.e. action). 
To clarify, communication process is constituted by three parts: information, utterance, 
and understanding (Luhmann 1995, p. 147).^ ® Any mere cognition and perception can be 
called communication only if these three parts can be distinguished and recombined together 
(ibid.);5i otherwise that particular operation remains a simple cognition. To give an example, 
a boy asks his girlfriend which movie they are going to watch, and she replies: "whatever!" 
The boy, first of all, has to deal with that information as an environmental complexity that 
implies specific semantic and concern with true/false and relevant/irrelevant distinctions. At 
To define, "[an] utterance is chosen from various behaviors•’ information is chosen from various facts., and 
communication combines the two into one event." (Luhmann 2002，p. 181. Italics added) In addition, 
understanding is the difference drawn to distinguish factual and behavioral elements, and then recombines 
them into a unity, namely, communication. 
51 Details between perception and communication, psychic systems and social systems will be discussed in 
section 2.2.5. Nevertheless, one can anticipate by common sense that the mind as a psychic system can 
transform sheer perception into communication only with utterance, that is, such as one sees a tree and this 
perception is transformed into communication when one speak of "I see a tree there". O f course, merely 
pointing by finger can be conceived as a communication as well; the crux of the matter is whether that 
information is thematized in a communicative process—being uttered and understood. See Luhmann 2002, pp. 
169-181. 
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the same time, the way she conveys this information一whether in a serious manner or 
dissatisfied manner, that she really has no idea, or covertly she has no interest on that 
movie—are closely observed. Utterance or action in this light only occupies part of the 
communication. Finally, the boy understands what she means—no matter he really got the 
"true meaning" underlying her intention or not—by successfully grasping the difference 
between the informational value of its content and the way of the utterance, and then the 
communication process is finished (Luhmann 2002, p. 157). Further replies would continue 
the communication process and seek to clarify, understand, and connect to other 
communications. 
Information stays in the environment before codification by system (e.g. ego). Ego 
decides what is relevant for one's communication and what is irrelevant that leaves outside 
system. Utterance provides information with a codified form (in most situation it is 
linguistically constituted) to indicate the information. And understanding of the difference 
between information and utterance completes the communication process as long as the 
difference is "observed, expected, understood, and used as the basis for connecting with 
further behaviour" (Luhmann 1995, p. 141). Both ego and alter observe the difference 
between information and utterance, appropriate what alter does, and use it to steer 
communication. In addition, both of them observe and draw difference to grasp informational 
value for their own operations, anticipate the other's anticipation, and continue 
communication. Hence, communication connects ego and alter by manipulating informational 
value for each side and thereby reproduces communication and social systems. 
The situation becomes more complicated when communication will be concomitant upon 
alter's acceptance or rejection of that communication. Whi le accept/reject does not belong to 
the realm of communication (ibid., pp. 147-148), nevertheless, accept/reject links alter's 
reaction and thus generates connectivity for communication to communicate with. When 
125 
one's proposal is being rejected by alter, one has to communicate on why alter rejects. In this 
while the rejection itself becomes the theme of communication, and perhaps connects to 
persuasion, explanation, or retreat. In short, only communication communicates 
communication, but not action or anything else constitutes communication.^^ The primacy of 
action over communication in conventional social theory is reversed in this regard, and it can 
be possible inasmuch as the self-reference of communication cut off itself from the 
anthropocentric thinking, that is, even animals communicate in a similar mechanism. The 
overtone herein implies that systems theory concerning social systems is not merely limited to 
human society, but all other societies as well. Therefore, again, ethics and morality as human 
attributes occupy only a marginal position in this de-anthropocentric systems theory. 
A further step to the de-anthropocentricize and de-normalized society is completed by 
formulating the pre-linguistic feature of communication (Luhmann 1995, p. 151). 
Differentiated from the conventional communication theories, utterance does not necessarily 
imply linguistic utterance. Even a laugh, a questioning look, dressing, absence, or deviation 
from expectations can be communicative utterance, so long as one understands it, whether by 
inference, instinctive articulation, or logical deduction (ibid.). It is not language that enables 
us to differentiate among things, as what semiotics and structuralists avow, rather, 
communication based on difference一in differentiating information and utterance一in the 
course of evolution makes language possible (ibid.), and that language becomes functional for 
the reflexive communication. Language is reflexive because it was developed to thematize 
what is being communicated (ibid., p. 153; 1995, p. 161), which will help to resolve the 
improbability of communication (Luhmann 1990，pp. 86ff). Hence the essence of 
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Additionally, communication can be observed, elucidated, and expounded by communication only. Other than 
that is merely a cognition or percept which resides in the psychic system by means of consciousness. 
Habermas agrees with that communication does not delimit to language, yet he argues that most of the 
communications are undertaken linguistically. A comparison between Habermas and Luhmann's conception 
of language will be shown in section 3.2.1. 
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communication is actually its selectivity based on difference (Luhmann 1995, p. 154)，in 
which understanding is needed for connection only, but not seek to any form of consensus like 
discourse ethics. Furthermore, misunderstanding in fact would lead to further communication, 
inasmuch as misunderstanding urges more communication to clarify the situation or just 
direct the communication to the misled way. In any case, understanding is the point of 
connection for further connection, as well as linkage to expectations, or developed into 
operational codes (ibid., pp. 153-154). In their purest form, all of them pertain to the selection 
of selection, only different in terms of forms and functions. That is to say, what does matter is 
whether the codes of different selectionsconsistency/inconsistency of information, the 
sincerity/nonsincerity of utterance, the correctness/noncorrectness of understanding, and the 
validity/nonvalidity of reactions~constitute selectivity in the course of communication. 
In this vein, communication cannot be conceived as action, nor be processed as a chain 
of actions, such as what action theorists formulated (Luhmann 1995, p. 164). Communication 
has a broader scope of selection than utterance (action), and this selectivity enables a high 
level management of complexity for social systems. Compared to psychic systems formed by 
consciousness, social systems do not invite consciousness to be their basal processing as what 
conventional action theorists do~to link up action with intention and subjective values in 
psychic system. Because consciousness is solitary and not attributed to alter—as its 
environment and other-reference—nor anything social, therefore one may be entangled with 
difficulties to define sociality merely by action. 
Despite these difficulties, action is indispensable for social system, because 
communication cannot be observed directly, but only be inferred (Luhmann 1995, p. 164). 
During observation between ego and alter, communication must be concretized to form an 
action system, in that communication is symmetrical insofar as every selection reserves its 
openness by the possibility of reversal, whereas action is asymmetrical by the way of 
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condensation of communication to provide temporal fixed points for connection (ibid., p. 
165).54 Simply speaking, once an action is performed, it cannot be reversed and thus events 
are determined, and complexity is hereby reduced. In so doing, action comes about only if 
selections can be attributed to systems, that is, selections are related to systems but not to their 
environment, which implies that "addressees for further communication are thereby 
established as points of connection for further action" (ibid., p. 166). And in this sense action 
is merely a meaning attribution of communication that orients to system, and without its own 
independent ground pace action theories' concept. 
To give an example, a soccer player in a match has already embedded in the context of 
communication if he is going to participate一do not ignore the possibility of daydreaming 
during the match, which is orient to other communications or individual consciousness but not 
the interaction situation. When he encounters the rival team player taking hold of the ball, 
communication is hereby built up through linguistic or behavioral information acquirement. 
The mode of information perceived is examined (i.e. utterance) and understood, thus 
communication is completed. Yet, this flux of communication can be, though not necessarily, 
condensed to action when communication is attributed to the communicative system (i.e. to 
defensed against the rivalry, or to get the ball, etc.) but not the environment (e.g. look at the 
audiences on the stage) (figure 6). Actions are intermittent and ad hoc but communication is 
coordinated once they are retrieved, for example, by reading a book written by another 
already dead thousand years ago. 
Action can be non-communicative, yet it can be constituted socially "in two different contexts: as information 
(or a theme of communication) or as the act of utterance. In other words, there is noncommunicative action 
about which communication merely informs itself. But even its social relevance is mediated by 
communication." (Luhmann 1995, p. 165). Action is relevant to communication when the utterance is 
interpreted as an action, "and only thus does action become a necessary component of the self-reproduction of 
the system from one moment to the next. Therefore it is not false, only one-sided, for a communication 
system to interpret itself as an action system. Only by action does communication become fixed at a point in 
time as a simple event." (ibid.). 
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Figure 6 The Relation between Communication and Action 
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Reference to system enables self-description and self-observation of the system一an 
essential constituting mechanism for social system—and action is more comprehensible than 
communication for self-description by its irreversibility. In addition, action describes social 
systems with specific determination to simplify and reduce complexity. Individual actions 
within social systems aim at produce supporting points for further connective actions, and this 
self-referential reproduction asymmetrize the selections made by communication by 
irreversibility of action. Owing to this integrative mechanism of action and communication, 
social system is thereby constituted. 
The implication for sociology of ethics and morality under this conception of action and 
communication is far-reaching. Ethics and morality can no longer rest on the substantive 
concrete action inasmuch as communication rather than action is the foundation of social 
systems, and only by means of abstraction can ethics and morality be significant at the social 
level. In other words, moral relationship (moral communication) is apparently more important 
than intrinsic moral value embedded in moral action, because value is only one of the 
semantic means to realize moral action (as an unity condensed and attributed by 
communication) based on the moral relationship (as an difference). In this way, functional 
explanation of moral relationships replaces causal explanations of moral action that 
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corresponds to the decentered morality under modem condition.^^ 
2.2.5. Double Contingency and Interpenetration: From Patterned Moral Order to 
Reflexive Amoral Order 
This is to be the last section for introducing the background of the code of the moral, the 
reasons of why ethics and morality is formalized, functionalized, and marginalized are fully 
explained by the concept of double contingency and interpretation, in which social order is 
re-interpreted and autonomies and binding forces between systems are explained. Simply 
speaking, double contingency and interpenetration concern the emergence and maintenance of 
social order, through which social system derives the resolution of double contingency 
between two opaque psychic systems without any guidance of norms or values. Furthermore, 
systems relate to other systems as their environment in light of utilizing environmental 
complexity as the binding and bonding force in between systems. In this way, complexity 
management is handled by (social) systems emergence from the intransparent psychic systems 
from below but not relies on the overarching normative cultural and moral values imposed 
from above. In other words, social order no longer guaranteed by moral values, which means a 
non-normative order besides moral order is possible. Normativity is precluded at social level 
because social system in effect curtails its operative linkage from psychic systems 
operationally—though both social and psychic systems have the relation of emergence, they 
operate autopoietically—which prevents systemic operations from the intervention of the 
humanistic ethical concern. In so doing the formalization and functionalization of ethics and 
morality is thus completed in light of repudiating substantive moral values in participation of 
55 "[T]his concept of action does not provide an adequate causal explanation of behavior because it ignores the 
psychic." (Luhmann 1995，p. 166). Thus, it is not surprising that systems theory as another theoretical 
paradigm would prefer to build up different presuppositions, methodologies, logics of explanation, and even 
ontologies. 
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systemic operation, yet assimilating the communicative function of the moral code for 
interhuman interpenetration. Ethics and morality must persist, but merely as semantic codes 
realized as personal value preferences, condemnations, strategies, construction of expectation 
structure, or even enhancement of self-esteem at the social level. 
First of all, the problem of order has to be resorted to the problem of double contingency. 
Double contingency is defined to be an indeterminate situation that ego~as a self-referential 
system—acts in relation to alter's (also a self-referential system) action and expectation, in 
which these expectations would influence ego's own calculation of action, given that ego 
wants to act with its own determination, and vice versa. This indeterminacy created in 
interactions becomes a problem of social order because action coordination, which is crucial 
to order emergence, seems to be improbable under the situation that ego and alter cannot 
predict the other's action precisely. 
This problem, nevertheless, is understood by systems theory as a condition for 
emergence of social system from psychic systems by the principle of "order from noise". This 
is new to sociologists because most of them, and Parsons par excellence严 embark on the 
problem of double contingency through action theory by investigating the underlying 
conditioning mechanism of action coordination. In addition, action orientations are 
ineluctably guided by value consensus that directs everyday interactions (Luhmann 1995, p. 
104). Luhmann concedes that double contingency should relate to action, but in a different 
way (Luhmann 1995, pp. 103ff). Undoubtedly, Parsons's solution is not the only convincing 
explanation for resolving double contingency. An alternative yet more subtle explanation 
without confining to value consensus is suggested in systems theory that there are functional 
equivalents, such as temporal dimension, can break indeterminate situation of interaction 
56 Parsons thereby assumes normatively that the consensus stemmed from a shared symbolic system provides 
action orientations to complement the contingent indeterminacy (Parsons and Shils 1951，p. 16). 
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(ibid.). More than this, value consensus is a posteriori achievement of the resolution of 
double contingency, but ironically at the same time value consensus is asserted a priori in 
Parsonian theory, making it unable to explain why and how social order emerges at the 
moment of social encounter (ibid., p. 123).^^ The "order from noise" principle as an 
alternative to Parsonian and others' solution, without any prerequisite of value consensus, is 
thereby introduced (ibid., p. 105).^^ 
That order emerges from noise can be exemplified in the construction of social system, 
which is in itself an embodiment of ordered operations. When two systems encounter each 
other, and as long as both are complex autopoietic system, both will experience the endless 
open possibilities of meaning determination that elude assessment from the outside (Luhmann 
1995, p. 106). Here ego/alter on the social dimension are assigned to be the observing and 
being observed psychic systems simultaneously (ibid., p. 109). Thus alter is considered to be 
an unpredictable autopoietic system and thereby becomes the environmental noise to the 
system (ego), whereas ego's action has to correspond to alter's action only because of their 
encounter一even being indifferent and silent to each other are forms of response, and these 
situations can be interpreted as a social communication as well, in that social meaning is 
selected and interpreted even in silence. Moreover, ego conceives alter as an altered ego that 
can deliberate and calculate as much as him/herself, thus both of them try to sort out the 
connecting point of action to determine their own action and reaction. In other words, the 
situation of double contingency only requires minimal reciprocal observation and expectation 
to initiate communication and thereby to constitute order (ibid., p. 108). Yet, owing to the fact 
57 Luhmann reviews the formulation of the problem of social order in the Enlightenment: utilitarian's enactment 
of social contract, such as Thomas Hobbes; and in the beginning of the establishment of sociology, Durkheim 
and Weber's solution by means of value consensus, civil religion, or legitimacy. All of them are prescribing 
certain a priori assumption without further reflection (or in Luhmann's concept, self-observation) (see 
Luhmann 1995’ pp. 123-124; Munch 1994’ p. 276). 
58 Hence, value consensus is not the preceding explanans of the problem of double contingency; on the contrary, 
it is the explanandum of the system emergent from double contingency. 
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that both autopoietic systems are reluctant to be directly interpreted, which may subordinate 
one side to the other's calculation and determination, no action will happen if this situation 
persists. 
The crux of the matter of the "order from noise" principle is that double contingency as 
such is the bridge between order and noise, inasmuch as double contingency is partly of noise 
and partly of order (Munch 1994, p. 277). The indeterminacy of action coordination is the 
noise that double contingency herein experiences, and in effect this noise is produced by two 
"black boxes-like" psychic systems which contain infinite open possibilities. However, an 
order can emerge from noise in that the complexity generated by psychic systems, as the 
environmental noise, can be conditioned with the emergence of social system, as the emerged 
order. In other words, the complexity of psychic systems as the information constructs social 
systems structurally, but of course, to reiterate, the latter's operation is independent from 
psychic systems (Luhmann 1995, p. 110). The reason behind is that since the pursuit of 
certainty by calculating or predicting alter's behaviour is not the goal of social system, control 
but not elimination of the uncertainty from its environment is adequate—and necessary in that 
connectivity has to be reproduced—for the emergence of social order (ibid.). In this light, 
system formation constrains and structures infinite possibilities and thereby autopoietically 
reproduces action out of action and condenses complexity by connections of selection and 
further connections. In other words, ego and alter remain opaque to each other, as they are 
autopoietic autonomous systems embodied with open possibilities, yet an autopoietic system 
can still emerge from them to secure operations by action attributions, as well as by order 
maintenance. 
In addition to the moment of experiencing double contingency, every self-commitment 
will acquire informational and connective values for the action of others (Luhmann 1995, p. 
116). Given that both are autopoietic systems, every accident, every impulse, and every error 
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is productive (ibid.). Because for any system experiencing double contingency, any possible 
connection will be readily selected for system functioning. Moreover, every system 
experiences double contingency and one knows that the other systems also have this identical 
experience, such that every system can expect that alter also seeks to find connection points as 
well. Therefore the convergence of experience of double contingency becomes possible and 
the probability for order increases.^^ 
Interpenetration explains the paradox of co-existence of independent autopoietic systems 
and coordination between these systems. During interpenetration process, systems relate to 
each relevant system(s) by system/environment distinction, in which other systems as 
environment providing complexity for one's own system formation. Similar to the way that 
social systems retrieve information from psychic systems, systems are mutually independent 
at the operational level, but dependent on each other to be their environment complexity for 
structural formation. 
For psychic and social systems, there are two kinds of interpenetrations: social 
interpenetration and interhuman interpenetration. Social interpenetration can be resorted to 
the conventional understanding of "individual and society" in the humanistic tradition. From 
this perspective, human nature, or humanity, is construed as the source of emergence of 
society by constituting the social order (Luhmann 1995, pp. 210-211). Thus a group of good 
people implies the formation of a good community and then signifies to a good society, in 
which ethics and morality are the coordinating factor, embodied as norms or values, between 
59 To give an example, when two strangers come across on a road, any signal of alter's movement will be 
immediately connected to ego's action, and vice versa, to generate further reaction. When alter seems to tilt 
his body to the left, ego will conceive this signal and respond by walking to the right side. When two 
competitors encounter each other in a taekwondo match, any bodily movement, gesture, tempo, and so forth 
will be strictly observed by both sides. If one's intention is revealed, then one's action would probably be 
determined by alter in that alter conceives one's action and connects his/her own reaction to it for the sake to 
win over the other. And here one can say that Luhmann grounds his coordination of expectation on strategic 
rationality rather than value rationality or communicative rationality. 
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individual and society. This "Old-European" conception of interpenetration of humanity and 
society inevitably leads to conformism and at the same time ignores the fact that social order 
is still viable even in the non-conformist (pluralistic) and non-normative modes of 
interpenetration. Moreover, from this humanistic understanding one cannot clearly specify 
which part belongs to individual and which part pertains to society, but merely enmeshes them 
without comprehensive deliberation. Systems theory, in this respect, aims at clarifying the 
situation by reducing all of them into autopoietic systems under the distinction of 
system/environment. 
Generally, interpenetration can be defined as systems reciprocally make their own 
complexity available for constructing another system (Luhmann 1995，p. 213)，thus the 
complexity of one system is functional to another system (Luhmann 2002, p. 182). So long as 
systems can maintain their autopoiesis, that is, by closing its operation circuit, can thus 
interpenetration be possible (Luhmann 1995, p. 219). Because if systems lose their 
autopoiesis, then the system/environment distinction can no longer be drawn, and observation 
and meaning attribution will be eliminated altogether. Nevertheless, even if systems closed 
their operations to each other, the complexity generated from this autopoiesis from the 
perspective of alter would disturb, stimulate, and irritate (but not determine) one's operation 
(Luhmann 2002, pp. 176-177). Interpenetration, or in another term, structural coupling,^® is 
possible because of the reciprocal irritations and initiations of the emergence of systems. In 
other words, both systems co-determine in each case of interpenetrating systems (Luhmann 
1995, p. 213). 
Management of noise herein becomes the underlying dynamic of interpenetration. Each 
60 Structural coupling is a technical term in biological theories, which has similar meaning to interpenetration in 
this respect. See Lee 2000, pp. 328ff. It explains how two or more systems can co-evolve, that is, to 
co-alternate around particular issues or ideas (King and Thornhill 2003a, p. 32). Luhmann gives an example 
for it: "Walking presupposes the gravitational forces of the earth within very narrow limits, but gravitation 
does not contribute any steps to the movement of bodies." (Luhmann 1992, p. 1432). 
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system creates sufficient noise to initiate another system, for example, social system "comes 
into being on the basis of the noise that psychic systems create in their attempts to 
communicate" (Luhmann 1995, p. 214). This noise creates the pressure to select a meaning 
and hence builds up the structure of expectation, and then the systems emerge. Different from 
the traditional meaning of interpenetration which exhibits the exchange of media (e.g. 
Parsonian systems theory)(Parsons 1977, p. 181)，autopoietic systems only share elements at 
the level of operation, but not an inter-systemic transmission of elements in a give and take 
manner. As such interpenetrating systems condition each other in light of maintaining their 
own self-reference, on the one hand, and create the pressure of system formation for other 
systems, on the other hand. Thus for example, life and consciousness are the preconditions of 
social systems formation (ibid., p. 218), yet the later operates by its own means (i.e. 
communication) and refuses to take the media of organic (i.e. life) or psychic systems (i.e. 
consciousness) into operation. 
If human agency is represented by consciousness in psychic systems, then exclusion of 
human agency from social operations is not too surprising. Communication and its attributing 
action, instead of human individual or subject, are the sole constituents of social systems, and 
only communication can communicate (Luhmann 2002, p. 169). This self-referential 
operation applies to psychic systems as well: consciousness constitutes psychic systems, and 
only consciousness can be conscious of this. Even if one can think of communication and one 
can, too, report about perceptions, the principle demonstrated above is not violated. 
Everything can be operated by psychic systems with consciousness by conscious of 
something, as well as everything can be talked (communicated) about (ibid., pp. 169-170, 
177). Hence, the autonomy of human agency reserved in system can be further clarified and 
thus the infinite possibility of symbolic variations through communication is explained. 
Following this vein, autonomy and the infinite possibility of symbolic interpretation are 
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the main features and social implications of interpenetration, in which the humanistic 
understanding of the linear relations between individual and society is subverted. For social 
systems and communication, human being composed of psychic systems and organic systems 
is indispensable for meaning attribution, that is, communication needs human being to utter 
messages to reproduce communication. Hence, human being resides in the environment of 
social systems does not necessarily mean that human being is insignificant (Luhmann 1995, 
p.212), but only clarify the fact that human being cannot participate into the operation of 
autopoietic social systems. 
In this 明外 freedom and autonomy obtain a new meaning in the situation that one system 
can determine whichever information and irritation are significant for its own good, and 
human autonomy is thus realized by the autopoiesis of psychic systems.^' Likewise, symbolic 
operations in communication are out of individual control, nor are they ascertained by 
communicative partners. Written text of the past, for example, opens infinite possibilities to 
the future interpreters and no unequivocally fixed final conclusion of interpretation is possible, 
because of the fact that blind spots creep into every observation and every actualized 
communication is surrounded by infinite potentialities. Interpenetration of psychic and social 
systems conditions each system with materials for perception and communication respectively, 
and their mutual independency provides spaces for the realization of human agency and 
communication possibilities. 
Based on the autonomy and mutual conditioning of interpenetrating systems, binding 
forces between systems are not exerted by any "supemorm" or "supersystem" (Luhmann 
2002，p. 179). "Binding comes about by selection, specifically, by selections that eliminate 
61 For instance, human beings are able to reject any socially imposed norms and rules because they are 
autonomous in this sense. Hence asceticism is intelligible under this meaning, in which psychic system 
determines itself without any direct intrusion of the complexity of organic systems. Of course, organic 
systems irritate psychic systems by signals of health condition and bodily feeling; however, radically, psychic 
systems can choose to starve unto death to achieve total autonomy. 
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(more or less securely) other possibilities" (Luhmann 1995, p. 223).^^ This emergence of 
bindings is largely accidental and context-dependent, without any prescription of norm, 
culture, or (moral) value. While the structure of expectation would be built in the course of 
communication, at every moment the particular selection is free to change the situation. In the 
same vein, binding force emerges so long as systems interpenetrate, which implies that social 
binding is not necessary all the time—for instance psychic system can still be active without 
communication (Luhmann 2002, p. 171).^^ This non-normative interpretation of social 
binding forces, to a certain extent, extricates the discourse of social order from the 
entanglement between subjectivism and objectivism, structure and agency, by subsuming all 
relations to the basic distinction of system/environment, and formalized and functionalized 
ethics and morality are thus exiled at the margin of social systems. 
Ethics and morality bind us not only at the social level in everyday life, but direct our 
actions during interaction. Correspondingly, another type of interpenetration, interhuman 
interpenetration, is special for us to replace ethics and morality at the micro level—it is 
intimacy. "Intimacy comes into being when more and more domains of personal experience 
and bodily behavior become accessible and relevant to another human being and vice versa" 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 224). While alter's activities are not determined by ego, they are relevant, 
or too relevant for ego to couple his/her action with these activities, if only because they are 
intimate with each other. In addition, human being identifies who is more relevant by the 
relation of intimacy, which also implies that he/she has to handle much more complexity 
attributed from that person than others, and thus friend/enemy, stranger/non-stranger, and 
62 Time performs an important role in the creation of binding force, to which each receiving system in the 
interpenetration makes selections according the constraint of time, as long as events needs connection 
temporally for the constitution of sequence and order, such that the binding force emerges by virtue of the 
enforced selection. 
63 However, social communication can hardly come about without the participation of the mind, in that 
communication needs human being to utter message and to be the direction of the attribution of 
communication. Hence the relationship between communication and mind is asymmetrical (Luhmann 2002, p. 
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beloved/hate are used to identify appropriate communications. One loves not because one 
seeks to gain control over the other, to be praised, or becomes docile in order to avoid conflict, 
but because one pursues a special meaning which only lies in the interpenetration itself, not in 
the individual performances but in the complexity of that unique other (Luhmann 1995, p. 224; 
1986a, p. 175). Only through intimacy can this special meaning as embedded in the 
complexity of the other, in the form of love, be retrieved. More importantly, this special 
meaning is a new kind of emergent reality that rests on the relationship but does not belong to 
anyone (Luhmann 1995, p. 225). As such the meaning via loving disappears as soon as the 
intimate relationship, which is the achievement of interhuman interpenetration, breakdown. 
In this way, intimacy replaces ethics and morality to bind human beings at the individual 
level by substitute the concordant to value consensus with the emergent meaning. The latter 
has an advantage over ethics and morality when confronting highly differentiated society, in 
which unanimous conformity can rarely be achieved and deviances pervade instead. This 
interhuman interpenetration has higher capacity to cope with the complexity of alter without 
limitation to moral/immoral person, as long as morality as a social semantic gradually resigns 
from the social arena of modernity. 
2.3. Concluding Remarks 
The decline of moral consensus in contemporary complex society is witnessed and the 
prevalence of amorality in different kind of social system seems agrees with Luhmann's 
observation. Sociology of ethics and morality extracted from systems theory is shaped with its 
marginal, functional, non-normative, and formal characteristics. Referring to the arguments in 
the beginning of this section, not only the substantive values of ethics and morality are being 
171). 
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functionalized and formalized in order to survive in social systems, but also their integrating 
and coordinating functions are substituted by another functional equivalent at both social and 
individual level. What remains under systemic theorization is their communicative function 
specifically attributed to the whole person during evaluation, and their influences to society 
become regional and ad hoc, given that social order does not amount to moral order in this 
regard. 
Numerous critiques are raised against Luhmann's peculiar sociology, yet only those 
related to this thesis are tackled. One of the prominent critiques is on the normativity of social 
reality, in which Luhmann's relatively descriptive argument on systemic operations without 
normative concern perhaps do not correspond to the social reality which is not non-normative 
indeed.64 
Another inexorable critique on the internal logic of the code of the moral is notified. 
Esteem is as such a historical variant and this particular moral phenomenon is inappropriate to 
demarcate morality into the universal binary code of esteem/disesteem.^^ 
The application of autopoiesis is as well doubtful since system codes usually intrude to 
other social systems in reality, for example, the prevalence of economic code with the logic of 
64 In fact, "societal reality does not really allow us to take a purely observing position." (Bluhdorn 2000, p. 349). 
Pure observation in real life expresses an indifference attitude which is as such worthwhile to observe, and 
this "pseudo-purity" of the observing position conceal its relevant to the lifeworld we embedded in at every 
moment. 
65 Ethics and morality in systems theory are grounded on the concept of respect that calls for a mutual 
agreement to coordinate expectations (Neckel and Wolf 1994，p. 79). Through this, personal systems can be 
linked up with social systems via two kinds of interpenetration. Problem arises at the point of Luhmann's 
ignorance to the mediating processes of individuation and sociation by simply erasing these "noises" by 
autopoiesis. Esteem is a historical-dependent concept that only appears in the modern age as the constituent of 
individuality, which has long been proved by Durkheim's ethnographical research (Neckel and Wolf 1994，pp. 
85ff; Durkheim 1965 pp. 236ff)- The prevalence of the concept of esteem must correspond to the social 
development and mediated by individuation and sociation processes which are blank in the code of the moral. 
As such the relative convincing formulation can only be reduced to mere function codes that are devoid of 
any foundation, and also the universality of systems theory should be tuned down to a limited time span, or 
boils itself down to a sheer reconstructive science mapping out the ideal type of an automated society. 
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market in most social systems as the characteristic of Capitalistic society.^^ The last一but not 
the leas tcr i t ique is on the social implication of his amoralization of society, which may 
incur to complicity of status quo, advocacy of conservatism, and social technology—all that 
critical theorists and leftists d isavow^ 
66 The binary codes of economic systems have already overflowed with its intrusion to other social systems, 
which Luhmann ineluctably yet reluctantly conceded (Bluhdorn 2000, p. 351). His overestimation of the 
autonomy of social systems ignore the fact that even in economic systems morality matters to be the 
underpinning sentimental elements for forming solidarity, in which the inclusion of moral values in Japanese 
organization is one salient and undeniable example (Neckel and Wolf 1994, p. 89). 
67 As early as in 1970s, Habermas had already debated with Luhmann on social theory, and he conceded that 
systems theory is so delicate on social organizations, but if it were applied to the society, it may reduce 
sociology to mere social technology (Sixel 1976). In this amoral society, any social practice carries with 
ethical and moral concern is thus undermined in that intrinsic values of ethics and morality are excluded by 
the boundaries of social systems, and only the amoralized moral communication mediated by moral code is 
undertaken. More importantly, self-referential organizations are appraised in systems theory and human 
agency is deemed the environmental irritation, which may consequently fits the status quo to be indifferent to 
social protests, and systems theory as a sophistical theory of social technique would readily become 
complicity to social administration. In other words, ironically, the debunking power of systems theory against 
any sense of moralization eventually turns itself into another ideology, though with the mask of amoral, 
scientific, and authentic description of the complex society. 
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Part II. Formation of the Sociology of Ethics and Morality: A 
Metatheoretical Comparison between Habermas and 
Luhmann 
If part I is the preparatory stage in extracting the elements of ethics and morality in 
Habermas's and Luhmann's general sociology, then based on these preparations. Chapter 3 in 
this part aims at comparing and constructing a theoretical framework of sociology of ethics 
and morality. In this respect metatheorization is introduced to theorize theories without 
intervention of normative judgments and personal value preferences. Understanding and 
construction of a theory are two tasks dialectically interwoven in chapter 3, that is to say, 
understanding their metatheoretical positions implies the beginning of theory construction at 
the same time. Thus two functions of metatheorization are argued by George Ritzer 
(1991)—for aiming at a deeper understanding and for anticipating the development of new 
theoretical perspective—are synthesized in this part. 
The result of metatheorizing is fruitful. Four underlying tendencies are surveyed. Firstly, 
the revision and the advancement of fact and value distinction in Habermas's and Luhmann's 
theory; secondly, the subject matter of the sociology of ethics and morality shifts from action 
to communication; thirdly, the unit of analysis changes from unit to relation, and fourthly, the 
level of analysis moves from substantive to formal. Besides, Habermas's and Luhmann's 
sociology of ethics and morality converge at the point of recursivity yet diverge at the point of 
normativity are indicated. Detachment of conventional sociology and philosophy in 
Habermas's and Luhmann's theories begin with the sublation of Cartesian tradition, in which 
new lights of conceptualization are shed on subject and individual (section 3.1.). Along this 
novel understanding of subject and individual, constituents of society~communication and 
action—are compared and the tendency of reversing the priority between action and 
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communication is noticed (section 3.2.). Not only moral communication and action are 
revised, another aspect of ethics and morality—meaning and value—are thematized to show 
the divergence of Habermas and Luhmann on normativity as well (section 3.3.). Furthermore, 
these related concepts to ethics and morality can be reflected in different understanding of 
ethics and morality, and their incommensurable presuppositions based on different ontologies 
are illustrated (section 3.4.). As such investigations on the external conditions of their theories 
are called for. 
Accordingly, different backgrounds and social concerns—humanism and 
enlightenment—build up the insurmountable opposition between Habermas and Luhmann 
(section 3.5.). Both humanistic Enlightenment and anti/post-humanistic enlightenment are 
plausible and perhaps they precisely map out the possible aspects of society. Hence reflections 
are shed on their concepts of society (section 3.6.), in which their contradictions and 
similarities are fully revealed and articulated to the theorizing of the sociology of ethics and 
morality. In addition, the nature of sociology as the subject matter of reflection will be 
reflected, which will further the metatheoretical understanding and construction of sociology 
of ethics and morality (section 3.7.). And lastly, social implications of their sociologies and 
the possible social consequences of normative and non-normative understandings of social 
orders are delineated to complete the discussions on sociology (section 3.8.). All these 
arguments converge at the reflection of the sociology of ethics and morality as such (section 
3.9.), and through this a tentative construction of a sociology of ethics and morality is yielded 
(Concluding Reflections). 
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Chapter 3: A Comparison between Habermas and Luhmann 
3.1. On Subject and the Individual 
Subject and individual are two cornerstones of sociology, as the reference and attribution 
of action and communication, and thus also as the constituents of society whether from the 
perspective of action or structure一they only differ at the level of determination. 
Conventionally speaking, the subject matter of ethics and morality in the philosophical 
discourses is attributed to individual subject under the ontological background of subject and 
object, in which ethics and morality are conferred to subjective agency, as in contrast to the 
objective non-human world. With the paradigmatic transformation from the philosophy of 
consciousness into the philosophy of language, linguistically competent individual subject 
and operational system revise or even subvert the preceding ontology of subject. 
3.1.1. On Subject 
"[U]nder the heading 'subject', modem individual conceives himself as an observer of 
his observing" (Luhmann 1995, p. xxxix). Subject is, actually, conceived as an observer in 
systems theory, and modem individuals with their ability to reflect upon themselves undertake 
observation on self/other and assign this capability as "subjectivity". ‘ What irritates 
Luhmann is that if subject is attributed to the concrete individual, then the term "subject" 
becomes vague and confusing. What is subject? Does it refer to individual cells, brain, or 
personal psyche? The concept of the social cannot be rested upon an undefined terminology, 
‘ T o add, the psychic system forms individuality but not as such being constituted as a "subject", rather, the 
subject is being substituted by the observing self-referential system. 
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as much as an individual which is further derived from the concept of subject. Rather, subject 
is the derivative of the historical semantics (ibid., p. xl; Luhmann 1998，pp. 23-27). In this 
regard, subject is no longer the ultimate centre of agency and humanity, let alone 
"intersubjectivity" in either Husserl's or Habermas's own terms (ibid., xli). 
Even if the above polemic are supposed to have been resolved, another problem of 
"meta-subject" would inevitably arise, as in the theological interpretation of the ultimate god, 
such as Aristotle's "unmoved mover" and Thomas Aquinas’s ultimate "The One". In short, 
further sociological explanation would be impeded by the problem of infinite regression. 
Mystical "meta-subject" cannot be observed because she is the transcendental observer, or the 
problem of observation is ignored as a whole, such that no knowledge can be generated from 
the unintelligibility of "meta-subject" (Luhmann 1998, pp. 26-21)? In so doing, theory built 
on philosophy of subject, on the one hand, entangles with the problem of observation in that 
an unobservable observer is unintelligible; and on the other hand, as Habermas argued, the 
irreconcilable tension between subjective consciousness and its outer objective world will 
arise (Habermas 1984，pp. 388ff). Based on these points, different reactions are undertaken. 
Intersubjectivity as a mediator between subject and object, backed by the ultimate horizon of 
lifeworld, resolves the paradox of the self-preservation of subject; the obsolete concept of 
subject is then replaced by the observing system/its environment in systems theory to 
supersede the rudimentarily erroneous presupposition of subject-object relationship (ibid., p. 
396). 
If we adopt systemic perspective, Habermas's intersubjectivity is actually another 
version of "meta-subject", in which discourse emanated from individual subjects represents 
2 Therefore, religion in Luhmann's systems theory functions as a paradox-absorbing mechanism, owing to its 
resolution of the paradox induced by meta-subject, which can observe the others but cannot be observed by 
others (Luhmann 1990, chap. 8). 
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the collective conviction that based on consciousness without any fundamental discrimination 
from the philosophy of subject, but only differentiated into different degree of generality yet 
still rests on the presupposition of identity. That is to say, the identity of subjective individuals 
is presupposed even in the reflective discourse and incapable to comprehend the 
ever-deferring differences—a point severely criticized by the postmodernists一that underlie 
subject, which will in turn contradict the idea of the non-exclusion of a public sphere. 
It is not difficult to imagine Habermas's reply. The linguistic (pragmatic) structure, 
which is essentially social, and which becomes the widest horizon, will eradicate any trace of 
subject or object. That is to say, intersubjective horizon一as a meaning horizon—becomes the 
end of all teleological regressions in the form of incessant sliding horizon (in a 
phenomenological sense). Hence it is Luhmann's incapability to deal with language properly 
by reducing pragmatics into the semantic forms of the generalized symbolic media of 
communication, in which the transcending power of language is neglected (Habermas 1987b, 
pp. 379ff). Despite their mutual disagreements, a coincidence on the ever moving "horizon" 
or "possibility of observation" that can supersede the philosophy of subject is indicated and 
can be explained by their somewhat shared usage of the phenomenological conception of 
meaning (section 3.3.1.). 
3.1.2. On Human Individual 
Human individual as the action attribution centre is reserved in intersubjectivity in 
Habermas's theorization. That is, intersubjectivity as the mediating platform for the individual 
and collective sides is only a functional existence but not any form of "meta-subject" or 
collective subject—actually Hegel's absolute spirit is, instead, the one that Luhmann criticizes. 
Meaning and value that are realized in ethics and morality are still preserved in human—but 
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not any non-human—institutions, which are only the functional extensions of the human 
lifeworld. In this regard Habermas's humanistic tendency is explicit. 
However, according to Luhmann, concomitant with the deconstruction of subject is the 
exclusion of the individual from social systems. The complexity of humanity attributed to 
human individual, such as subjectivity, subjective value orientations, normative preferences, 
will power, and emotions, have to be reserved in psychic systems because they are mediated 
by consciousness instead of being communicated directly. Linkage between subjectivity and 
sociality by extension of consciousnesseven in Hegel's "objectivation" of spirit—is no 
longer convincing and thus individual as the counterpart of society only entails normative 
preferences, in which autonomous individuals are suppressed by and alienated from society. 
This humanistic preference as conferred to subjectivity, that is, the "feeling" of voluntary is, 
in effect, strictly confined in the individual psyche (Luhmann 2002，pp. 176ff), and yet when 
this "feeling" is being spoken of, explicated, written, gesticulated, and as a whole, 
communicated, subjectivity as a semantic will then be thematized by communication, and 
thus through which enters into the social system. Above all, individual (or precisely, 
individual consciousness) is only the centre of psychic system (Luhmann 1995, p. 109), or 
broadly speaking, the personal system (organism coupling with psychic system). 
The above operational exclusion of individual from social systems by no means deny the 
empirical existence of individual within societies (yet without subject as an analytical concept) 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 256). Individuality is the unique "feeling" of individual which, in fact, 
signifies the self-reference of a psychic system. While subjective and voluntary actions are 
being expressed during the coupling between psychic and social systems (actually organic 
system may also participate when situation involves behaviours), perceptions, feeling, and 
connecting actions are co-determined insofar as each of them provides environmental 
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complexity to the others. More precisely, voluntary action during interaction is the 
communicative outcome of interpenetration instead of a direct expression of the psychic 
system that has long been taken-for-granted as a natural process of human activities. 
Individual only functions as the attribution centre of communication and action, other than 
this any ontological presupposition of humanity, individual autonomy and personal feelings 
are precluded. Mainstream sociology is fundamentally flawed insofar as the dichotomy of 
individual versus society is presupposed, which will delimit and reduce sociology to the 
psychological or anthropological explanations, and the meaning of the social is further 
perplexed. 
If we accept the positive interpretation of the exclusion of human individual from society, 
one may conclude that only thus can human integrity and autonomy be preserved in 
contemporary society. That is to say, modernization, for Luhmann, is fundamentally a positive 
yet contingent outcome of the evolution of societies. Through the functional differentiation 
the independency of human being and society are largely enhanced, while a weak sense of 
integration—interpenetration_is still maintained. System boundaries of psychic system 
protect pluralism of the intransparent human mind, and thus privacy in this regard is the last 
resort for securing human autonomy. Admittedly, a negative interpretation is valid as well. 
Imagine that human individuals and their agency have no direct effect on the social process 
would eventually come up with the conservative conclusion of the social order, in which the 
possibility of social change stems from the perspective of human interest would be dismissed 
and the self-reference of social processing with complicity to status quo is appraised. As long 
as individual is isolated from collective level, mystification of the collective level in terms of 
authority or overwhelming systems and structures would be resulted. That is why Luhmann 
was labeled a neo-conservative who advocates social technocracy (Habermas 1984, pp. 358， 
378). Not simply influential at the societal level, but that a purely descriptive methodological 
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theory will probably be yielded by this top-down cybernetic from society to individual as well 
(Roberts 1995, p. 87; Holub 1991). 
More poignantly, another theoretical contradiction appears when the theoretical logic of 
systems theory is examined. As Luhmann reminds us, contemporary society is too 
interpenetrated instead of being too segregated (Luhmann 1997, p. 618, quoted by Lee 2000, 
p. 328)，3 every system is deeply interpenetrated to acquire functions, thus an incidence in one 
system will soon spread its effect to all related systems. In other words, local incidences can 
make societal effects. Hence, under this postulation autonomy is delimited to the operative 
level, in which the mode of operation is freely chosen. But this operational autonomy cannot 
reach out to the empirical autonomy of systems. Following systems theory, the "noise" 
irritating to other people can be dismissed operationally, but no practical solution is suggested 
by systems theory to handle noise. In so doing, consciousness is free to react, conceive, 
understand, interpret, or even indifferent to environmental noises, yet cannot totally neglect 
them. Hence, if we comment from the humanistic perspective, autonomy provided by systems 
theory is merely a reduced, passive and negative autonomy (free from something) in contrast 
to the humanistic understanding of autonomy~especially the Marxian type一totalistic, active, 
and positive freedom (free to do something). 
To conclude, while ethics and morality are mediated by intersubjective discourse, human 
subjects are still the point of meaning attribution and only thus can the argument of justice 
becomes intelligible~justice is in essence defined as the commonly committed proper 
distribution of interests in society—and thus the source of morality remains largely on behalf 
of individual subject with the complementary intersubjective procedure. Whereas individual 
3 Therefore, the traditional understanding of integration (mutual determination and condition) is discarded and 
replaced by a new, yet paradoxical, meaning of minimal integration through the mutual irritation, in which a 
state of autonomy while at the same time an overly integrated order is maintained (cf. Luhmann 1997，pp. 43, 
789，803). 
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morality finds its footing in the moral consciousness is in fact a permanent noise for social 
systems as a seduction of moralization. In so doing individual subject is evacuated from the 
society and thereby decomposed into various mutually independent systems, in which the 
substantive grounding of ethics and morality is lost and reduced to the complexity of personal 
systems, particularly related to the psychical self-identity (Luhmann 1991，p. 84). 
Locating in the background of the theory of complexity, anthropocentric and 
ontologically related terms such as subject and individual are precluded in describing society.'^ 
This move alternates the meaning of human being and humanity fundamentally. This 
post-anthropocentric turn does not amount to a devaluation of humanity by excluding human 
participations in society, but for the sake of clarification of social boundary. As such, a more 
comprehensive picture of humanity can be restored by the way of reserving full complexity of 
humanity against the reduction of humanity into one-sided goodness by using the distinction 
of normal/deviant (Bluhdom 2000, p. 347). In systems theory, both sides of the 
rational/irrational and moral/immoral distinctions drawn by humanistic thinking are 
conceived (as a second-order observation), whereas humanistic thinking seeks to alter and 
replace the otherness of humanity by subordinating human being under the predominance of 
collective action and norms. The cost is that individual irrationality and immorality will then 
be labeled as deviance (by using normal/deviant (Luhmann 1995, p. 322)) and thereby being 
suppressed and restituted to the positive side of the distinction, as what Ingolfur Bliihdom's 
suggested, resulting in the ironically argument: cancellation of subject and exclusion of 
individual from social arena as a non-idealistic conception of individual would revitalize the 
full complexity of humanity at the formal level, in this way systems theory is even more 
"humane" than humanistic theory! 
4 See Luhmann's summary on the history of semantics of being, nature, thought, action, and rationality in which 
traditional conceptions of human have to be superseded by the second-order cybernetics to bypass the paradox 
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3.2. On Communication and Action 
Mediated by value-oriented action, ethics and morality in sociology conventionally 
served as a special idea for collective action orientation, in which conformity and collective 
action become possible. Their dualistic nature~obligation and conviction—has incurred 
enthusiastic controversies within action theories which cannot be easily settled.^ Since no 
predominant discourse, especially in the tenet of action theory, can modestly handle with the 
complexity of morality, a paradigmatic change from the action-centered and relatively static 
social theory to a much more dynamic relational sociology that centered on communication is 
not surprising. 
Reversion of the priority between action and communication can be shown in the 
function of communicative action. It should be reminded that normative consensus is, still, the 
heart of the matter in the theory of communicative action, so that social integration as the 
broadest conditional horizon of collective human existence is thus preoccupied, yet in 
different form comparing to preceding action theories. Not to rely on voluntary rational 
calculation of interest, nor to beg for the intervention by the mystic "invisible hands" lies in 
social structures, communicative action and rational discourse shed light on the integrative 
relations rather than integrated units. This form of social integration anticipates a corrective 
of the non-observable subject (Luhmann 1998，chap. 2). 
5 One branch of action theory is represented by Durkheim and Parsons, which is characterized by putting ethics 
and morality a burden of social integration, either in terms of solidarity or normative imperatives (cf. Hagen 
2000, p. 30). In other words, integration is stemmed from the external norms. Whereas in another stream, 
represented by rational choice theory (e.g. James Coleman), the integrative function of ethics and morality is 
substituted by the rational calculations of a solitary egoistic actor. This approach, following the economic 
perspective, pinpoints the fact that non-normative and amoral social activities are prevailing in many social 
spheres by the de-moralizing power of rationality. Emphasized by them, rational action rather than normative 
action is prioritized amongst social relations and social structure, despite the fact that rational choice theorists 
would mute in front of the question of social order (ibid., pp. 34-35)，resulting in the misleading assertion that 
sociality is only the result of the coordinated individual rational calculations and thus norms are the secondary 
products. 
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mechanism for social order, and sees the reproduction of the lifeworld as a flux of 
continuation of communicative action akin to Parsons's Latency. 
A complete replacement of action by communication as the major constituent of society 
is illustrated in systems theory. According to Luhmann, communication and action are, in fact, 
the separated components of social systems, therefore social integration can be maintained 
without the necessity of the analytical coupling of communication and action~of course, 
empirically communication and action are closed combined into one "act", in that 
communicative act as a whole is the constituent of social systems. More fundamentally, 
integration is mediated neither by communication nor by action, but motivated by social 
complexity and coordinated by interpenetration. Social system—as such is an ordered and 
integrated achievement from communications—persists so long as the connectivity of 
operations is guaranteed amid the flux of complexity. In this way communication and action 
are not burdened with the task for social integration in the conventional sense, but merely 
responsible for constituting its own self-referentially closed social systems. Unlike 
Habermas's conception of communication and action to which human individual is attributed 
at both subjective and intersubjective levels, the substantive contents of communication and 
action are no more significant in this regard, unless the functionalities of the substantive 
contents are being extracted and employed by systems. 
Discussions on communication and action in Habermas's and Luhmann's general 
theories will come to a conclusion that, according to their different theoretical background, 
action theory and systems theory obtain contradictory status to which the fundamental 
conceptions of communication and action are retraced. ^  In Habermas's consideration, 
6 One may notice that Habermas's action theory, particularly the lifeworld thesis, is similar to the early stage of 
Parsonian structural functionalism, in which systemic operations find meaning attributions from actors, and 
Habermas's three worlds coordinated in the lifeworld~culture, society, and person_find their origins in 
Parsons' four systems scheme of action system: culture, society, personality, and behavioral system (cf. 
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systems theory should be grounded by action theory under the schema of the lifeworld/system 
thesis, in which human actions are sublimed to the intersubjective level through discursive 
process, and thereby individual actions are transformed into collective actions/ Whereas for 
Luhmann, the problem of social order is grounded by the theory of complexity in way of two 
guiding questions: how can society exist and persist in the flux of complexity (the problem of 
social ontology)? And how can it be conceived (the problem of epistemology)? (section 2.2.1.) 
In this regard, only observation of form by the principle of distinction is capable to describe 
society in that the mode of operation is abstracted into pure laws of logic. That is to say, 
systems theory, in this regard, overrides action theory and thus relational sociology is 
exemplified herein.^ 
. This is not a special case in sociology, instead, claimed by numerous theorists, the 
advancement from action theory to communication theory is as such an indicator of social 
change (Stichweh 2000, pp. 11-12; Leydesdorff 2000; cf. Luhmann 1990, p. 6). If one takes 
complexity as the motif or the self-description of society一the ever-lasting geometric growth 
Habermas 1987a, pp. 235ff). Whereas Luhmann's systems theory imitates to the late-Parsonian structural 
functionalism, specifically both of them rely on cybernetics, in which actor and agency are overridden by 
systemic processing. 
7 In order to bridge up individual with society, intersubjectivity is transcended from both sides dialectically by 
becoming the structure higher than the individual—it is not readily alternated by individual consciousness, 
whereas at the same time retaining collective agency distances from the objective and factual social level. It is 
disputable whether Habermas can really fill up the gap between individual and society or can only narrow it. 
In social reality there are many complexities out of the domain of communicative action, since action that 
pertains to communication occupies only part of the social life, and it is suspicious that all of them can be 
either subsumed, or reduced, to lifeworld or system. 
8 According to Luhmann, even if a deconstructive theory is posed by postmodernism—as one type of relational 
theor iescan by no means fulfill the requirement of formulating a productive knowledge of society, precisely 
because the deconstruction of human subject also reserves the substantive contents of human social life that 
impedes the post-anthropocentric movement (King and Thomhill 2003a, pp. 156-158; Luhmann 2002, p. 110). 
Lyotard's refusal to the metanarrative, Foucault's remnant normative concern on human condition exemplified 
in his critique on Enlightenment, and Derrida's free-floating pursuit of difference and otherness are not 
qualified to be the theory of society in Luhmann's eyes, which is necessarily universal (metanarrative), 
precludes the anthropocentric metaphysics (sociality distances itself from humanity), and being consolidated 
under the law of form (the theory of difference conceptualized under the theory of distinction). 
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of information and knowledge, what "social" means is thus readily rewritten by computer 
technology, especially the internet,^ and the ecological movements~conventional action 
theory, at least, requires more theoretical development in order to reflect social reality. 
3.2.1. The Role of Language in Communication and Action 
This paradigmatic transformation from action theory to communication theory began 
with the linguistic turn in social theory,'® such that it is not difficult to understand that 
Habermas's theoretical strategy leans heavily on language. In the form of universal 
pragmatics, language becomes the very ground to underpin rational and moral potentials in 
communicative action. Only thus can action, which ultimately attributes merely to human 
locutors at each level—from individual calculation and conscience to collective rationality 
and morality—be expounded from the paradox of modernity. ^ ^  Additionally, what all 
mentioned above can only be achieved by presuming the basic postulation that people need to 
12 
understand the substantive meaning of one another. Through this the lifeworld are unfolded 
9 For the impact of the technological advancement to modern social life, the most prominent theoretical 
formulation is undertaken by Jean Baudrillard, who has numerous coincidences to Luhmann's arguments. See 
Sawchuck 1994; Best 1994. 
As early as in George Herbert Mead's theory the semiotic importance of language has already been notified 
and the arbitrariness of everyday language has been revealed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in which the linguistic 
structure in place of concrete action becomes the focus of social theory and sociology. For example, 
structuralism and later on post-structuralism and post-modernism expand the applicability of language in 
theorizing society. Hence linguistic turn is ineluctably the important source of numerous contemporary social 
thoughts. 
11 The use of language can reunion reason and morality by connecting itself to the human essences: who are 
capable to speak, to reflect, and to evaluate. These are what Luhmann strongly disagrees with, in which 
construing language and humanity as the foundation of sociological theory will eventually fail to analyze and 
explain societal complexity, because rationality and morality cannot exhaust the social life~e.g. 
non-linguistic communication, irrational and immoral behaviours. Thus, according to Luhmann, an 
operational form instead of substantive predicate of rationality and morality can truly universalize the world. 
12 It is, in fact, the core assumption of the theory of communicative action. Without this the whole theory would 
become untenable because communicative action is not necessary, since people have no emergency to 
understand each other. 
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and meaning are shared on a horizon and, in other words, actions and meaning are 
coordinated when action or communication orientation are harmonized. 
Based on different presuppositions, on the contrary, the importance of language is 
recognized as a media that enables reflexivity in the course of human evolution (Luhmann 
1995, p. 94ff). In particular, as a complement to systemic operations, language is not the 
common ground of communication and action, rather, it is only a generalizing media of 
meaning, which is the shared horizon of social systems and psychic systems (ibid., pp. 94ff, 
160ff). Compared to the theory of communicative action, the predominant primacy of 
language is dethroned and thus the claims to a fundamental linguistic structure of human 
society are undermined in systems theory. The underlying reason is simple: because 
communication is possible without any intention of utterance, that is, without language (ibid., 
p. 151). Even a change of gesture—as behavioral i n fo rmat ioncan be conceived as the 
source of selection of information and (non-linguistic) utterance and thus being understood 
from the perspective of alter. In this way, meaning selection does not necessarily depends on 
language, 13 but undeniably, since language become prevalent in social life as an effective 
means of communication, everyday operations (e.g. talks about the gesture, interprets the 
gesture with specific meaning) amidst ever-increasing environmental complexity would 
eventually mediate by the linguistic communication. Unlike Habermas, nevertheless, what is 
particularly noteworthy is that the prevalence of linguistic communication is an evolutionary 
result but not the case of a universal and foundational structure. 
The functionality of language is the focus of both Habermas's and Luhmann's general 
sociologies, as well as their sociology of ethics and morality. What differentiates them is that 
Habermas as the successor of Enlightenment thinking invites reason and morality as the heart 
13 Perceptions of a particular gesture can be communicated through not by language, yet, alter's interpretation 
on it is most probably processed with language in one's thought. 
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of the matter of his theory, that is, linguistic communication is functional to the reproduction 
of the lifeworld~~and broadly speaking the moral order~in which reason and morality can 
best be expressed. The other way round, substantive values attached to language are deprived 
in systems theory and only its functional form that benefits to connectivity is reserved. Thus, 
language is not a matter of good or bad, rational or irrational. In short, for society, function 
rather than essence or substantive structure of language is considered.'"^ 
Yet, more elaborations on Luhmann's avowal are required to reply to the criticisms of the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. That is to say, discourse actualized in social life cannot 
bypass validity claims. Without examination of the validity claims in discourse would lead to 
the meaninglessness of communicative situation—as no shared understanding of meaning is 
possible—and no positive and productive information can be obtained. Hence the functional 
forms are precise only at the analytical level, but require further refinement to apply at the 
empirical level. Besides, suspiciously enough, the overarching structure of the universal 
pragmatics may incur criticism on its being foundationalist (Knodt 1994). Yet, universal 
pragmatics should not be superficially conceived as a pure logical argumentation, which 
would be readily entrapped in foundationalism, but as such a theorization as well as an 
orientation to practice—the true meaning of eschewing “performative self-
contradiction"—that is, a practical necessity that no one can escape so long as one speaks. 
3.2.2. The Meaning of Understanding in Communication and Action 
Disputes extend from language to the meaning of understanding, with the fact that 
understanding is closely related to language in the sense of being prescribed as the inner telos 
14 Because, as Luhmann argues, functionality and functional explanation can resolve the impasse of the 
traditional teleological-causal explanation (that either resorts to the transcendental being or incurs to the 
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of communicative action and systemic communication to coordinate social life. For the 
former, understanding is the necessary condition for the formation of moral order by fusing 
horizon, such that the other's intention, interest, and condition for that particular action is 
conceived as a communicative situation. Furthermore, understanding is inevitably a cognitive 
condition as well as the normative component of the lifeworld. Through understanding can a 
new borne baby be individuated via socialization, and by this the vulnerability of human 
existence can be safely secured by morality—in a value-neutral meaning that functions in 
communicative action to reproduce the shared lifeworld (Habermas 1990a，p. 199). 
For the latter, situation becomes different in systems theory. Habermas's optimistic 
anticipation of consensus from mutual understanding in discourse is being criticized for the 
point that it erroneously linking up understanding and consensus with communication, namely, 
communication aims at and leads to mutual understanding of the locutors (Luhmann 2002, p. 
159, 162). Referring to Luhmann's conception of understanding, on the one hand, there is no 
reason and no motivation to communicate if ego and alter reach mutual 
understanding一because there is nothing new (ibid.). On the other hand, by the assumption of 
the intransparency of ego and alter as two distinguished personal systems, mutual 
understanding of each other consciousness is basically impossible. Once the boundaries 
between psychic system and social system are drawn, a totalistic understanding is no longer 
possible—in the sense that we cannot really understand another psychic system via the 
formation of social system, but can only construct a "postulated" or an "imagined" other. In 
short, understanding must be social, and yet it does not necessarily give rise to consensus. 
Ironically, more understanding about each other~in other words, one's action is more readily 
to be expected by others—amount to the situation that one's expectation and action is 
determined by the others, and therefore any sense of autonomy and voluntary become 
vicious circle) by asking different一yet more relevant to the real situationsquestions (Bednarz 1984b). 
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meaningless. 
This line of criticism is convincing only if understanding is identified with consensus in 
the theory of communicative action, which is, unfortunately, not the case. Surprisingly enough, 
Habermas's conception of understanding is closely similar to Luhmann's cognitive 
understanding in communication, in which the mutual concordance of the meaning of 
situation is signified, and yet the understood situation does not leap to the state of the 
unanimous consensus, owing to the range of application is strictly confined to the 
coordination between the speaker/ego and listener/alter, but no normative values are imposed 
in the communication situation. Understanding, in fact, in both Habermasian and Luhmannian 
theory, is the prerequisite of the cognitive coordination to reproduce social order, whether the 
information is conveyed by pragmatics or non-linguistic communication. In short, Luhmann 
is veiled by his prima facie to Habermas's normative orientation and the non-normative 
(analytical) aspect of the theory of communicative action is thus neglected. 
Even the normative aspect of Habermasian theory does not prescribe the end point of 
consensus and anticipate a social unanimity and conformity (see section 1.3. for similar 
critiques). What precisely discourse ethics does pinpoint is that the redeeming and justifying 
procedure opens the possibility to disagreement, and at this point reason and morality are 
realized in the discursive interactions. Taken for granted consensus is vulnerable to dissent, 
and discourse ethics as a corrective mechanism seeks not to conformity but mutual 
recognition, through this a pluralistic yet peaceful co-existence of different values can thereby 
be maintained. 
Recognized by both Habermas and Luhmann, a total transparency can never be possible, 
but from the perspective of discourse ethics, the horizon of action coordination visible for 
everyone can thereby be widened to allow for more rational discussions. In this way the 
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construction of the social can be rationally controlled, in which reflexivity instead of taken for 
granted common sense is the crux of the matter—social order is reproduced reflectively and 
reflexively. Quite the contrary, from the system theoretical perspective, any possibility of 
transparency (or shared lifeworld) is excluded by building up system boundaries. Complexity 
as the content of meaning is the platform of understanding in systemic operations, but 
complexity as such is a value-neutral fact isolated from reason and morality. Thus 
reflexivity—but not reflectivity as the latter involves conscious reflection which is the case 
for psychic system only—and rationality, in this regard, are boiled down to self-reference 
rather than assigned to any substantive value (Luhmann 1995, pp. 443ff). In sum, what 
differentiates Habermas's and Luhmann's conceptions is that understanding in discourse 
ethics is coordinated by language and therefore applicable to human society only; whereas 
understanding in the code of the moral refrains from any anthropocentric presuppositions and 
thereby applicable to all kind of societies, including non-human societies that are mediated 
non-linguistically. 
At last, a conclusion can be drawn from their emphasis on the status of communication 
in sociology. With the aid of linguistic turn and theory of complexity, Habermas and Luhmann 
find the way out of the philosophy of consciousness, and thereby communication, which is 
closely related to the structure of language and a de-substantiated selection process, is 
emphasized to replace the intricate problems stem from action, e.g. entrapped in 
subject/object and agency/structure distinctions. Hence focus should be shifted from action as 
a relatively concrete and fix attribution center to a more flexible communicative relation, by 
which the trend of transferring from concrete social unit to fluid social relation is once again 
illustrated. 
159 
3.3. On Meaning and Value 
Sociology of ethics and morality should entangle with meaning and value at any rates, 
which will then dovetail with the preceding discussions on individual and subject, in that 
meaning and value, according to Habermas, are adopted for mediation and the substantive 
contents of lifeworld and thus normal social order is maintained. Meaning provides lifeworld 
with the foundation for the reproduction of cultural, social, and personality domains, and 
value provides orientation for social actors to perform communicative action. 
Meaning and value are understood differently in systems theory. Complexity 
characterized meaning as the incessant selections and connection between‘selections, that is, a 
horizon of complexity for systems to operate and to draw boundaries. This sheer horizon for 
selections is the result of a phenomenological conception of meaning, and together with that 
self-reference of meaning-selection process, their linkages to human subjectivity are curtailed. 
Following this de-anthropocentric conception of meaning, value does not confined to any 
substantive reference as well. Rather, it is reduced to its pure form as the thematization of 
situation—i.e. semantics一such that expectations are symbolized in a form merely for 
communication reference (Luhmann 1995, pp. 317ff). 
3.3.1. On Meaning 
To define the meaning of meaning perhaps is already polemic. A clear-cut sociological 
interpretation on meaning is adopted instead of philosophical and psychological explanations, 
inasmuch as the social realm is qualitatively different from a sheer intellectual theorization (to 
use system theoretical terms, philosophy under science system) and individual psyche 
(psychology under system of social science). In this respect, meaning is an interpretation 
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process of symbols, which becomes the collective representation in Durkheim's sociological 
vision, and endorsed as the realization of the life forms that are self-interpreted by actors 
subjectively in Weber's sociology. Yet, common to most social theories is that meaning is 
attributed to human actor, even if actors are not the ultimate explanans of society in 
structuralist and system approaches. ^^  This anthropocentric interpretation of meaning, 
likewise, is also inherited in the theory of communicative action which partly embraced 
Weberian interpretive sociology, partly shared Durkheim and Mead's conception of 
communication (Habermas 1987a, pp. 11-22), and partly inherited the Marxist, or specifically 
Critical Theorist, approach to the phenomenon of alienation. In short, in Habermasian theory, 
subjective, symbolic and humanistic conception of meaning (stemmed from Weber, Durkheim 
and Mead, and Marx respectively) are synthesized, and added with a value-neutral 
phenomenological conception of meaning that underlies lifeworld. 
More details of meaning in Habermasian theory can be reviewed by its functions. 
Meaning, in one aspect, is related to action via the mediation of understanding (Habermas 
1984, pp. 102ff), provided that meaning is social when it undergoes interpretation of one's 
own action一in effect a Weberian perspective. Construing meaning in this perspective 
assumes that actors can interact precisely because of their capability to interpret the others' 
meaning of action, and thus capable to react as well. Hence meaning is conceived as the 
common platform and the connecting points for interacting partners insofar as their lifeworlds 
can merge and thus resulting a deeper understanding. 
Another aspect is that meaning is related to the subjective value of the actor, an action is 
15 For example, Claude Levi-Strauss agrees with Durkheim that meaning is attached on symbols which is 
organized by the linguistic structure of the human mind. Also, Foucault remains link up the fragmentized 
meaning with human being in the form of ethics, particularly to the body and irrationality of the human mind. 
Only Derrida totally extracts meaning out of the human subject and then confers it to the text, in which the 
meaning of the text can never be fully conceptualized and unified in the totality. 
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meaningful if particular subjective value can be actualized. Once again, value realization is 
mediated, most likely, by communication, in that actualization of subjective value in most of 
the cases is correlated to the social world, such that meaning is subjective as well as 
intersubjective. In so doing, humanistic and philosophical meaning which are largely 
attributed to individual subject are thus transformed一via language—into sociological 
theorization to delegate the meaning (re)production in social relations. Heretofore we can sum 
up that meaning in the theory of communicative action is not only humanistic, but also 
normative md functional—for the sake of maintaining social integration (i.e. the reproduction 
of the lifeworld) and normal functioning of social interactions (social normality). 
In the conceptualization of meaning in lifeworld will be uncovered the convergence of 
Habermas and Luhmann, regarding on the point that meaning is featured with a 
phenomenological horizon, of which the lifeworld (Habermas 1987b, p. 119) and the world 
are composed (Luhmann 1995, p. 69). Meaning, as well as value, in their phenomenological 
concepts (Sokolowski 2000, pp. 97-102), is not a consumable and exhaustive substance. 
Rather, they are orientations of action or selection that enables subject to understand one's 
objective world, such that particular action or selection can be called "meaningful". 
"Meaningful" is thus a process of information acquiring via action, experience, and 
communication, or in system theoretical terms, a consequence of selection with connection to 
further selection in psychic and social systems. In so doing, "meaningfulness" means that 
something has already actualized—self-actualized or the actualization of being 
selected一however infinite potentialities await for future actualization. This value-neutral 
interpretation of meaning is the defining feature of lifeworld, in which everyone cannot step 
out of it because of the horizon moves along actualizing meaning (Habermas 1987a, p. 126). 
In much the same way, it features the world that complexity is mediated by meaning to couple 
system/environment relation for psychic and social systems (Luhmann 1995, p. 59). 
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This two-folded understanding of meaning—value-neutral and value-laden—is 
employed by Habermas as the basic structure of the lifeworld. Further, encountering 
value-oriented meaning (value-laden meaning) is unavoidable (value-neutral horizon) for 
every social member, so long as participation in social life linguistically has crossed the 
threshold of the social, and that certain normative preferences are brought along with 
participation. Contrary to this argument of normative necessity of social life, the normative 
part of meaning is construed as superfluous owing to the fact that pre-linguistic 
communicative situations are valid for social life (see section 2.2.4.)，and grounding social 
life on language is disqualified to be a general theory of society, let alone a rigorous 
sociology. 16 The latter answered the question on motivation of selection in which chains of 
selection of complexity is furthered self-referentially (Luhmann 1995, p. 61). By virtue of the 
fact that meaning is indestructible—the "used", actualized meaning will only fade into to 
potential, and actually it is selection that creates meaning by defining what will be actualized 
and what will be remained potential一hence it is not an ontic substance that can be eliminated 
forever~by turning "existed" into "non-existed"—and the meaning horizon as a "whole" 
could not be lost—the dismissal of the thesis of "loss of meaning".'^ 
3.3.2. On Value 
Two interrelated conceptions of value appear in Habermas's theory: one is in the 
analytical and value-neutral sense, and another is in the normative and value-relevant sense 
16 Meaning as a condition to organize complexity enables selection, and vice versa—selection creates 
meaning—by which complexity can be effectively reduced yet increased simultaneously. To note, complexity 
as such is an amoral fact that refrains from a normative understanding of meaning. 
口 The horizon of meaning is "totalistic" in the sense that horizon has unlimited possibilities and "infinite 
boundary"—in fact it is paradoxical because infinity is defined by boundary-less (boundary marks off finite 
denotations). 
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(Habermas 1990a, p. 201). Similar to Parsons's voluntaristic theory of action, normative 
orientation as the component of unit act guides action orientation but does not predestine any 
particular direction—neither good nor bad, ethical nor unethical, moral nor immoral. Value as 
illustrated here is understood analytically, in terms of the object of understanding for coupling 
concomitant actions in the interactional situation. Any substantive value is not invoked herein. 
Additionally, another conception of value guides the direction of Habermas's theoretical 
endeavour in the overall rebalancing of lifeworld and system, resolving the paradox of 
modernity, and providing a blueprint of a non-pathological society would be the 
value-relevance of his theory]8 To epitomize, discourse ethics is a value-relevant theory 
owing to its strictly abstinence to normative moral theory, which is the main feature of a 
procedural ethics.^^ Actually, even a sheer value-neutral theory as a social activity cannot be 
curtailed from its social consequence.^^ However, lastly, the relation between ethics and 
morality and moral order is both analytical and normative—in a value-neutral and 
value-relevant sense though. Ethics and morality are functional necessities of social (moral) 
order, as explained in section 1.1.1., yet, this linkage is based on his normative presupposition 
of a humanistic conception of the coupling of reason and morality. Hence, the holistic 
formation of Habermas's sociology of ethics and morality refuses any rash classification that 
may degrade its theoretical depth. 
18 Admittedly, as elucidated above, Habermas's social analysis should not be decoupled with the normative side 
of his theory, since they are interdependent to each other, and a specific goal is required to assign meaning to 
the analysis as such. 
19 Procedural ethics "differentiates normative statements about the hypothetical justice of actions and norms 
from evaluative statements about subjective preference that we articulate in preference to what our notion of 
the good life happens to be" (Habermas 1990a, p. 204). 
20 Social theorization as one kind of social activities (intellectual activities) is ineluctably embedded in the social 
context, and that is the subject matter of the "sociology of knowledge", the "sociology of sociology", and here, 
"metatheory". In so doing, even if systems theory is only one of the descriptions of society, it cannot evade 
from criticism of becoming a political propaganda, though unintentionally (Miller 1994; Neckel & Wolf 1994; 
for Luhmann's defense, see Luhmann 1994a). 
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According to these classifications, value-free is what Luhmann construed as the defining 
element of a scientifically rigorous sociology. However, what interest us is that the humanistic 
conception of value as such is undermined in systems theory and then functionalized into 
three forms. 
First, value is neither understood as a media of any privileged social system, such as 
economic system in the mid-nineteenth century, nor confined to the normative domain, such 
as moral philosophy or even in Weberian conception of ethics. Rather, value is only a form or 
a program—as construed in natural science and mathematical science一that emerges to be the 
criteria of the code of operation (section 2.1.2.). Both good and bad are values, so are as 
radicals and conservatives. 
Second, value is functionalized for the sake of intensification and coordination of 
expectations (Luhmann 1995, p. 317). Via this an observing system can be readily observed 
other systems (as environment) with the criteria of specific value. In so doing expectation 
coordination is assisted by value to reduce unexpected situations, such as the functions of 
norms, role, and program that provide a pre-established context of communication to delimit 
and facilitate connections of communications and actions. In short, value is functional to the 
connectivity of communication systems, but not normatively directing any substantive 
orientation of that specific communication. 
Third, in its content, value is in fact a semantic that provides a description of the society 
in the early Nineteenth Century in the form of moral integration (Luhmann 1993a, 1996a, p. 
65). By using the value of "good" to determine the communication and action orientations of 
the whole society, and by assigning consensus and conformity to be the prime values for 
social integration, other possible forms of social integration are blocked and condemned as 
pathological and deviant to asymmetrize the indeterminate distinctions. However, in 
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modernization process, the predominant totality of value splits into contradistinctive value 
spheres and retreats from the core of society. Different social systems have their own rules, 
values, codes, programs, and media of communication~of course, the underlying 
presumption is that modem society cannot return back to pre-modem society in the tides of 
rationalization.^^ In so doing, value rises to fame in the age of Enlightenment as a semantic 
devise for the humanistic self-reflecting mechanism,^^ and especially welcomed by radical 
social upheavals to rehabilitate social and moral order when the foundation of social 
integration is shaken, such as the transition from traditional society to modem society. Yet, it 
is noteworthy that not the functional differentiation of society gives rise to the differentiation 
of semantics, but conversely, the former is the consequence of the latter. In short, "media 
codes can be conceived of as catalysts which necessarily bring about a differentiation of 
complex social systems" ((Luhmann 1986, p. 6). Value, viewed from the evolutionary 
perspective, is no longer a yardstick or Archimedean point of communication and 
action一unlike the nostalgic avowals of communitarians一but functions as the semantic 
media and the blind spot, albeit already obsolete, to de-paradoxize the indeterminacy of social 
complexity. 
To put it in the broader social context, however, value preference implicitly ingrained in 
systems theory cannot evade from the entwinement in value-relevance related to the current 
socio-historical context. As demonstrated by King and Thornhill (2003a, pp. 163ff), most 
21 It is noteworthy to argue against the criticisms on the determinism lies in Luhmannian evolutionary theory. If 
one examines systems theory seriously, it, in fact, does not postulate any pattern of unidirectional societal 
development (Beyer 1984, p. xlii; Luhmann 1982, pp. 251-254), inasmuch as evolution is historically 
contingent by the fact that every actualized social event has infinite potentialities to become another one, and 
that Luhmann's three types of societal differentiation (segmental, stratification and functional differentiation) 
appear simultaneously in every society at any time, and yet with different priorities. 
22 In the pre-enlightened societies, semantics of religion are sufficed to stabilize selection and thus evolution can 
proceed. Only in the age of Enlightenment can men themselves become their own object of reflection and 
thus objective values are relativized into the fragmented social spheres. 
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academic debates in post-war Germany are related to political radicalism on the legitimacy of 
the state, as exemplified in Critical Theory, and the other side is conservatism, represented by 
Arnold Gehlen and Helmut Schelsky (ibid., pp. 167-169). While humanistic values of 
humanity, individual autonomy, and political liberalism succeeded from Western Rationalism 
are generally shared by the radicals, collective solidarity and anti-humanistic power of 
institution and state are, nevertheless, embraced by the conservatives. To simply impute the 
loss of humanity to the enormous growth of organizations cannot resolve any complex social 
issues. Rather, as suggested by Luhmann, only by discerning humanity from the predisposed 
Humanity can the relationship between individual and society be clarified. The value-neutral 
humanity一featured by individual autonomy—is not completely eradicated, depersonalization 
in modem societies is only a necessary consequence of societal differentiation process, and 
thus personal domain is further differentiated to deepen the inwardness of individual 
self-identity. 
By this prima facie Luhmann is obviously abided by the conservative value that human 
volition is subordinated to the supra-individual constructs in society, and yet systems theory, 
in fact, goes beyond the old-fashioned social conservatism that construing modem men are 
entrapped in alienation, exhausted in the devoid of meaning, and lost in anomie with traces of 
pessimism. According to Luhmann, society and individuals are increasingly autonomous from 
the outset of modernization, and the impetus provided by functional differentiation 
compartmentalizes and functionalizes social spheres and mutually independent to each other 
at the operation level—interpenetration—to engender complexity. This independency 
obtained by differentiation does not necessarily amount to the negative side of modernization, 
such as those critical theorists who moum the passing of "good old times". In this vein, if 
society is sick, it is only because of the project of enlightenment that renounces immaturity of 
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the minority of humanity, as what Kant avows, has not yet been finished (Kant 1996, p. 17).^^ 
Under the sober analysis from the non-normative perspective, value is then formalized 
and functionalized under the scope of scientific terminology that should be devoid of 
substantive content. Yet, if one were deconstructive enough, science, value, and worldview as 
such are one of the ideologies, or in other words, one of the many self-descriptions that end 
up with tautology and paradox (Luhmann 1988，pp. 28ff). Thus, logical universality as an 
inner telos of every general theory, that both Luhmann and Habermas pursue, will more or 
less be the remnant of Western Rationalism.^"^ This implicit value lies behind Luhmann's 
systems theory (i.e. the pursuit of universality is an ideology of Modernity being criticized by 
postmodernists), and perhaps, according to the tautological and paradoxical nature of value 
foundations, the theorization of systems theory would be impeded owing to the irresolvable 
blind spot that systems theory cannot reflect by i t s e l f t h e blind spot that is unobservable by 
first-order observation (Luhmann 1988，pp. 32ff). That is to say, systems theory is entrapped 
in its own logic that interrupts further theoretical operations, in that systems theory can and 
cannot observe its very constitutive value will end up with paradox. And that particular value 
foundation can have no other-reference insofar as it is not the construction of its effect, thus to 
denote that value will lead to tautology as well一the nature of that value is that value. What is 
implied here is that systems theory requires other-reference which is not constructed by it, or 
in other words, a universal systems theory calls for another reference that would paradoxically 
23 To clarify, the enlightenment with small latter "e" is distinguished from the enlightenment with capital letter 
"E", in which normative and historical inferences are renounced. Instead, only a self-empowerment by the 
incessant extrication from one's minority and immaturity is precisely what enlightenment means. See section 
3.5. 
While analysis of pragmatics is a means to pursue the scientific status in Habermas's theory, the 
hermeneutical understanding of meaning should be highlighted as well. Hence his project aims at bridging 
science with hermeneutics, together with critical elements for practices. To what extent it can successfully 
mediate all three components is a controversial methodological issue. See Joas's critique on Habermas's 
far-fetch integration of hermeneutics (2002). 
168 
impede its universal conceptualization which is another paradox (universal and 
counter-universal at the same time)! And Habermas's theory perhaps can supplement to 
Luhmann's self-contained social ontology. 
Whatever Habermas and Luhmann have notified their deeply seated ideologies, reflexive 
mechanisms endowed in their theories can handle these paradoxes and tautologies reflexively. 
Rational discourse enables speakers to challenge one's own blind spot, and collective 
rationality via communicative action is thus introduced to restore a clearer understanding of 
that blind spot, which means paradoxes and tautologies are resolved as long as their 
self-references are exposed. In much the same way, the infinite possibilities of second-order 
observations draws distinctions to contrast the blind spot with other-references, which may 
expose and explore the blindness of blind spot. Both approaches resolve blind spots and 
reconstruct the social structure reflexively~consensus mediated by communicative action 
and self-referential communications一at the same time. Moral communication, in a similar 
way, are examined and restructured reflexively in their sociology of ethics and morality. 
3.4. On Ethics and Morality 
Discussions on ethics and morality at the metatheoretical level involve investigation of 
the theoretical foundations, therefore a groundwork of their sociology of ethics and morality 
should be undertaken, in which their presuppositions, methodologies, the subject matters and 
their level of analysis are reviewed. On this ground, sometimes metatheory may be distanced 
to ethics and morality, but it actually goes beyond the superficial phenomenon of ethics and 
morality and probing into the core, which can consolidate the understanding of moral 
phenomenon from Habermas's and Luhmann's sociology of ethics and morality. 
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3.4.1. Presuppositions 
Particularities of Habermasian and Luhmannian sociology of ethics and morality can be 
traced back to their theoretical presuppositions to reveal their root of incommensurable 
theoretical conclusion. Based on the following presuppositions and deductions, in Luhmann's 
case, conflicts as well as consensus are in equal weighting in morality: first of all, there are 
two forms of moral communication, esteem and disesteem. Second, everyone has their own 
value, self-conception, self-identity that are not easily changed as long as maintenance of the 
integrity of personality is important for every person (cf. Luhmann 1991，p. 86). Third, moral 
condemnation and appraisal are attributed to the whole person, thus evaluation of that 
person's personality and thus influencing one's self-identity (Luhmann 1989，p. 140). 
Paradoxically, the fourth point is that morality should entail condemnation and appraisal, in 
that if no deviation from the normal—whether good or bad—is drawn, then morality as a 
communication can no longer be identified. Normality is subsumed to be the 
taken-for-grantedness and yet morality emerges when disturbance of normality occurs. The 
fifth presupposition is that for the sake of securing one's integrity and self-esteem, one will 
fight back when these values and conceptions are being offended (Luhmann 1991，p. 86). 
If these five presuppositions are plausible and justified, then the conclusion that both 
conflict and consensus are the cases of morality can be deduced. Emphasis of conflict instead 
of consensus is prominent in the code of the moral~even though moral appraisals ineluctably 
occur as well—in that Luhmann would like to demystify the one-sided goodness of morality 
by illustrating the conflict situations provoked: conflict occurs insofar as esteem or disesteem 
imposed upon one's personality will affect the connecting point in interpersonal relations, that 
is, unlike value-neutral evaluation of one's technique by normative-free procedure, ^ ^ 
25 Discourse ethics seeks to ground morality on this cognitive and scientific procedure with a value-neutral 
attitude, yet this procedure cannot evade from the normative evaluations. Even scientific procedure would be 
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De-evaluation of personality will affect the attribution of trust of the others. The consequence 
is that the complexity of an issue is reduced by ignoring these complexities. For example, 
appraising a politician will increase his/her trustworthiness and being construed as good 
person, in which his/her political impotence or incapability in other aspects is neglected. Thus 
moral communication usually involves moralization of a person (but not a system) and the 
structure of expectation is built up to facilitate selections during moral communications? 
To probe deeper, the range of selection of communication and action are delimited by the 
structure of expectation and therefore a moral people (e.g. a priest) are usually burdened with 
great pressure of being moral. Once this established structure of expectation specific to 
morality is broken down, because the codes are assigned to personality that is construed as 
stable and fix, the cost will be very high in that distrust attached with morality has enduring 
effects—another structure of expectation based on distrust is built up at the same time! 
Therefore people always defend against being assigned to immorality by the code of 
disesteem to protect their trustworthiness and reputation, which are crucial for their 
complexity handling. 
Self-reference of moral code is thus illustrated when one defends against the assigned 
immorality. At the side of accuser, moral accusation should be retained and defended 
against any refutation, in that one's original accusation would become morally wrong and thus 
one's reputation would then be annihilated. 
Thus moral communication as such is a risky endeavour, and further rational discourse 
will only increase complexity or leads to other kinds of communication. This explains why 
accused as complicity to the status quo or facilitates manipulation in organizations, thus embracement of a 
particular ethical position is ineluctable. 
26 For more details about the relation between norms, values, and trust, see Jalava 2003. 
27 See figure 3 in chapter 2. 
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moral communications in everyday practice are rarely examined, rather, morality grounds on 
incommensurable values is often the case. Conflict in this regard does not obscure 
communication. Instead, further communications are connected by conflict in way of building 
up points of dissent (Luhmann 1995, p. 388). Hence, conversely, consensus attained would 
impede further communication by closing the differences in discourse. Viewed from another 
way, consensus engendered by morality will consolidate the couplings of speakers by virtue 
of the integration of the structure of expectation. In-group and out-group members are easily 
indicated by their specific mode of communication, e.g. slang, custom, manners, etc., and 
suspicion of out-group members can thus be understood as due to the enormous complexity 
that impedes inter-group communications. As such inter-group communicationespecially 
between two groups with high solidarity—is prone to conflicts instead of consensus. However, 
insurmountable environmental complexity signifies infinite information, and that is why 
"cultural exchange" or "intercultural discourse" are popular nowadays because these 
information give rise in system/environmental contacts are beneficial to the participants. 
The abovementioned formulations based on the premise of complexity reduction do not 
persuade Habermas, who grounds discourse ethics on other humanistic presuppositions. First 
of all, even though Habermas has never explicitly claimed, in discourse ethics human beings 
are assumed to be conscientious and capable to discern what is morally good from morally 
bad, and they prefer the former and reject the latter. This foundational assumption bridges the 
gap between theory and practice; without it sheer cognitive condition of social action is no 
longer convincing in that practically moral orientation is ambiguous. Second, from the theory 
of communicative action, this preference of morally good is articulated to communicative 
rationality embodied in one of the validity claims. Third, corresponding to the second premise, 
human beings are rational beings and, most importantly, the teleological direction of 
communicative rationality一as a means of calculation of appropriateness (phronesis)~is in 
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itself morally good (Gunther 1993，p. 33). And finally, even if the social reality does not 
correspond to his theory, another meaning of morality— the moral order of social life~cannot 
be denied because, as presupposed in the first premise, people pursue good life instead of bad 
life, and only through discourse ethics can robust lifeworld and thus normal social order be 
maintained. 
Examining these four assumptions would map out the importance of reason in 
Habermasian theory. Certainly, communicative rationality draws from the intersubjective 
discourse can transcend yet coordinate subjective interests to objective and collective interests. 
However, the heavy dependence on human reason~even though understood 
intersubjectively一would put the theory as a whole at stake: in case humanity is deconstructed 
as a fragmentized concept to replace the obsolete pursuit of totality embodied by human 
subjectivity. In spite of the risk of this premise of Enlightenment thinking, communicative 
rationality links up with morality by referring to normative claims in discourse, through which 
the principle of universalization (U) and principle of discourse (D) are entailed in response to 
practical evaluations. Observance to these principles are motivated by two predominant 
premises that lie in Habermas's general sociology, one is that linguistically competent actors 
are endowed with communicative rationality, another one is that actors are cultivated within 
the pre-established lifeworld to acquire norms and culture that constitute the criteria for 
evaluation in simple communication (tacit mutual agreement). All these demonstrate the 
empirical condition for moral communication一in the form of rational discourse—in 
everyday life, but do not anticipate any practical necessity for moral discourse.^^ 
Their different presuppositions of ethics and morality give rise to incommensurable 
28 We can, at most, emphasize that one can be moral via discourse ethics yet inappropriate to assert that one 
should be moral, which is apodictical and will lead to the dismissal of individual volition, motivation and 
individual autonomy by reducing morality from the reflexive principled ethics to the law ethics (see 
Schluchter 1981, pp. 48f¥), as well as from the sociology of ethics and morality to the normative ethics. 
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sociologies of ethics and morality, which can be explained by their different conceptions of 
humanism and enlightenment.^^ Presupposition of preservation of self-identity as the starting 
point of moral communication combines with self-referential communication would result in 
an egoistic (or system-oriented) perspective. Moral code is used amorally for one's own good 
to maintain, construct and defend the structure of expectation. In this regard not only 
humanity is not the concern (rather than self-reference of system), but, reason and morality 
are also decoupled and falling out of consideration. Contrary to this is Habermas's humanistic 
standpoint by presupposing the normativity of human being and social life, and aided with 
communicative rationality, reason and morality can rest on a common ground. Human social 
world is the arena of application of discourse ethics, other than this are out of the boundary of 
sociology. Based on these presuppositions their methodology and subject matters are, again, 
contradiction to each other. 
3.4.2. Methodologies 
Corresponding to the sublation of the obsolete antinomy of fact and value that is based 
on the theory of communicative action and systems theory, the methodologies of the 
sociology of ethics and morality have different outlooks which are closely related to their 
substantive theory. To epitomize their differences, several sociological perspectives 
(Durkheim, Weber, Parsons and Bauman) on ethics and morality are borrowed to obtain a 
metatheoretical perspective by locating their theories in different lines of theoretical logic. 
Figure 7，8, and 9 have summarized Habermas and Luhmann's methodology of the 
sociology of ethics and morality. In figure 2 and 3，Bauman, Weber, and Habermas cling to 
hermeneutic and allege the importance of participation to retrieve authentic social meaning, 
29 See section 3.5. for more details. 
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whereas Luhmann, Parsons, and Durkheim are subordinated to the tenet of positivism that 
maintains certain distance from participation.^® 
Figure 7 Participative practice~Contemplative observation Continuum 
:Participative ： : Participative ： i Contemplative j 
: Practice | : Observation j : Observation j 
• • • • 拿 
Bauman Weber Habermas Luhmann Durkheim 
Parsons 
Although Habermas prefers hermeneutics to science—especially positivism, yet 
scientific objectivity can be retained via participative observation (Habermas 1984, p. 130). 
On the one hand an objective social observing distance can be maintained by a social 
researcher inasmuch as language can be objectified and investigated scientifically, e.g. in 
discourse analysis. Also, objectivity is in fact an intersubjective agreement and does not have 
any transcendental meaning (cf. Bernstein 1988, pp. 182ff). On the other hand social 
researcher acts within his lifeworld and one can only understand the subject mat tero ther 
human actors—via communication, to which validity claims and rules of discourse are 
stipulated. Most notably, in the case of ethics and morality, understanding and evaluation of a 
particular moral phenomenon require understanding and then objectivation communicatively. 
By communicative action and rational discourse, the actor's intention, motivation, meaning, 
value, and rational deliberation can be understood by inquiring their validity claims. This 
whole inquiring process as such involves no particular value that affects its objectivity, in that 
understanding meaning by checking one's validity claims is a value-neutral process. Yet 
To note, Parsons's relationship to positivism is complex (Tiryakian 1992, p. 71)，thus these figures are drafted 
for clarification in a relatively simplified way for the ease of comparison only. 
31 See his participation in the positivistic dispute in the 1960s (Adorno et al. 1976). 
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further (moral) actions initiated are out of the range of discourse ethics, insofar as discourse 
ethics can, at most, be a theory of justification—a metaetheory inquiring mechanism of 
morality一instead of a theory of judgment—a normative ethics stipulating moral principles. 
Abstracting from the contents of morality, ethics in systems theory is a second-order 
observation without any normative prescription aims at observing and delimiting the 
operation of moral code within interpersonal relationship and, at last, the structure of 
expectation in interpersonal communications is thereby influenced (cf. Krohn 1999). In so 
doing, sociology of ethics and morality is not about how to participate in a moral 
communication, such as resolving conflict by discourse ethics, but to observe how is one side 
of the code selected and how the receiver responds to it, namely, how to observe moral code 
under the scrutiny of ethics indifferently. 
Distanced from the extreme end of contemplative observation, moreover, Luhmann 
prefers to hold a modest attitude towards observation, in that any second-order observation 
can be another first-order observation from another observation. ^^  As long as no 
transcendental position is convincing in modem society (Luhmann 1998)，no dialectical 
synthesis is available in a post-metaphysical world. Only different perspectives—first or 
second order observations—but not different meta-positions in the hierarchy of observation 
are possible. Reflexivity in the course of observation is maintained self-referentially instead of 
subordination to the transcendental meta-position in this regard (Beyer 1984, p. xxiv; 
Luhmann 1995, pp. 448ff). 
32 He proclaims that only participation is possible for observation because there is no transcendental ground for 
pure "objective" observation; however, compare to Habermas, his abstinent position immunes from social 
practice gains him a contemplative and intellectualistic image. 
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Figure 8 Hermeneutic—Scientific Continuum 
y •• 
: Positivistic ： 
i Hermeneutic ： | Science j 
• • • • # 
Bauman Habermas Luhmann Durkheim 
Weber Parsons 
Participation and observation are concepts closely related to the definition of "science" 
in sociology. Hermeneutics seeks to understand meaning with the cost of scientific generality, 
while positivistic science induces enduring patterns of social phenomena without much 
concern on subjective meaning. Habermas, Weber, and Bauman are situated in the 
hermeneutic side as shown in figure 8, the former two are relatively less extreme than the 
latter in that objective causal explanations are integrated differently into their interpretive 
sociology to explain macro social phenomenon. From the other way round, Luhmann, Parsons, 
and Durkheim all allege scientific rigor by introducing different perspectives of pure science 
into sociology一all are broadly inspired by biology, yet Luhmann and Parson are also inspired 
by cybernetics. However, "science" is not the same for all of them. Compared to Parsons's 
and Durkheim's affinities to the positivistic science, to which the facticity of society is 
presupposed, Luhmann prefers constructive science which conceives social reality as a 
systemically constructed reality. According to Fuchs, Durkheim and Parsons are empiricist 
who take factual social phenomena as the unity of analysis, which is different from Luhmann 
who is a sociologist of scientific knowledge (SSK) that reflects upon the foundational of 
science as such (Fuchs 1992). 
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Figure 9 Value-laden—Value-neutral Continuum 
:Va lue- laden ： : Value-neutral ： 
• • • , 
• • • • • 




Hermeneutics and positivism can be further demarcated by their different attitudes to 
value (figure 9). The criterion asserted herein follows Weber's methodology in which the 
attitude towards research and its relevance are discerned (Weber 1949, 1968). Except Bauman, 
who aims at reconstructing sociology into a practical social theory (Bauman 1989), all of 
them concur with the principle of value-neutrality in social research. And yet, value-neutrality 
for Habermas should not be understood without complement to his normative value-relevance, 
same as other sociologists. It does not mean that his analytical research only serves to be a 
verification of his theoretical practice, but the two approaches are integrated as a totality. 
However, as a theory of society the value-neutral theorization of moral order makes him more 
prone to the side of value-neutrality. 
Remarkably, in Luhmann's case value-neutrality is strictly observed and his 
value-relevance is seldom revealed, but, in fact, no theory can escape from value-relevance as 
long as sociology is one kind of social activities. Yet, formalization and neutralization of the 
conception of value as such make it more complex to discern its value-neutrality and/or 
value-free. Hence Luhmann's sociology of ethics and morality is value-neutral (as claimed by 
himself), value-relevant and value-free (as observed from other theories). 
To epitomize, both Habermas and Luhmann agree that participation and observation are 
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essential for a methodology in sociology, because social phenomena are constituted not only 
by factual and observable events, but altogether with implicit subjective meaning and the 
underlying form of operation. The main difference between them is that participation and 
observation should be dialectically synthesized in rational discourse, and yet, from 
Luhmannian perspective, they should be strictly demarcated in the code of the moral by virtue 
of different orders of observation. All these arguments find their roots in their theoretical 
background that mechanical separation between participation (with value) and observation (of 
fact) is strongly opposed by Habermas as long as communication as a concrete practice is 
undertaken. In the case of Luhmann, two orders of observation are discerned based on the 
epistemological and logical necessity to avoid paradoxical and tautological situations. In this 
respect, Habermas's methodology seeks to mediate between theory and practice by 
coordinating meaning interpretation and scientific objectivity based on the objectivity of 
pragmatics, whereas Luhmann's formalistic methodology signifies the tendency of formalism 
in sociology. 
3.4.3. The Subject Matters and Their Level of Analysis 
Closely related to methodology, the subject matters and their level of analysis obtain 
theoretical importance by Habermas's and Luhmann's peculiar theoretical approaches. Among 
different descriptions of the subject matter of sociology, substance and form are the most 
general concepts as a metatheoretical orientation and conception of the social world and 
sociology. Substantive content of social action or social structure are regarded as the basic 
reference point in substantive sociology, with which hermeneutic and interpretive sociology 
coincided; whereas social facts that reflecting the objective social patterns are traditionally 
assigned to formal sociology, and particularly undertaken by the positivists and structuralists. 
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Figure 10 Substantive—Formal Continuum 
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With reference to figure 10, division is drawn by the criteria of the characters一formal 
and substantive—of the subject matter in sociology. Bauman is the exemplar of the extreme in 
substantive sociology, who construes society only from its material aspect, and any attempt in 
sociological abstraction is repudiated, as reflected by his sympathetic attitude to humanistic 
postmodernism. As mentioned in the introduction, Durkheim and Weber remain in substantive 
sociology which construes society from the point of meaning and solidarities. Needless to say, 
their formal sides on bureaucracy and social facts should not be overlooked. For Parsons, who 
concedes to the voluntarism of action theory, however, does not necessarily oppose 
formalized form of social action, due to the fact that action can be subsumed to general social 
system as the underlying source of information and attribution centre. Yet the implicit 
normative orientation of Parsons's theory, that is, realization of reason and morality in 
modernity by system operations, brings him from the extreme formal position to relatively 
substantive side. 
Similar to Parsons's subject matter, but accomplishes this enlightenment ideal via 
another critical theorization characterized the relation between Habermas and Luhmann.^^ To 
reiterate, pragmatics as the centre of Habermas's theory coordinates both the substantive and 
33 Do not forget that the subtitle of The Theory of Communicative Action Volume Two (1987a) is "Lifeworld and 
System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason". 
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formal side of social action. However, the emphasis of the proceduralism and formalism 
entitles him in the tenet of formalism.]* 
What stays at pure formalism without compromises is Luhmann. Accordingly, only a 
theory with a high level of abstraction from the unorganized social complexity is sufficed to 
be called a real sociological research, in that only explanations by pure forms can provide a 
universal and general knowledge about social reality. The underlying logic is that pure form 
of social event is codified to binary code permits further upgrading vis-a-vis environmental 
complexity by increasing connectivity. Put it in a simpler way, form as such is a reduced 
concept with higher explanatory power (more control) but fewer material contents (less 
information)—the common cybernetic foundation shared by Luhmann and Parsons becomes 
salient (cf. Parsons 1966). What differentiates them is the predominant self-reference 
mechanism in all systemic operations. In other words, the subject matter of the sociology of 
ethics and morality is purified by formal abstraction—as a moral code in communication一 in 
which moral feelings, experiences, and other agonistic factors that largely related to psychic 
operation are too complex for social systems. 
Indubitably, social complexity resulting in societal differentiation is not overlooked in 
discourse ethics, and yet a different starting point brings Habermas away from systems theory. 
That is, complexity in moral phenomenon in its very formation should be mediated 
linguistically, and through participation in discourse and communication can morality be 
thematized~and thus moral order can be reproduced. Any observing distance out of 
In fact this tendency of formalization lurks in sociology beginning from Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, and 
accelerats by Habermas and Luhmann, in which ethics and morality are conceptualized from the viewpoint of 
society instead of an individual perspective. For instance, in Durkheim's investigation on social solidarity, 
moral integration can still be asserted in the form of the division of labor, but ethics and morality in Weber's 
project on the Protestant ethics are only boiled down to the collective value orientation (life orders influenced 
by ideas). And later only the integrative function of moral/cultural value as functional prerequisite is retained 
in Parsons's AGIL framework. 
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discourse would impede the understanding of meaning, inasmuch as understanding cannot be 
undertaken without communication. Although abstract procedure is at the core of his theory, 
emphasis on practice has not been discarded. In other words, the theoretical (analytical) level 
and practical (empirical) levels of Habermasian sociology of ethics and morality should be 
clearly discerned to avoid any entanglement of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 
Figure 11 Individual level一Societal level Continuum 
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The dichotomy of the substantive and formal has always been linked up with different 
levels of analyses in sociology. One of the most controversial analytical level lies in the 
continuum of individual and society (figure 11), which is the foundational axis in nearly all 
sociological theories. Although most of them attempt to bridge these two ends by traversing 
the two levels by the concept of duality of structure (Giddens), institutionalization of action 
(Parsons), and habitus (Pierre Bourdieu), and so on, the continuum has not yet been 
completely relinquished in mainstream sociology. Hence we can modestly allocate the 
above-mentioned theories to different positions in this continuum. 
The reason of putting Habermas in the individualist tenet~compared to those 
functionalists~does not identify his theory with Bauman's theoretical individualism. This 
notwithstanding, inter subjectivity inevitably relies on individual subjects which are the source 
of discourse. Furthermore, even though the range of his theory cannot be fully covered by 
methodological individualism, the reservation of subject and individual as the voluntary 
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centre in intersubjective discourse of morality brings him to a relatively individualist position. 
From the other way round, at the extreme of societal level, individual is undermined as 
mere environmental noise that is ambiguous in the eyes of social systems. In much the same 
way, individual morality is only a flux of noise intervening systemic operations. If Durkheim 
and Parsons still reserve a place for individual as the indispensable constituent of society, then 
Luhmann has ruthlessly annihilated any possibility of the individual in sociology by replacing 
agency with self-referential communications. 
Comparisons on the subject matters and the level of analysis of Habermas's and 
Luhmann's sociology of ethics and morality do not end at this point, because the intricate 
relation between substantive and formal are not only pertain to the concepts of ethics and 
morality, while the subject matters of sociology of ethics and morality can be fully explicated 
if sociology as such is reflected accordingly. This metatheoretical requirement also appears at 
the levels of analysis. To understand the relationship between individual and society could not 
leave the discussion of society behind—as individual is thematized in section 3.1. In so doing, 
a more accurate and specific focus on meta-reflection on sociology is called for, which may in 
turn able to overarch particularities from a general level of theorization. 
3.4.4. Concluding Remarks 
Through metatheoretical reflections on Habermas's and Luhmann's sociology of ethics 
and morality, the general tendency of developing this sub-discipline is uncovered to a large 
extent. Refrained from individualist perspective, the predominance of society is underlined 
and thus concomitant with the transformation from consciousness-dependent to 
communication-dependent sociology. In this way the dynamic of society gradually shifted 
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from action to communication to cope with increasing complexity, and similarly substantive 
units are replaced by formal relations to obtain a more general theory of society without 
delimitation of concrete unitary action_actualized action observes itself as a self-contained 
unity, yet communication implies actualized and potential communication attributions, 
whether in terms of linguistic or self-referential communication. 
3.5. On Humanism and Enlightenment 
Recalling the arguments in the preceding section (section 3.4.1.)，the irreconcilability of 
Habermas's and Luhmann's theories can be explained by their different theoretical starting 
points on conceiving the relation between man and society in the way of humanism versus 
anti- or post-humanism. Generally speaking, Habermasian theory is assigned to the 
humanistic tenet owing to the priority of theoretical preoccupations given to the substantive 
content of culture, values, interest, subjective preference, subjective meaning, intention, and 
interpretation rather than structure and system. According to the general understanding of 
humanism—simply be defined as the respect of the dignity and worth of all human being, and 
particularly in a form of anti-positivism in sociology (Marshall 1998, pp. 289-290)—the view 
that human individuals can be reduced to unanimous monads that are deprived of their 
substantive differences in their biased culture, values, interest, etc. are strongly opposed. Thus 
humanistic sociology has already adopted interpretive and hermeneutical sociology as 
methodology, and adopted critical sociology as its corresponding theory for social practices. 
Critique is necessary, according to Habermas, since social developments that leads to a 
pathological consequence—automated self-referential society has already escaped from 
human control—is detrimental to human dignity, self-determination, and meaning 
construction, which are the core for reproducing lifeworld. 
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Juxtaposing humanistic sociology with its counterpart—anti-humanism—as exemplified 
in Nietzsche, scientific positivism, system theories, structuralism and post-structuralism, to 
name a few, who argue against the preoccupation of subject as the centre of the world and the 
attributions of all social mechanisms to human agency. Thus, obviously, emphases on social 
operations and structure are the main features of anti-humanism. As such, sociality is 
comprised of the underlying social structure or systemic processing, instead of human 
consciousness. However, attempts to mediate between humanism and anti-humanism are 
undertaken, as if the automation and self-maintenance of systems are stressed in late 
Parsonian theory, whereas the last resort of human agency, though in a formal sense, is 
reserved to be the material for social systems (Habermas 1987a, pp. 251-256). 
Yet, this kind of mediation is completely renounced in Luhmannian systems theory 
owing to the fact that erroneously presupposed antinomies一subject/object, individual/society, 
agency/structure—should not entangle sociology anymore, and a more radical, yet precise and 
correct, theoretical scheme by forming system/environment relationship between social 
systems and psychic systems should be employed. Under this systemic schema, the autonomy 
of systems is extremely exaggerated—from each system's own perspective their own world 
and environment are created by themselves. In so doing, human agency, which contains 
humanistic values of identity, integrity, autonomy of consciousness, is then reduced to be the 
unmanageable complexity excluded outside of social systems theoretically and analytically. In 
this way Luhmannian systems theory can be classified as a methodological anti-humanism—a 
de-anthropocentric sociology?^ The existence of human agency is reserved,^^ however, only 
Luhmannian theory is a methodological anti-humanistic because "the disposition of normative antihumanism, 
such as those that mark the world of Arnold Gehlen, are almost completely absent." (Habermas 1987b, pp. 
378，422. Italics added). Methodological anti-humanism does not neglect human agency, but at the level of 
sociological theory human agency is analytically excluded as the environmental noise. 
36 By the fact that human agency exists outside social systems, together with that system boundaries are 
exclusively closed to each another, society can never comprehend human agency authentically by direct 
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in psychic systems, in which by system/environment distinction, society is not constituted of 
human agency, but self-constituted by communication. 
Figure 12 Humanistic——Anti-humanistic Continuum 
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Again, the theoretical schema employed in previous chapter is applicable for this 
comparison (figure 12). To put Habermas and Luhmann in context, except Luhmann, all are 
more or less humanistic, for example, even Parsons would reserve human agency in his early 
stage, and the humanistic and moral ideal for the Third Republic are embraced by Durkheim 
(cf. Bellah 1973). In this regard, critiques raised against the impersonal invasion of human 
agency from society will entitle sociologists to be claimed as humanistic. Likewise, albeit 
unlike those Marxian endeavours, concerns on the condition of modem man and 
decomposition of human integrity in Weberian sociology assign Weber a humanistic 
sociologist. 
The peculiar picture that Luhmann stands alone in the tenet of anti-humanism can be 
explained at the ontological level. The presupposition of the ontological existence of 
"Subject", which is deconstructed and repudiated by Luhmann, as the ultimate reference point 
of conceiving reality colors most mainstream sociologists (Luhmann 1994b, p. 135) (section 
3.1.1.). Contrary to this, the underlying distinction that Habermas employed for his reasoned 
subject in rational discourse is ultimately a moral distinction; only thus can critical potential 
observation, and yet can only infer the subject matter by its own binary schematism. Thus, similar to the 
conclusion drawn by Husserl (Zahavi 2003, pp. 17ff), the theory of correspondence that commonly abided by 
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be released from an analytical communication theory (cf. Bliihdom 2000, p. 348). It can be 
traced back to the Enlightenment beliefs that everyone is equipped with their own reasoning 
power, which should infer to morality as a result, to emancipate themselves from their own 
minority (Kant 1996). What can be derived from this understanding of enlightenment would 
be self-reflective on forms, regardless of the substantive contents—reason and morality.]? 
Based on their contrasting positions on humanism, the closely related concepts of 
enlightenment are sharply opposed to each other. "Old-European Enlightenment" embraced 
by Habermas has implied the capability of self-emancipation from any unnecessary constraint 
by means of developing reason and morality (Luhmann 1998’ p. 31). Specifically, a society is 
enlightened insofar as three levels of integration of the lifeworld are satisfied by means of 
incessant undertaking of communicative action, and thus the counterpart of 
lifeworld—system~can be balanced with and being controlled. Social pathologies—anomie, 
loss of meaning, and alienation—are thus eliminated and solidarity as well as plurality are 
thereby maintained, which is the ideal state that Durkheim, Parsons, and both liberals and 
communitarians envisaged. 
As mentioned in the above, however, enlightenment can be construed in a non-rational 
38 
and/or non-moral way as well (section 3.6.4.). Reason and morality can be, and should be, 
in Luhmann's framework, separated in which the former is a self-reference circularity of 
systemic calculations, and the latter is differentiated into form (i.e. the code of the moral) and 
substantive content (i.e. moralization). Without this coupling of reason and morality, the 
traditional epistemologies is outdated in this regard. 
37 That is to say, enlightenment can actually be a pure reflexivity in a de-rationalized and de-moralized form, see 
reflexive modernization that Ulrich Beck proposed (Beck 1992). Additionally, the meaning of enlightenment 
should not be confined to the Western historical terminology, see Chan 2002, chap. 1. 
38 Although Chan (2002) did not incorporate Luhmann's conception of enlightenment into his typology of 
enlightenment, Luhmannian enlightenment could be nevertheless placed in the category of non-rational and 
non-moral (cf. ibid., pp. 221 i f ) . 
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Utopian vision that has long been endowed with enlightenment repudiated, but purified to be a 
state of deeper understanding comparing to the unreflected perplexed state. As such reasoning 
has to be circulated by way of constant self-reflection (Luhmann 1995, p. 455), and moral 
code has to be observed by ethics to generate knowledge of morality. Simply speaking, what 
implied in this non-normative, or cognitive, enlightenment is that second-order observation as 
such amounts to (sociological) enlightenment in that it can observe what being observed 
cannot observe (Luhmann 1988). This cognitive and epistemological enlightenment, indeed, 
may fit the original meaning of enlightenment, that is, to extricate "from his self-incurred 
minority" (Kant 1996，p. 17), with the fact that "minority" as a blind spot of every 
observation is what one cannot observe. As such enlightenment is accomplished since 
morality is observed by ethics (second-order observation of morality), and reason is 
self-reflected rationally (second-order observation of rationality) (Luhmann 1995, p. 455). 
This system theoretical understanding will inevitably imply a narrower definition of the 
enlightenment. That is to say, enlightenment is delimited to be sociological but not social, and 
thus it will only be worthwhile for those systems sociologists. However, Habermasian 
enlightenment is comparatively more progressive than Luhmannian one when we consider at 
the social level. Although the former burdens with old-European tradition, it makes for 
societal and collective enlightenment, despite the content of coordinating individual and 
society, reason and morality. Even if Habermas's project of Enlightenment may never be 
finished, his theory is much more constructive than postulating intellectual self-reflections. 
Of course it is dangerous if the enlightenment project is too radical and practical, which 
may readily slipped into ideology; yet, one should be reminded that obsession to theoretical 
universality is as well another ideology that may lead to political indifferences and promotes 
administration of society (section 3.8.). Yet, the tag of "sheer intellectualism" should not be 
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placed upon Luhmann, since systems theory does not serve for intellectual games that curtail 
any reference to social reality, rather, it aims at providing a precise description of 
contemporary societies. Through the explication of Habermas's normative project of 
Enlightenment and Luhmann's non-moral and non-rational enlightenment, the range of the 
possible states of being enlightened is thus further explored: enlightenment can be endowed 
with or without morality! 
3.6. On Society 
3.6.1. Identity and Difference 
Conception of modem society can be shown in their views on identity and difference as 
the description of social order. Although discourse ethics is clearly defined as a procedural 
ethics for pluralistic social situations, totality and identity that are essential for social 
solidarity, inasmuch as social order with communicative action is the normal case, yet 
discursive procedures are only redeeming mechanism of abnormal state (i.e. communication 
disrupted and/or distorted). Those identity formations are undertaken by way of socialization 
of the lifeworld, and the pre-established culture and social norms are, in fact, the platform of 
discourse. Differences between interest groups and individuals are the defining features of 
modem society, as Habermas conceded, yet discourse ethics as a procedure for moral 
integration articulates different identities and thereby a collectively convicted consensus is 
yielded.39 
Universalization of difference, on the contrary, is proved by the theory of observation, in 
39 Moral integration in this respect is somewhat different from Durkheimian moral order by virtue of the latter 
appears in the functioning of divided labours in terms of the organic solidarity; rather, Habermas relies 
heavily on the discursive process to counterbalance the overly self-referential function systems. See Table 1. 
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which any center and hierarchy are deconstructed and thus totality is not possible. Inasmuch 
as social order no longer relies on value center, institution, or authority, moral integration is 
only an imagined fantasy that is unable to cope with societal complexity. In such a 
de-centered and amoralized society, no particular system is hierarchically superior to others 
by way of, for instance in Parsonian theory, a cybernetic hierarchy between cultural system 
and behavioral system. The only difference that leads to unequal relationship is 
system/environment—the only center of operation. The function of maintaining social order, 
therefore, has to be relegated to other differentiated systems, such as the totalizing function of 
morality—sacredness, integration, and justice—had already transferred to religion, politics, 
and law. And now these social subsystems are independent from the influence of substantive 
morality via the maturity of binary schematism. In so doing morality becomes one of the 
interferences owing to its sheer effect of moralization (Luhmann 1995, p. 240). 
Based on the theory of observation, certain blind spots lie underneath distinctions make 
the world possible. As such a totalized concept of society can only be ideally anticipated, but 
cannot be grasped empirically. According to Habermas, however, the everyday language we 
are using conveys meaning and the invisible lifeworld. Only via communicative action can 
people overlap their particular lifeworld and thereby the formation of the social is possible. 
And that lifeworld situation, as the ultimate horizon for human condition, obtains the highest 
priority by virtue of constituting the basic foundation of our everyday life. As such lifeworld 
characterizes social life of human being, while Luhmann's systemic operations can be applied 
to all autopoietic systems, in which amoralization of morality is not only possible but also 
desirable for systemic autonomy. 
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3.6.2. The Constitution of Social Order 
The polemic of identity and difference as the foundation of social dynamic is extended to 
the basic question of the constitution of social order. A hierarchical relationship between 
individual and society is overtly reserved in Habermasian sociology, and a de-centered 
relativistic social configuration is emphasized in Luhmannian sociology at the same rate. 
According to Habermas, a hierarchical flow of information and control is directed in 
between individual and intersubjective social levels via communicative action and 
institutional systemic controls. Neither individual nor society is the sole determinants of the 
other in this interactional modal, notwithstanding the fact that three constitutive levels of the 
society are integrated in parallel: individual, lifeworld, and society. 
On the contrary, according to Luhmann's systems theory, society has no fixed center, but 
do not has no center, since center is still visible in contemporary times in the way that every 
system is the center vis-a-vis their environment. Thus we can say that contemporary society is 
a multi-centered society, while performing functions without hierarchical order. Unlike 
Durkheim, Parsons and Habermas, who agree on the functional differentiation of modem 
societies, hence, certain center is postulated to build up structural patterns for maintaining 
social order, and culture and value are regarded as the highest hierarchical order of function 
systems. Luhmann disagrees with them because the problem of order is no longer relegated to 
hierarchical values, namely, no authority or center is needed for social planning, patterning, 
and control. But every function system, as they are the center in their worldview, encounters 
one another in a doubly contingent situation to create certain order without involving third 
parties. In short, because the solution of the problem of social order goes beyond traditional 
solution by integrative values and replaced with inter-systemic emergence, functional 
differentiation therefore can be consistent to its concomitant consequence of a 
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decentered—but not centreless—society. In addition, from this systemic conception of society, 
postmodernists' failure on explaining social order and thereby recede to nihilism is prevented. 
As such relativism of systems theory is possible without undermining the maintenance of 
social order; in other words, direction of control is no longer unilateral in terms of individual 
versus society, nor bilateral in terms of reciprocal determination of individual and society, but 
emerges contingently in ad hoc. 
3.6.3. Lifeworld and System 
Hierarchical thinking is also exemplified in Habermas's conception of lifeworld. In the 
course of societal evolution, as illustrated in the theory of communicative action, system 
emerges from lifeworld to take up the function of coping with the ever-increasing complexity 
of societal differentiation (Habermas 1987a). Media (such as money and power) developed to 
facilitate exchanges out of human determination in system (such as market and state), that is, 
complex situations created by human participation are bypassed and the burden of lifeworld is 
thus relieved. In this respect, Habermas agrees with Luhmann, to a certain extent, that 
impersonal systems are indispensable. Yet bifurcations appear precisely at the point of the 
relative significance between lifeworld and system. Lifeworld is the motherland of system by 
providing with meaning attribution and thus bridging human volition and collective interests 
to the institutional and impersonal systems/® According to this lifeworld perspective, 
pathology emerges when the linkage of meaning is broken down and system is exiled to 
become self-referential. In other words, what Luhmann celebrates一the autonomy of function 
40 Unlike Parsons, who links up human agency to system by functional performances under the framework of 
pattern variables, a substantive platform for the reproduction of everyday life on cultural, social, and 
personality aspects, namely, lifeworld is formulated by Habermas, in which a clear boundary between 
lifeworld and system is discerned. Only through this can a "critique of functionalist reason" be commenced 
from the lifeworld perspective (Habermas 1987a). 
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systems as a result of autopoiesis—is precisely what Habermas ruthlessly criticizes. 
In this respect, lifeworld is hierarchically superimposed on system, yet in the case of 
system theory every system is relative to one another, therefore describing modem society by 
normal/deviance or moral/immoral distinction is only one of the descriptions—a normative 
one without any preordained necessity一and therefore the primacy and immediacy of 
lifeworld are dismissed and lifeworld as a whole is fragmentized into different systems, since 
meaning in systems theory is "de-normalized" and boiled down to be the operational horizon 
of psychic systems and social systems. 
To go even deeper, whether lifeworld exists or not is by no means the core problem that 
Habermas noted. More poignantly, the central problem is that even if lifeworld exists, whether 
lifeworld is significant vis-a-vis the system is polemical. For Habermas it is a theoretical 
necessity for the anchorage of system on lifeworld via meaning attribution process (Habermas 
1987a, pp. 172ff). Whereas the dynamics of the linguistically constituted lifeworld has 
already been overridden by systemic logic, and the anthropological and philosophical 
meanings embedded in the lifeworld are not the matter for social systems so long as they have 
not been communicated. 
3.6.4. Rationality, Morality, and Normality 
The comparison of the conception of lifeworld and system leads to the controversial 
question of whether humanity—as embodied in l ifeworld~is the last resort of sociality. In 
other words, can reason and morality, particularly the latter one, be secured as the highest 
hierarchical status in modem societies. According to Habermas, language endowed with the 
potential of reason and morality that "installed" in human being constitutes both lifeworld 
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directly and conditions system indirectly. Humanity with reason and morality as the content is 
reserved in the lifeworld, which is potent vis-a-vis the system. Whereas the only primacy in 
systems theory is the autopoiesis of systems, any further elaboration of humanity, reason, or 
morality are secondary derivatives of the self-reference of systems. 
To recapitulate the dispute, a typology of rationality and morality is drafted to illustrate 
the contrasting positions on the conception of society, which is closely articulated to the 
conceptual framework of enlightenment to underpin social order (table I ) , 
Table 4 A Typology of Rationality and Morality 
Rational Non-rational 
Moral Durkheim, Parsons, Habermas Weber, Bauman 
Non-moral Luhmann 
According to the table, the ideal of Enlightenment is inherited by Habermas, Parsons, 
and Durkheim, who avow the rationally guided moral integration of a society, albeit in 
different form and means. Yet, decoupling of reason and morality is neatly demonstrated by 
the postmodernist position of Bauman, who construes rationality as the suppression of 
personality and individual freedom. Instead of a sober and indifferent theorization of the 
society by rigid sociology, moralization via social theory is preferable. Similar to Bauman, 
Weber grounds social order on a non-rational approach to enlightenment. Personal ethics and 
maturity are the last vantage point vis-a-vis societal bureaucratization, and rationality in this 
regard is prevailing in social reality, but the ideal of an enlightened society can only be 
realized via non-rational and moral ways. In sum, the meaning and functions of morality are 
conceived in different ways at the axis of morality. Though they converge at the point that 
This table is borrowed from Chan's typology of enlightenment, in which different approaches to 
enlightenment by either at individual or collective levels are defined. Herein a simplified version is employed 
to draw the possibility of the formation of society along two central axes. 
194 
morality in any aspect—individual, subjective, collective and intersubjective—is crucial for 
the constitution of moral order, and thus morality in this light is understood non-normatively 
but according to its social function. 
Besides the axis of morality, non-moral dimension are embraced by Luhmann. Social 
order is more prone to be de-moralized by impeding any substantive sense of morality in 
systems theory. Moreover, the concept of reason is also translated into systemic terms of 
recursivity that subordinated to systemic self-reference (Luhmann 1995, p. 477). In so doing, 
as mentioned above (section 2.2.2.), based on Luhmann's peculiar social ontology and 
epistemology, self-reference replaces rationality and morality to reproduce social order. Hence, 
this pure non-normative understanding of ordering—as shown in his order from noise 
principle一grounds that justifies Luhmann's controversial de-anthropocentric sociology. 
To conclude, one may be confused with that Habermas's enlightenment generated 
through normative control, rational calculation, and prediction (Chan 2002, l.III.ii)，however, 
may not observe empirical reality of contemporary society, in that social order persists even 
when morality is frequently violated. The crux of the matter lies in Habermas's conception of 
normal state as closely articulated to moral. In short, normal is moral., because that one feels 
normal is already the outcome of communicative action which is as such moral in a 
value-neutral sense. Only in the abnormal case would a rational redemption of normal state be 
called for, that is, morality in Habermas's sociology of ethics and morality can be understood 
non-normatively, and thus normality as morality marks the human condition as such. 
Yet, all of the above are transformed in system theoretical terms. Norms in systems 
theory only function as the supplementary structure of expectations of communication and 
action, but do not have any a priori transcendence and universality in society. Actually, the 
attachment of norms to society is only an Old-European presupposition (Luhmann 1995, p. 
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325). More radically, social life is possible without norms (ibid., pp. 325-236)! The only 
premise of social systems is autopoiesis, which is much more fundamental than norms or 
social contract—that supersedes action theoretical formulation of the Hobbesian problem of 
social order (ibid., p. 326). As such any normativity attached to norms, values, ethics, or 
morality is precluded. This postulation is supported by the developmental tendency of 
functional differentiation, in which cognition is differentiated from norms to specialize for 
truth questions.42 Consequently, the upgrading of social order is illustrated in its cognitive 
coordination via the expectations of action and communication, in which the connectivity is 
fostered beyond the narrow range of normative expectations (ibid., pp. 322-324). 
3.6.5. Descriptions of Modern Society 
According to their conceptions of society, contemporary society is thematized differently, 
in which the probable descriptions of social life in general and morality in particular are 
reflected. Stemmed from the Marxist tradition, a normative alert of social crisis created by the 
derailed modernization process is warned by Habermas, whereas a relatively non-normative 
description of a risk society is claimed by Luhmann (cf. Luhmann 1984). 
Along the normative array of Habermas's theory of communicative action, as long as the 
lifeworld is the centre of society based on humanity, its colonization amounts to the collapse 
of humanity, and resulting in societal dehumanization and demoralization (cf. Habermas 
1987a, p. 143; 1975, part I I ) , As such critiques against the functionalist reason stemmed 
42 The turning point appeared in David Hume's critique of the human reason, and thus the truth question is 
differentiated from the moral question. The theory of communicative action aims at resolving this problem by 
altering the traditional conception of truth and morality to communicative rationality and discourse ethics that 
grounded on the same basic pragmatic structure (cf. Habermas 1979). 
In the preface of Legitimation Crisis, Habermas wrote down his endeavour in that book: "The application of 
the Marxian theory of crisis to the altered reality of 'advanced capitalism' leads to difficulties. This fact has 
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from system are immediately called for to recover the well-being of the lifeworld. 
Contradiction becomes more acute and irresolvable in terms of the conquest of individual 
interest and subordination under systemic efficiency. Not only at the level of individual 
personality that meaning has been lost, but crisis has penetrated into the social and cultural 
domains, and the feasible solution, according to Habermas, is to re-harmonize and re-balance 
the relationship between lifeworld and system by means of communicative action (Habermas 
1987a).44 
Unlike Habermasian normative description, risk is conceived as an ever-existing 
phenomenon of contemporary complex society (Luhmann 1993b). Risk, particularly 
ecological risk, brings us to the awareness of our uncontrollable and unpredictable 
environment. In this respect, reduction mechanism to handle risky communications is urged, 
lest the disconnection of communication when trust cannot be built up for information 
exchange. Provided the enormous complexity and uncertainty in the social realm, norms, 
values, and familiarity that pertain to relative small groups are now playing only a peripheral 
role in today's society (Jalava 2003, p. 186). Trust is, instead, an excellent way to absorb 
complexity (Luhmann 1979, p. 20). However, trust as a system theoretical communication 
presupposes a situation of risk, and that only in unfamiliar situations can trust becomes 
significant (Jalava 2003, p. 174). Contra Habermas's reliance on familiarity and 
communicative rationality, the decline of familiarity as a result of modernization and 
given rise to interesting attempts to conceive of old theorems in new ways, or, alternatively, to develop new 
crisis theorems in their place." (Habermas 1975，p. xxv). 
44 To note, the broader context of the paradox of modernity is largely related to the rise of capitalism. In 
Marxian terms, the central problem is the suppression of human potential in the capitalistic labour process, 
and thus different solutions besides the orthodox materialist Marxism are proposed to recover humanity by 
different form of revolt: that by ideological hegemony (Gramsci), by the advocacy of class consciousness 
(Lukacs), by a totalistic cultural critique (Frankfurt School), by the critiques on everyday life (Lefebvre, 
Situationist International), or in this case, by the rehabilitation of interaction in Habermas's early development 
and recovery of communicative action in his latter stage. 
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differentiation cannot be redeemed by any normative means一whether authentic 
communication or critique of pathology. Rather, the more fundamental mechanism of trust is 
employed to cope with contingent situations by reducing complexity (Luhmann 1979，pp. 
42-43). 
Comparisons between Habermas's and Luhmann's descriptions of modem society can be 
drawn on the point of trust and familiarity.'^^ During the resolution of double contingency, 
trust is built up to be a structure of expectation to assist the formation of social system. Social 
relations without trust cannot support a long-term stabilization of social system inasmuch as 
trust is a strategy that considerably extends one's potential range of action, by the way of 
permitting unsure premises to be incorporated into the certainty value of one's own system 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 128). That is, trust can reduce complexity by means of providing 
guarantee to outweigh the uncertainty of particular event (cf. Luhmann 1979, pp. 24-31). 
Under this formulation, trust can also be converted to distrust insofar as communicative 
results are not in accord with the expectations and the guarantee thereby broken down. 
Distrust is, therefore, a constraining strategy because it needs a relative high level of certainty 
and particular precaution to any disappointment. The redeeming actions given by distrust 
thereby absorbs disappointment and unexpected consequences to reestablish system order, 
thus distrust can be reversed to trust by additional supports, such as law, organization, and 
moral appraisal which secure certainty. 
In fact, the argument hereby asserted finds affinity with the relation between 
communication and rational discourse in Habermasian theory, only with the difference that 
Luhmann does not consider the content or normative value of trust~contra the substantive 
45 Recalling the theory of communicative action, trust is the product of consensus that secures the taken for 
granted structure for everyday communications. Discourse is entailed only if trust relationship secured by the 
mutual acceptance of validity claims—that is, familiarity of everyday life一is questioned. See section 1.2.3. 
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communicative conditions assigned in the validity claims—but merely extracts its functional 
value with regard to consolidating the structure during double contingency (Luhmann 1979, 
pp. 24-31). In addition, moral evaluation is closely coordinated with trust, in which moral 
esteem enhances trust and facilitates connection of expectation (section 2.2.4.). Or one can say, 
moral esteem or disesteem in fact struggle for trust to increase the chance of action 
determination upon the others. 
To elaborate Habermas's description of a crisis society, it is not difficult to disclose his 
belief that in order to maintain a robust and "healthy" social order, normative participation via 
communicative action is called for. In other words, ethics and morality are essential for 
continuing the project of Enlightenment to extricate out of the aporias of Capitalism, and 
what he suggested is one of the preferable ways of Enlightenment—whatever its ideal一the 
coordination of reason and morality. 
Extrication from this normative solution of social order is intelligible as well. Social 
order is possible with the help of behavioral expectations, most notably in the form of trust in 
today's risk society (Jalava 2003; Luhmann 1979). Unlike Beck (1992), who is rather 
idealistic for the capability of the upgrading of society in risky environment, Luhmann maps 
out a relatively arbitrary picture of trust in risk society, in which either trust or distrust are 
available with equal chance. Both sides of distinction have their own potential to be 
actualized, and trust (similar to familiarity in the theory of communicative action) versus 
reflexivity (similar to rational discourse) does not necessarily give rise to synthesis, but only 
slides to another distinction. In so doing, ethics and morality with normative contents are 
replaced by the value-neutral semantic of trust, risk, and anxiety (Luhmann 1988, pp. 32-33), 
which are societal semantics with more connecting points in comparison to morality delimited 
to personal levels. 
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As such social order is possible even if one encounters totally unfamiliar situations 
without prior guiding norms and situation definitions, insofar as communications and actions 
can be connected solely by behavioral expectation. That is another reason explaining why 
systems theory can be applied to non-human domains with exactly the same mechanism as 
well, for instance, to societies of animals (cf. Luhmann 2002, pp. 191-192). 
3.7. The Nature of Sociology 
3.7.1. Methodology 
Understanding is not only a sheer epistemological matter, according to Habermas, 
condition of humanity is precisely highlighted by understanding because only 
human—despite extraterrestrial organisms—require understanding to interpret meaning. To 
reiterate, recalling Habermas's normative conception of meaning, phenomenological meaning 
only occupies part of its meaning, yet the social part are not fully explored before the problem 
of double hermeneutic has been resolved. The uniqueness of social life，therefore, is grounded 
on the presupposition of the need of understanding in order to live together with a viable 
mechanism of lifeworld reproduction. That is, social order based on violence and rational 
calculation cannot resolve the Hobbesian question of social order. In so doing, understanding 
through participation in lifeworld and observation and reflection via rational discourse is the 
very method to construct not only the sociology of ethics and morality, but all social 
activities. 
Similarly, Luhmann does not abide by positivist sociology (cf. Fuchs 1992). 
Understanding is in this regard crucial for the connection of communication as well, yet 
conceived differently: non-normative conception of understanding and meaning explain social 
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order from the standpoint of noise. Meaning amounts to the dimensions and forms of 
complexity—as the outcome and dynamic of selection. Understanding meaning therefore 
denotes the unity of difference in communication process, as well as a complexity reducing 
and increasing mechanism. To cope with these fluxes of communication, only second-order 
observation observing distinctions drawn can unfold further meaning, especially for 
knowledge construction. Society is a composition of special autopoietic systems characterized 
by communication, but indeed only one of many autopoietic systems in the world. Thus, the 
method to conceive the world should be delimited to observation only, if method is defined as 
the way to gain knowledge. 
3.7.2. Sociology and Society 
Contradiction of methodologies can be reflected by explicating different approaches to 
mediate sociology and society. According to Luhmann, sociology within the category of 
science system functions to provide descriptions of society, that is, sociology as a system of 
knowledge that can enhance the level of observation on society (Luhmann 1988, p. 35). That 
is to say, to understand society via observation is the most elementary goal of sociology, and 
any other partisan judgment and normative critique are superfluous and excluded out of the 
boundary of sociology—to recede to a less rigid and precise social theories aim not at 
knowledge production (Luhmann 1994b, pp. 136-137). Any substantive and immovable 
Archimedean point of critique embraced by social theories cannot evaluate its own raison 
d'etre, which is indeed the blind spot of a distinction. Additionally, any critique based on 
certain value or ideology is, in fact, striving for particular purpose but cannot reflect on 
society authentically. Needless to say, this approach of theoretical indifference would be 
ruthlessly attacked by Habermas with the criticism of an inadequate understanding of 
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language (Habermas 1987b, pp. 378ff; Leydesdorff 2000), and sociology providing theories 
of society seems to be cut off from social practices, which is actually consistent to Luhmann's 
non-normative sociology. 
The involvement of sociology in society is much more positive from Habermas's 
perspective. Theory and practice are after all two sides of the same coin—the totalistic 
lifeworld underlying all social activities, including the theorization of society. It should not be 
misunderstood as a promotion of rash social practices in terms of ideology, nor subordinating 
sociology under the service of partisans' struggles. Clearly stated by Habermas, his sociology 
of ethics and morality can only map out the cognitive conditions and justifications of morality, 
and yet unable to explain how can moral action be motivated (Habermas i990a, pp. 196-197). 
What Habermas strongly opposes is the implicit social consequences that are veiled under the 
avowal of value-neutrality.46 Sociology as a social activity should be able to reflect on itself 
sociologically, and critiques are necessary to unveil these ideological theorizations. This 
critical position explains Habermas incessant disavowal of Luhmann's systems theory as 
metabiology (Habermas 1987b, pp. 372-373)—to justify its validity self-referentially by 
introduction of autopoiesis" 
Metatheoretical reflection on sociology and its relations to society demonstrates that 
sociology as a reflection on society should not be confused with policy advisor or social 
engineering. In much the same way, sociology of ethics and morality are not ethical and moral 
sociology, hence a clear-cut boundary of sociology一by Habermas's totalization of theory and 
practice or by Luhmann's self-referentially drawn boundary—is indispensable. To accentuate, 
46 His attitude does not change since his participation to the positivist dispute in 1960s (Adomo et al. 1976). 
47 Critics raise this question against Luhmann on the possibility of transplanting biological phenomenon to 
explain society (Joas 1996; Mingers, 2002; Munch 1994; 0sterberg 2000; Viskovatoff 1999; Wagner 1997， 
1998). Actually, even the original advocator of autopoiesis does not totally agree with Luhmann's usage 
(Krull, Luhmann, and Maturana 1988, pp. 88-89). 
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it is precisely the very particularity of sociology of ethics and morality. Abstraction of moral 
complexity is approved in both discourse ethics and the code of the moral, which is the 
condition of a general sociology indeed. In this vein, especially for the clarification of the 
boundary of a newly established sub-discipline, formalization of ethics and morality in terms 
of procedure and codified form is justified, albeit more observation of the ideological 
tendency disguised as value-neutral sociology is needed. 
3.8. Social Implications 
The possibility of sociology degenerating to become social ideology reminds us the 
social implications of Habermas's and Luhmann's sociology of ethics and morality. Needless 
to say, both perspectives do not aim at alternate social practices directly, while their 
value-relevance requires more clarifications to distill the remnants of ideology. 
From Habermas's perspective, Luhmann's anti-humanism would imply dangerous social 
consequences, that is, the advocacy of technocracy insofar as differentiated social systems 
runs self-referentially that isolated from any human participation at social level (Habermas 
and Luhmann 1971; Roberts 1995，p. 87; Holub 1991)/^ and thereby human interests will be 
readily subordinated to the social systems with a disguise of the primacy of systemic 
operations, since autopoiesis and connectivity are prioritized for all social systems. In other 
words, human agency can "participate" in social systems only by environmental irritations 
and passively conceived as environmental complexity. Therefore systems theory, which 
implies social technology with scientific neutrality (Sixel 1976)，can easily be manipulated by 
power holders and authorities because of its being a delicate apparatus, or more poignantly, 
48 This critique carries along with Habermas from their early debates to the recent disputes (Habermas and 
Luhmann 1971; Roberts 1995). 
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complicity to social control, as illustrated in the welcomes from organization theory'^^—in 
which depersonalization of organization is construed as an advantage for 
administrators—owing to its ability to manage individual contingent complexity by 
institutional operations. 
Paralysis of the potential of critique stemmed from humanity gives rise to amoralization 
of contemporary society. A highly amoral and differentiated society is projected by the moral 
minimalism of Luhmann with weak value integration一^^ for example, (paradoxically enough) 
the value of pluralism and relativism—and highly autonomous yet indifferent social systems. 
Moreover, social structures are temporal, without any substantive underpinning except the 
mechanism for (cognitive and behavioral) expectation of expectations (Luhmann 1995 pp. 
143，305). The scenario may not be the war of "all against all" as envisaged by Thomas 
Hobbes, yet social members have to split their own personality—a social schizophrenia 
(!)一in order to accommodate the dramatic schism of psychic systems and social systems in 
everyday life. Mediating mechanism of two systems is largely preoccupied by complexity 
which is out of personal control and regard, people in this, according to Habermas's criticism 
(Habermas 1987a, pp. 153ff), experiences radical alienation not only from one's own labour 
and product, but poignantly from the outer environment as a whole—perhaps it can be 
analogized to Leibnizian metaphysics of monad.^' This novel social monadology, at this time, 
relegates the ultimate control from God to complexity, in which interpenetration as a 
de-anthropocentric means is sufficed to handle complexity, including those complexity 
49 See numerous repercussions from the literatures in organization studies (Seidl and Becker 2005; Bakkan and 
Hemes 2003; and the special issue in Organization, 2006，volume 13’ no. 1’ "Special Issue on Niklas 
Luhmann and Organization Studies.”). 
50 The most basic condition of sociality is an encounter between at least two people, that is, in Luhmann's terms, 
the situation of double contingency. 
51 Briefly speaking, monads are the ultimate elements of the universe. Monads are the substantial forms of being 
with the following properties: they are eternal, indecomposable, individual, subject to their own laws, 
un-interacting, and each of them reflect the entire universe in a pre-established state of harmony. 
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stemmed from humanity, by confer them to the environment of social systems. 
If amoralization of society incurs to ideology of individual autonomy—personal systems 
are autonomous owing to their autopoiesis, then critiques on moralization of society implied 
in Habermas's sociology will be imaginable. Emphasis on coupling of reason and morality 
may colour his sociology of ethics and morality with naive optimism, inasmuch as societal 
consensus is rare and rational discourses are seldom actualised perfectly. Distorted 
communications and mediation of power and money, rather, appear to be the observable 
prevalence. Even though Habermas's sociology of ethics and morality is strictly discern from 
moral philosophy, the totalistic character of discourse ethics would readily mislead to a 
normative ethics, and the relatively equivocal attitude towards critical theory and philosophy 
may incur to ideological activism as well. 
However, we cannot simply conclude that discourse ethics is merely a social ideology of 
utopianism, since the sociological elements that discourse ethics abstracted—in terms of 
reproduction of social and moral order~discern its unique synthesis of normative and 
non-normative understanding of ethics and morality. One should not isolate value-relevance 
of the practice from value-neutrality of analysis in his theory, as long as ethics should not be 
understood at the sheer cognitive level, as what G. E. Moore (1966) did, rather, participation 
has the primacy for every social interaction which is at the outset the constituent of the social. 
Moreover, systems theory is not only a value-free analytical theory for theory 
construction per se, but on the one hand, what Luhmann describes is certainly the "real" 
picture of social reality. On the other hand, from the perspective of the sociology of 
knowledge, this theory leads to political amoralization and paralysis of social movements 
(Neckel and Wolf 1994). In short, his theory as such has moral implications and moral 
practices, which needs more observations and delimitation to sociological knowledge only, 
205 
otherwise it may be reduced to one of the social ideologies that provides another novel yet 
fanciful descriptions of society. However, ineluctably, one can ask in retrospect that whether 
pure formal transformation is the necessary condition to transcend from common-sense and 
individual viewpoint. It seems that individual (or personal) level and societal level should be 
clearly demarcated for the establishment of sociology一not only for the sociology of ethics 
and morality per se. 
3.9. Concluding Remarks: Metatheoretical Reflections on the Sociology of 
Ethics and Morality 
Metatheorizing employed for this thesis is significant because it clarifies the particularity 
of sociology of ethics and morality by discerning philosophical sociology that tends to 
metaphysicize ethics and morality, as well as prone to pursue universal foundation for further 
normative critiques (Weinstein and Weinstein 1992’ pp. 137-139). It is not to say that 
metatheory in sociology is totally relative and value-free, instead, it requires situating 
sociology within socio-historical context that provides empirical underpinnings for any 
sociological theory. Hence multiplicity in place of monolithic grounding is considered in 
metatheory, and this pluralism resorts to empirically plural social contexts. 
Metatheoretical positions of their sociology of ethics and morality can be summarized in 
table 5. Some remarks on this table are needed. Fact and value dichotomy as the basic 
conception and starting point of the methodology of sociology in the past is now superseded 
by grounding the antinomy on communicative action and social communication. In so doing 
fact and value are actually mediated by communicative rationality, according to Habermas, 
and are functional constructs of systemic communication. 
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Table 5 Summary of the Metatheoretical Positions of Habermas and Luhmann 
Habermas Luhmann 
Fact and value are grounded on Fact and value are grounded on 
communicative action communication 
Communicat ive action Social communication 
Formal procedure assimilated with Formal systemic relations based on pure 
substantive meaning and values forms 
Reflective and Reflexive Reflexive and self-referential 
Normative Sociology Non-normative Sociology 
Human ism Methodological Anti-Humanism 
Interpretative and Hermeneutics Descriptive and Scientific 
Cultural Science; anti-positivistic Biological Science; post-positivistic 
… . ， „ Post-Enlightenment; sociological 
Enlightenment Reason enlightenment 
Their commonality on the primacy of communication over action at the social level is 
the result of superseding the philosophy of consciousness. Action is retained in Habermas's 
theory inasmuch as human volition that incarnates in action are irreducible units of sociality, 
while social relations conducted by communication are prioritized at the operational level. To 
exaggerate, what is social is communication, such that action in this regard is the attributed 
communication. Hence the tendency of transformation from action to communication is 
clearly revealed. 
Compatible to these transformations is the change of subject matters and levels of 
analysis from substantive to formal and from unit to relation. Both of them recognize the 
functional requirements of formal relation and procedures in that contemporary society 
encounters unprecedented social complexity and classical sociologies, including Parsons, are 
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unable to cope with it. New social configuration calls for new knowledge on society, and 
moral phenomenon hereby are deprived of their substantive content, which are unproductive 
for sociological theorizing, are thus transformed into procedure of justice and moral code. 
Convergence and divergence of their position appear at the point of recursivity and 
normativity. Communicative action, rational discourse, and self-referential communication are 
reflective, reflexive, and recursive toward ethics and morality. Normality of social life is 
construed as moral from Habermas's perspective, in which normal and abnormal are mediated 
by discourse. On the contrary, normal social life is understood non-normatively, and its 
reproduction is conducted by systemic communications. 
These tendencies and comparisons can be explained by their different theoretical 
presuppositions. One of them is the basic conception of society in terms of humanism or 
anti-humanism. Habermas emphasizes moral agency of human conscience and just procedure 
in discourse, which is exemplified in the requirement of attributing meaning from the 
lifeworld to system. Whereas methodologically anti-humanism embraced by Luhmann 
excludes human individual out of social systems, yet humanity is in fact reserved in personal 
systems. 
Based on these conceptions of society, the ways to understand the meaning of ethics and 
morality are diversified as well. Discourse ethics captures meaning via interpretation and 
participation, with subjective meaning as the last resort of humanity. Whereas systems theory, 
albeit it discards positivistic science, still abides by natural scientific perspective that aims at a 
neutral analysis of society and anticipates sociology as a mature science. 
The meaning of science is conceived differently by virtue of their opposing 
presuppositions. Apparently Habermasian humanistic theory brings him to the side of cultural 
science, which sees cultural reproduction as a vital function of society, and culture as such 
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obtains complexity that cannot readily be reduced in positivistic framework. From the other 
way round, different from traditional positivistic sociology, which depends on predictable 
functional analysis of science, biological science and post-positivistic sciences are introduced 
as the backbone of systems theory. 
These contrasting positions can be summarized in their conceptions of enlightenment. 
For Habermas, Enlightenment reason as a precious tradition for the hope of societal 
sublimation is redeemed by the reflectivity and reflexivity of communication and discourse. 
Full realization of humanity can only be possible under a robust lifeworld that reproduces 
meaning necessary for social life, yet counter-balanced with systemic mechanisms ground 
upon human volition. Precisely at this point Luhmann inexorably attacks this normative 
Enlightenment value in that its own paradox is concealed ideologically, which would preclude 
any sociological observation by taking the coupling of reason and morality for granted. 
According to Luhmann, an authentic enlightenment in terms of extrication from self-incurred 
inferiority can only be accomplished by systems theory, insofar as observation can observe 
what one cannot observe, and through this recursive observation all possible forms of reason 
and morality, namely, unreason and immorality, are reflected on and thus a sociological 
enlightenment that can provide an authentic understanding of society by evading any 
ideological, political, and metaphysical seductions is yielded. 
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Concluding Reflections: Prospects for the Sociology of Ethics and 
Morality 
The line running through the thesis indicates the prospects for the sociology of ethics and 
morality. Four tendencies pertain to different aspects of ethics and morality are highlighted to 
map out this newly established sub-discipline. For the methodology and epistemology, the 
contradictions between participation and observation, as well as fact and value are mediated 
by means of communicative action and social communication. The methodological problems 
implicit in the philosophy of consciousness, which have impeded understanding on moral 
phenomena, are thereby superseded by Habermas's and Luhmann's sociologies vis-d-vis 
classical social theories. 
In so doing, conceptualization of ethics and morality in sociology obtains new meaning 
as well. Based on the transformed social ontologies—the philosophy of language and the 
theory of observation—action as the concrete attribution centre of social activities is gradually 
replaced by, or at least subordinated to, communication. It is not difficult to understand that, 
communicative relations, as the basis of social life, is more prone to receive different moral 
complexity than concrete action, since moral complexity is, in fact, generated by (linguistic) 
communication manifested in the form of action and communication. 
In this way, researches should not delimit themselves to the socio-psychological 
explanation (such as Bauman) and to the extant quantitative and qualitative methods (such as 
Bellah et al. and Putnam). Inevitably, these approaches obtain certain significant results, 
however, the focus of the research may have been already shifted to the moral discourse, in 
which the use and the meaning of the moral language (i.e. pragmatics and semantics) that 
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represent the communicative situation can describe the collective social characteristics more 
precisely. 
The level of analysis undergoes changes correspondingly. Formalization of ethics and 
morality is the approach adopted by both Habermas and Luhmann, inasmuch as substantive 
analysis of communication would be less productive to understand the general picture of 
sociology of ethics and morality. Undeniably, substantive meaning and value of discourse 
participants are crucial for discourse analysis, yet what articulates these particular meanings 
and values is the procedure of justice. At the extreme of this tendency, according to Luhmann, 
only forms are relevant to the discipline. That is to say, form is the ground and means to 
conceive substantive elements—as complexity一by way of systemic self-construction of 
operation. In short, theoretical abstraction is indispensable for explanation of social 
complexity, even if moral phenomena are characterized with intense substantive meanings 
and values. 
Divergence of their sociologies of ethics and morality appears at their conception of 
social order. From Habermas's perspective, social order is possible by virtue of the fact that 
moral order can be maintained, reproduced, and revised according to human interest. Norms 
nourished by lifeworld consensus are crucial for the continuation of social life, that is, to 
perpetuate the "taken-for-grantedness". Additionally, abnormality can be redeemed by rational 
discourse to bring the problematized abnormal state back to what is normal. Without doubt, 
this circularity can be distorted by power and money, yet Habermas separates the necessary 
coupling between theory and reality to reserve the idealizing tendency of his sociology of 
ethics and morality. 
The normative social order that Habermas aspired to does not have the same effect in 
Luhmann's case. Since autopoiesis and the functional requirements of complexity reduction 
have already fulfilled the conditions of social order, ethics and morality as the obsolete 
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semantics and functional codes are thus formalized, functionalized and marginalized in the 
world of systems. In this way, in this new social ontology reason and morality are not the crux 
of the matter of social order, such that the dynamic between normal and abnormal state of 
society is mediated not by reason nor morality but self-referential communications. This 
non-normative conception of social order may provide a new possibility for sociology of 
ethics and morality, inasmuch as the marginalization of ethics and morality in contemporary 
society is witnessed. 
Regarding the recursivity of normal and abnormal social order, both Habermas's and 
Luhmann's sociology of ethics and morality points to the reflexivity of social life.‘ 
Communicative action and rational discourse are both reflective and reflexive. By adopting 
Ulrich Beck's terminology (Beck 1992), reflectivity pertains to conscious self-reflection and 
self-observation. This line of argument can be found in the advocacy of reflectivity by Alvin 
Gouldner, Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu, and in this case, only the agent of 
reflectivity is changed from sociologists and social actors to participants of a discourse. 
Speakers in discourse consciously doubt the validity claims given and at the same time justify 
validity claims they give. In this respect, rationality and morality are the means and grounds 
for argumentation. Nevertheless, unconscious reflexivity also constitutes a part of Habermas's 
theory. Inasmuch as speakers are endowed with linguistic competence, social life continues 
without consciously avowal of rational discourse. The irritation of "unreasonableness" 
provokes rational justification reflexively and recursive to-and-fro discussions mediated by 
communicative action between lifeworlds are undertaken. 
For the case of Luhmann, reflexivity is understood in terms of self-reference, in which 
human consciousness does not pertain to the social systems. Rather, consciousness resides in 
‘Although Haan et al. have already avowed the reflexive nature of social science to deal with moral issues 
(Haan et al. 1983), most of them only construe reflexivity as the resolution of the double hermeneutic situation 
when one inquires moral phenomenon. 
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the psychic systems should not be confused with social systems, which are mediated by 
different operations. Thus, social order is reproduced by communication and psychic order is 
perpetuated by self-referential consciousness. Ethics and morality, in this regard, split into 
substantive morality (e.g. moral feeling and moral sentiments) which are attributed to psychic 
system, and the formal side of ethics and morality are functionalized to contribute to the 
reproduction of social order as one of the functional equivalences to reduce complexity. In 
short, incessant second-order observations constitute reflexive communication without any 
normative elements, and this non-normative and reflexive social order perhaps explains the 
perpetuation of amoral social order. 
The goal of this thesis has been achieved to a large extent. The essential elements of a 
sociology of ethics and morality are abstracted from Habermas's and Luhmann's sociologies, 
and through a comparison between their theories at a metatheoretical level, four general 
tendencies of the sociology of ethics and morality, and their convergence and divergence are 
found. It is too dogmatic to claim that sociology of ethics and morality should follow these 
perspectives, notwithstanding as a reference point, it is worthwhile to illustrate the possible 
condition of establishing this new sub-discipline in contemporary society. Modem sociology 
together with its ontology, perhaps is inadequate to handle the contemporary complex moral 
situations, and this thesis may contribute to this endeavour to somewhat extent. 
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